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five-digit annual losses for decades — why their situation gets lower priority.” Even in a budget-constrained envi-
ronment, fair treatment for survivors of servicemembers who gave their lives for their country shouldn’t be last in line for funding. Congress needs to extend and increase the SSIA in the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act.
Your Cost to O
the Military And how much does the military cost you?
ne way or another, it always ends up being about the money. For years, Pentagon
leaders have complained about person- nel costs “spiraling out of control.” MOAA’s rebuttal showed personnel and health care costs have been stable at a relatively constant 30 to 32 percent of the budget for the past 30 years. Now the comeback from Capitol Hill is,
“OK, it’s true the percentage of the budget has been constant, but the cost per person is well beyond where it used to be. What’s your answer to that?” Yes, the cost per person has risen. But so has the cost of doing everything else. In particular, the cost per ship, cost per bomb- er, cost per personnel carrier ... and cost per whatever unit of nut, bolt, service, and equipment ... is what truly has skyrocketed. For example, an aircraft carrier cost $6 billion in 2009, but the cost now has shot past $13 billion — a 117-percent in- crease in six years. The big problems with the defense budget are contract inflation, gross over- sight failures, and stunning accounting lapses on the part of those charged with managing defense programs of all kinds.
For decades, dozens of Government Ac- countability Office, Inspector General, and other reports have documented that DoD cost accounting systems are so flawed, they’re unauditable, with billions having gone unaccounted for. Massive cost over- runs have been the rule rather than the exception. But the system goes unfixed. So the bang for the procurement buck gets smaller quickly. But because the de- fense industry has built-in lobbyists with deep pockets, and because legislators with plants and jobs in their districts have vested interests in keeping even wasteful contracts alive, the target gets shifted to people programs. There aren’t any big campaign contri- butions supporting people programs, so they’re easy to attack. And DoD leaders have shown little hesitation in selectively using numbers to make it look like people are the problem. One popular way has been to use the
year 2000 as a starting point to measure cost growth — conveniently forgetting that was a retention low point brought on by more than a decade of pay, health care, re- tirement, and other cutbacks. The funding increases in subsequent years were need- ed to restore career retention incentives and improve readiness and quality of life. Another favorite stratagem has been to
pile every possible nickel into the calcula- tion of “cost per troop” to drive that figure as high as possible. For example, many such calculations include a present value for all future ex- pected VA disability and health care costs for Iraq and Afghanistan veterans — as if the troops were at fault for exposing themselves to combat. They almost universally include a fig-
ure for PCS costs — as if there’s a benefit value in being required to move across the country periodically and be reimbursed less than it costs you and your family
*on the web: Inim voluptat elit utpating ex etuerci eu feum eum aliquating ese feugait FEBRUARY 2016 MILITARY OFFICER 33
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