for Mr. Cheney. Norm captured the media’s attention on the enveloping plan. It was well-deserved.

What surprised you about the character or commitment of Iraqi forces at that point? First days of a ground war are always tricky because you think you know everything. As German Field Marshal [Helmuth] von Moltke put it, no plan survives fi rst contact with the enemy. It was clear to me early on that what the Iraqis chose to do was sit there. With divisions right across the bor- der in eastern Saudi Arabia, facing our troops and Marines, they were not moving. They had three or four divisions on the coast that weren’t moving. The Republican Guard, in reserve positions up toward Kuwait City, had staged themselves out [of

First days of a ground war are always tricky because you think you know everything.

the fi ght]. As we put this huge force in motion, everybody could see it moving to the west to envelop, and yet the Iraqis didn’t move. As some- body described it, they essentially had tied themselves to a stake in the ground and made it easy. That caused me some problems because the Marines wanted to do an amphibious operation on Iraqi positions on the coast. I refused.

Norm said, “No, there’s no need to lose a Marine fi ghting them on the beaches.” That caused some distress among some colleagues.

What seemed to be Iraq’s strategy? Do sufficient harm to coalition forces to win some sort of draw? That was the only hope they had. I assume that’s the hope that existed

The “Highway of Death” — the route taken by retreating Iraqi forces — is lined with demolished vehicles in this April 1991 photo.

PHOTO: TECH SGT. JOE COLEMAN, USAF

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