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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have already demonstrated their ability to establish firm links with groups like Boko Haram (in Nigeria) and Al Shabaab (in Somalia). But they have also expressed their ability and willingness to move into some of the voids left as a result of the Arab Spring uprisings. With the events still taking place in Libya and Syria, it is possible that Al Qaeda could establish new footholds in these states which are in various transitional stages.


Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular continue to plot and conduct attacks against targets, ostensibly within Yemen though they have dispatched attackers and devices against Western targets outside the region. For example, the printer cartridge IEDs of October 2010, intercepted at East Midlands Airport in the UK.


So the host society where the terrorist chooses to locate and the legitimacy of how it is perceived is a good indication of how effective they may become.


The second influence lies in governments’ responses. Where border control is tight and security responses work hand-in-hand with local communities to deter the terrorist, we can expect to see heavily suppressed organised terrorist activity. The ideology and threat however remains very real, transferred through social media and worldwide personal communications. In more secure states, we can increasingly expect to see attacks from lone individuals or small relatively unsophisticated groups who are unable to draw upon a comprehensive support infrastructure. Our intelligence and alerts need to reflect this very different profile and our response plans need to consider the type and method of attack in a different way also.


The advent of the lone actor terrorist is indicative of the future threat we face. Indeed looking at the USA, there have been five examples of probable lone actors since July 2011. The question for intelligence agencies is how to identify these threats which may not readily be apparent through conventional monitoring methods.


As to the other threats facing us, I believe the advent of last year’s “Occupy” movements in London, New York and Europe and Australia and their anti-capitalist drive, which at present remains limited to peaceful and lawful protest, could in the long term pose an enduring threat which may inspire some factions to violence. Whilst many nations continue to be


affected by the financial downturn and associated austerity measures, resentment and frustration could prove to be a fertile breeding ground for the anti-capitalism movement. The speed with which the Occupy movement spread from Wall Street, to London and across numerous other cities and countries was quite remarkable.


The challenge for governments is not only in recognising emerging threats but responding in such a way that balances the rights of individuals. Known terrorists or terrorist sympathisers will always warrant a proportionate response. However, the lone activist or extremists who consider violent criminal action to justify their otherwise lawful right to protest, present more challenging issues. Those governments who are thinking ahead will be considering how best to manage the necessary intelligence gathering to identify such individuals in a manner that also protects the rights of the lawful majority.


Being mindful of how threats might start to change shouldn’t just be limited to the individuals and how they might attack. We have recognised over the last decade how fund raising, communications and training are vitals element of terrorist enterprise.


Within the City of London, in addition to our focus on counter terrorism, we are the lead police force in the UK for economic crime. There is a significant change taking place within the world of internet enabled crime. Cyber attacks either sponsored by the state or the criminal are now becoming so intrusive and potentially damaging that the UK has listed this threat as one of the most serious the country faces, alongside terrorism. We


shouldn’t rule out how the aspiring terrorist might look to use this form of attack either in place of or alongside conventional methods.


And it’s not simply the technical cyber attacks, but also the increasing volume of economic crime and indeed the number of criminals becoming involved in fraud. Over 30% of the organised crime gangs in the UK are now using fraud as a means of making money. Why? Because the whole of society is going on line and there are rich pickings to be made with low risk. We should be mindful as we start to future proof our terrorist response that we recognise how future terrorist fund raising and indeed attack planning may start to take shape. You don’t need to be a computer scientist to know that the internet will be involved.


Whilst the threats we face continue to evolve and change I am confident that the structures we have developed and put in place in the UK will be robust and flexible enough to adapt to these challenges.


Our risk assessment needs to be constantly “future proofing” the new potential threat and this must feed the equally important strands of prevention, target hardening, responding to attacks, but most importantly the never-ending search to influence the underlying motivation of the terrorist.


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