hobby drones? It is possible that the camera could be replaced by a small explosive device which could be flown into a sensitive facility. If it is not spotted and defeated, it could be directed towards a specific target within a nuclear site.
are terrorists just flying a kite?
However, due to their robust construction, facilities containing nuclear material are not likely to be breached. A typical US boiling water reactor has multiple layers of safety, with the containment vessel being constructed of 40mm steel, while the shield building wall is constructed of >1000mm of reinforced concrete interlaced with steel rods. These multiple layers of safety provide about four metres of strong protection. We choose not to disclose UK power reactor containment structures in this article. Other areas of a nuclear site could be vulnerable, but are equally protected by multiple layers of safety, and are difficult to fly a drone into without the signal being lost.
However, any incident on a nuclear site, even without a release into the atmosphere, will cause headline news and a perception that nuclear power is unsafe. This will cause a loss of public confidence which will take many years to regain. This is perhaps the most credible threat of all – the ‘propaganda of the deed’ and the fear it would instil of a repeat and more effective attack.
In conclusion, the technology that drones use is ever advancing. Land and sea-based drones also exist (we used to call them remotely controlled cars and boats) and similar arguments apply to these. There are even submersibles. But we propose that simpler, more conventional solutions remain the weapon of choice for the terrorist. Even if regulations are introduced to control the purchase and use of hobby drones in the future, a drone could become a delivery method for explosives. Counter measures need continuing development. But if a terrorist wants to deliver explosives into the heart of a nuclear power plant, this can be most simply done with a missile or a mortar. Unfortunately, other targets may be much more vulnerable to ‘the attack of the drones’.
been used by Greenpeace to penetrate the French reactor site at Le Bugey, without violence.
All UK nuclear facilities have a robust security infrastructure, underpinned by a strong safety and security culture. There is a dedicated armed police force for UK nuclear sites, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC). They have considerable resources to call upon.
Worldwide, work is under way to develop passive and active counter measures to a drone attack, using jamming and even counter-drone drones. A shotgun is said to work wonders too.
© CI TY S ECURI TY MAGAZ INE – S PRING 2016
Flying is strictly controlled under the Air Navigation (Restriction of Flying) (Nuclear Installations) Regulations 2007 with UK nuclear installations subject to a ‘no flying zone’. This includes flights by drones. And it is enforced: in 2014, Robert Knowles from Cumbria was fined £800 for flying a drone within 50 metres of a nuclear facility. This was the first successful prosecution by the UK Civil Aviation Authority for illegal flying of an unmanned aircraft.
Legitimate hobby drones have to be flown within these strict flying constraints, but the determined adversary will not worry about these. So how realistic is the threat from
www. c i t y s e cur i t yma ga z ine . com
Tony Peters MIstLM, AIExpE Chris Englefield CRadP, FSRP, FSyI
Nuclear Security Services
enquiries@nuclearsecurityservices.co.uk
The authors are affiliated to the Security Institute’s new Nuclear Security Special Interest Group.
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