The New Jersey Police Chief Magazine | March 2017 Continued from previous page


11. Third Party did not have authority to consent to search of bedroom. State v. Cushing 226 NJ 187 (2016) The record contains ample evidence to support the Appellate Division’s conclusion that Betty Cushing did not have actual authority to consent to the search of defendant’s room.


Betty could not have conferred through any power of attorney an authority that she did not possess herself.


In addition, it was not objectively reasonable for Officer Ziarnowski to rely on an apparent authority by Lisa Mylroie as the basis for valid third-party consent to his initial search of defendant’s bedroom.


12. NJ Supreme Court makes “plain view” car searches easier. State v. Gonzales__ NJ __ (2016) The Court now excises the inadvertence requirement from the plain-view doctrine. Because it is setting forth a new rule of law, the Court will apply the reformulated plain-view doctrine prospectively. Nevertheless, the Court holds that the trial court’s finding of inadvertence is supported by credible evidence in the record. The Court therefore reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstates the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. A -5-15


13. Protective search on house not permitted where no evidence another person present. State v. Bryant __ NJ __ (2016) The officers here lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion that another party was present, much less that another party posed a danger to officer safety. The protective sweep was thus insufficient to establish an exception to the warrant requirement, and any evidence found as a result of that sweep—even if it was found in plain view—must be excluded and suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. A-2-15


14. Driver with prior school zone DWI sentenced as 2nd Offender. State v. Wheatley __ NJ Super. __ (App. Div. 2016)


Distinguishing State v. Reiner, 180 N.J. 307 (2004), the court held that a defendant who was previously convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI) in a school zone in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(g) is subject to the increased penalties applicable to second offenders under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(2) when he was subsequently convicted of a conventional DWI in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). A-5026-14T1


15. Town outside surveillance camera not subject to OPRA but maybe subject to common law. Gilleran v. Township of Bloomfield__ NJ __ (2016) Compelling release on demand of security surveillance video would be contrary to the legislative intent motivating OPRA’s exemptions based on security concerns. The Township’s explanation for denying the request for the footage was adequate. Requests


for video from surveillance cameras protecting public facilities are


better analyzed under the common law right of access. The Court therefore reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and remands the matter for further proceedings based on the unresolved common law claim. A-15-15


16. Twitter statement admissible in criminal trials. State v Hannah __ NJ Super. __ (App. Div. 2016) Defendant was charged with hitting the victim in the face with her shoe. At trial, the State introduced a screenshot taken by the victim of a "tweet" allegedly posted by defendant after the incident saying "shoe to ya face." Defendant argues that this Twitter posting was improperly admitted into evidence, citing a Maryland case requiring that such social media postings must be subjected to a greater level of authentication. The Appellate Di- vision rejects that contention, holding that New Jersey's current standards for authentication are adequate to evaluate social media postings. Under those standards, it was not an abuse of discretion to admit the tweet based on the presence of defendant's photo and Twitter handle, its content containing information specific to the parties involved, and its nature as a reply to the victim's communications. A-5741-14T3


17. No obstruction for failure to provide DL for parking ticket. State v Powers __ NJ Super. __ (App. Div. 2016) Defendant was convicted after a trial in municipal court, and again on appeal to the Law Division, of obstruction based on both physical interference and an "independently unlawful act." N.J.S.A. 2C: 29-1(a). The court remanded for


findings that might illuminate the judge's 34


conclusory determination that defendant Continued on next page


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