THE CHALLENGES OF DEALING WITH TERRORISM
against the insurgency and nevertheless the enlarging crisis seemed to overwhelm the measures employed to confront it. Other measures put in place by the federal government include poverty alleviation programmes, economic development, education and social reforms. The government provided modern basic education schools for the Almajiri and established nine new federal universities in some states. Its youth empowerment programmes like YouWin were established to aggressively address the challenges of poverty. In addition, the government invested massively in infrastructure to promote economic development. At the peak of the crisis, the government set up an Administrative Panel to discuss the situation with the sect, although they refused to meet with the government team. The framework of the anti-insurgency policy of the President Goodluck Jonathan administration to confront insurgency in Nigeria included: •
The reinforcement of Nigerian Troops
• •
Putting in place the International Joint Task Force (JTF)
•
The establishment and ratification of the state Civilian JTF by the federal government Imposition of curfews
“The challenges of dealing with the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria remain daunting; just as the crisis continues to affect national development.”
•
Regulating GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) services in affected areas
•
Setting up of road blocks for security cordon and search operations. The proclamation by
President Mohammadu Buhari, head of the new government on 29 May 2015 to move the command centre of the army to Maiduguri, signifies a strengthened resolve to end the crisis in Nigeria and only time shall reveal the extent to which this decision will help in addressing the crisis.
Conclusion
The challenges of dealing with the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria remain daunting; just as the crisis continues to affect national development.
The initial handling and killing of the erstwhile leader of the sect by the Nigeria Police contributed to the escalation of insurgency in the country. It is therefore wise to review the government’s subsequent strategies towards combating the menace to include a strong local community effort. Education and civic awareness remain paramount in this quest, while adequate political will must be exerted towards this course to attract the expected success. The involvement of frontline countries like Niger, Chad and Cameroon and the support of other friendly nations (especially the G7 and AU Nations) has gone a long way in the successes recorded in the war against insurgency.
References 1
Campbell J. Boko Haram: Origins, Challenges and Responses. Policy Brief published by Norwegian PeaceBuilding Resource Centre,
October 2014 2
Adagba O., Ugwu S., Okechukwu E. (2012). Activities of Boko Haram and Insecurity Question in Nigeria. Published in Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (OMAN
Chapter) Vol. 1, No.9; April. 3
Ohiwerei, F. O. Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency/Terrorism in Business Education in Nigerian Universities. Scholarly Journal of Education Vol. 3(9), pp. 163-171, December 2014. Available online at http://
www.scholarly-journals.com/
SJE. 4
Okorie, I. (2011), “Insecurity” Consequences for Investment and
The Parliamentarian | 2015: Issue Three | 203
Employment, “The Punch, Thursday, September 9, pp37-38.
Further reading
1. Adebayo, A. A. (2014). Implications of ‘Boko Haram’ Terrorism on National Development in Nigeria: A Critical Review. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol 5, No 16. MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy. 2. Akpan F., Ekanem O., & Olofu-Adeoye A. (2014). Boko Haram Insurgency and the Counter- Terrorism Policy in Nigeria. Canadian Social Science, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2014, pp. 151-155.
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