16 NAVY NEWS, MAY 2010

Cool appraisal of Cold Response

Lt Cdr Jools Haigh is a post-charge Pusser currently working as the

experience of a Norwegian winter exercise. Here is his account of the exercise.

I’VE heard all about winter exercises in Norway before, but never had the opportunity

to participate myself.

Now I’ve finally had the chance to see it for real. Over four weeks I saw the

fjords, the snowy mountains and the spectacular Northern Lights; but the detail and complexity of the exercise itself was a mystery to this dark-blue Pusser. In working it all out I’ve had the

following thoughts. The scenario could be taken from the recent history of any failing state – an unrepresentative government of an impoverished country (Eastland), struggling to find its way in a post 9/11 world, making a land grab to gain natural resources and a deep-water port. At its disposal was a Soviet-era

military, an extensive propaganda effort and the support of a part- time terrorist outfit calling itself the Eastland Tigers. To counter this the UN Security Council issued a resolution giving NATO and an alliance of Scandinavian countries the lead in returning the invaded territory back to its rightful government. NATO declared the creation of a task force of combined armies, air forces and navies – CTF 507. More than 8,500 people

were brought together to sweep across this frozen area of arctic Scandinavia to repel the invaders. Of this, a sizeable chunk was

maritime, which meant a fleet of ships and a landing force of light manoeuvre troops ready to regain control of the sea, storm the beach and fight their way inland to link up with the land force of the combined armies. On paper, this maritime force of 3,980 people looked simple enough, a familiar management pyramid showing clearly who had authority over whom. Tiers of HQ elements planned and managed the actions of ships, helicopters, boats and people to ensure the correct ‘effect’, with each subordinate level adding greater detail to the plan. ‘Effect’, by the way, isn’t shock

and awe style destruction; it is the erosion of the enemy’s will to fight using all the tools at our disposal. The biggest tools in this box

were some (necessarily assertive) weapons and the warriors that wielded them. However, political and legal

advisors and media specialists were also embarked to exercise the not-inconsiderable influence of ‘soft power’.

This sizeable military force was not an off-the-shelf, ready-to-go

Maritime Logistician for Commander UK Amphibious Forces.

As such he recently returned from Exercise Cold Response 2010 – his first

train set.

In reality it was created at a pen stroke in NATO HQ and, once given a name, it filled up with appropriately-trained personnel and the kit needed to equip this complicated system of groups. The make-up of this force was not simple.

international maritime component was, perhaps surprisingly,

In charge of the significant not

an admiral but Maj Gen Buster Howes RM. As the two-star Commander of UK Amphibious Forces, his 55-strong HQ is made up of a majority of Royals, whose amphibious and littoral knowledge was supplemented by specialist naval and air staff, some of them American, officers.

French and Dutch

When deployed away from Whale Island, his staff is further augmented by another 42 personnel, many of them reservists with specific, specialised skills. For this exercise, Maj Gen

Howes and his 97 staff were embarked in the Dutch amphibious assault ship HNLMS Johan de Witt, a highly-capable vessel with a two-spot flight deck, a large dock for landing craft, cavernous load space and accommodation for up to 400 amphibious forces and their equipment. The impressive ship’s large,

integrated and technologically- advanced command centre enabled Maritime HQ staff to receive the flood of information from the battlefield,

develop

contingency plans, make decisions and then issue cogent orders. Rapid connectivity and good IT meant their decision-making process was

significantly faster

than that of the enemy – and maintaining the initiative is key. In that way Maj Gen Howes and his staff effectively stage-managed the building blocks, the groups of ships (amphibious platforms, two escort groups and a group of mine countermeasures vessels) and the brigade of international troops. Each group had its own HQ and for this exercise assault ship HMS Albion happened to be carrying the two most significant teams. Cdre Paul Bennett was in charge

of the Amphibious Task Group, a variety of some 120 regular and reservist specialists. Also on board was Brig Ed Davis

RM, the commander of some 750 – mostly Royals – including 200 of his own HQ staff. This was the business end of the landing forces, the backbone being 45 Cdo RM, and alongside them were the 200-strong Commando

l A Dutch landing craft operates from HNLMS Johan de Witt, and (below) Wave Knight on a replenishment in a heavy blizzard

Support Group, 50 or so artillery specialists from the Army’s 29 Cdo, 60 staff of 24 Regt Engineers and a company of 120 personnel from the 2/25 US Marines. The complexity of managing this formidable force was not helped by the fact it was scattered throughout the task group which, as well as Albion and Johan de Witt, included helicopter carrier HMS Ocean and the capable Mounts Bay which, although operated by the RFA, finds herself a long way up-threat.

