FOREFRONT: Think like Soldiers, Act like Cops
Police offi cers used liability-based tactics (LBT) while soldiers must react to reality-based tactics (RBT).
Islamist terrorist organizations such as Al- Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are not hampered by budgets that re- strict, or even eliminate training. T is was made very clear in 2002 when a copy of the Al-Qaeda training manual was discovered in the United Kingdom. T is manual does not teach report writing, ethics, or criminal law; it teaches how to kidnap, kill, and terrorize. While all Islamist terrorist organizations may not necessarily use this manual, it certainly establishes a baseline for other Islamist ter- rorist organizations to emulate in their own training camps.
In reality, they train to kill all non-believ- ers, without prejudice, not just soldiers or law enforcement offi cers, but all non-com- batants, men women, and children. T ese
9 The Police Marksman Mar-Apr 2015
reality-based tactics (RBT) will be devastat- ing if any attack on our Homeland occurs for two reasons: State and local law enforce- ment offi cers are trained to arrest with the intent of bringing the off ender before a court of law and second, the Constitution requires that law enforcement offi cers have a solemn duty to protect civil rights. Police offi cers therefore use liability-based tactics (LBT). In short, Islamist terrorists using RBT have but one rule: kill or be killed, while law en- forcement is constitutionally bound to arrest and prosecute.
Such was the case in 2008 in Mumbai, India where members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, an Islamist terrorist group, launched 12 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks lasting four days across the city of Mumbai,
killing 164 people and wounding at least 308. Lashkar-e-Taiba utilized Fourth Gen- eration Warfare Tactics (4GW), which are generally characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, combatants and civilians. T e RBT employed in this case introduced the world to swarming tactics and the eff ectiveness of targeting the fi rst, second, and third responders.
Imagine an Islamist terrorist group si- multaneously attacking with the use of Mumbai Style tactics at a professional foot- ball game on a bright, clear Sunday, when literally thousands of fans are in the park- ing lot tailgating before the game. Before the attacks, they prepositioned Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and during the at- tacks they use swarming tactics. T en imag-
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