This might sound highly organised and compartmentalised, but these military personnel do not think in such rigid terms. They had been called in to represent their area of specialisation and for the exercise they came together in this system of teams in order to complete the task. The scenario in Cold Response 2010 called for the fleet to fight its way into Vesterfjorden and on to liberate Narvik while under attack from enemy forces in submarines, fast attack boats and fighter- bomber aircraft.

Then they had to cope with

floating minefields and terrorist arms smuggling operations amongst local shipping. The ‘enemy’ were the Norwegian

armed forces, who relished the opportunity to have a go at their allies and attempt to get one over. For the initial three days, the

naval contingent had to fight to protect their ships, taking the opportunity to practise gunnery, damage control and fire-fighting and, for the French frigate FS L’Herre,

carry out a rare live missile fire exercise.

The amphibious landing forces spent the period in transit meticulously planning how they would overcome the enemy ashore. Far from being a D-Day style single assault, the task force dispatched raiding parties and recce teams over a period of days, often in the middle of the night when temperatures were down to -15°C or so.

These teams carry out their set

of tasks and are then withdrawn back to the ships to warm up, re-configure and de-brief. Eventually,

after intelligence

had been gathered and a variety of enemy positions ‘neutralised’, the force conducted its main effort. That meant putting troops and equipment ashore in three locations simultaneously for a three-day effort to link up with their Army allies and push the enemy back into their homeland. During this period the entire

l Maj Gen Buster Howes at the helm of a landing craft from HNLMS Johan de Witt

force was as active as a wasps’ nest poked with a stick. The volume of traffic around the fleet from ship to shore

was hugely impressive – large amounts of troops, vehicles and equipment were ferried to and fro in surprisingly fast landing craft (six big LCUs that can carry 60 tonnes or 90 troops plus kit and 12 smaller LCVPs designed to ferry 30 people at speeds of up to 26 knots). Helicopters shuttle about with

artillery pieces under-slung while the enormous mexeflote, a giant powered raft, took the heavy equipment ashore. Again, most of this happened in the dead of the cold Arctic night. Once ashore the landing forces had to fight their way to their objective – the ‘enemy’

had

the benefit of local knowledge, familiarity with the climate and complex defensive positions. It’s fair to say the fight doesn’t all go the way of the allies. Some teams found themselves

overwhelmed by the enemy and ‘lifted’ – removed from the exercise to spend a few hours in the care of the Norwegian Army. Nevertheless the force pushed through, mostly on skis carrying enormous personal loads (35kg or over 70lbs) plus weapons. It’s worth mentioning that the cold there simply cannot be compared to a UK winter’s day. Personnel ashore expended most of their energy just keeping themselves safe and mobile in the deep snow – having to remove a glove to pull something out of a pocket can be a serious undertaking in such conditions. Once they got to their given

objective they then needed to find the strength to engage and destroy the enemy. It’s no wonder that the

l A Dutch landing craft approaches HMS Albion

Pictures: Cdr Dave Burns (COMUKAMPHIBFOR)

commandos have to be amongst the fittest and strongest in the Armed Forces.

At the end of the three-day assault the battle was won and, although the war continued to be planned, the exercise came to an abrupt halt. After many months of planning,

weeks on task and days in the field, the whole thing was over. Kit was re-stowed back on the ships, the land forces were brought

back into the warm to be washed and fed.

And that was the end of Task

Force 507; this leviathan was snuffed out and its personnel moved on to their next period of training, exercising or operations. I go back to my regular job

with COMUKAMPHIBFOR on Whale Island; never again will I look on blankly when others in the mess talk about the exploits of the ‘Arctic Fox’. Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48