The car at the centre of the controversy is the 2010 Lotus T127, built in record time by a team headed by Mike Gascoyne. The car was the best of the new teams that season but, when pictures of the Aerolab-built wind tunnel model were released (right), it was fitted with parts of the Force India VJM02 wind tunnel model, including the tyres and crash helmet. Interestingly, the Force India tyres were in fact the wrong shape for a 2010 model
and its operational staff). The 50 per cent model was
modified to suit the Aerolab tunnel, a process that involved creating a new central spine. A secure FTP connection was also established between Midland (which by then was morphing into Spyker) at Silverstone and Aerolab so that both aerodynamic teams had freely flowing aerodynamic and CAD data. Lola had resolved its tunnel’s
shortcomings shortly after the start of the 2007 grand prix season, so Spyker took advantage, instigating a parallel
the High Court. Not long after Gascoyne’s
departure, Force India decided that running two parallel aerodynamic development programmes, one in the UK and one in Italy, was too expensive and logistically challenging to be sustainable. It was therefore decided that Aerolab’s contract would not be renewed in 2010. Aerolab was by this point
strugglng to collect payment for its services on time from Force India and so, by January, instigated a payment plan to clear the outstanding balance.
“The deal included stringent confidentiality clauses”
that Midland, which at the time was ahead of Super Aguri in the world championship, could benefit from the expertise of Aerolab’s staff, who could assess and develop the entire aerodynamic concept of the car, and essentially reinforce Midland’s aerodynamic department. A development deal was signed, which would run from the end of 2006 until the end of 2009. The cost of the development was agreed at €246,833 (£206,200 /
$328,700) per month in 2008 and €253,400 (£211,625 / $337,400) per month in 2009. The deal included stringent confidentiality clauses, as would be expected. For example, if work was being done for the team then no employee of any competitor would be allowed on site. There was also a further condition that Aerolab and its employees could not work for any other Formula 1 team in a development role (though other teams could still use the tunnel
aerodynamic programme there using a second model, up until June of that year when its own tunnel came back on stream. At the end of the 2007 season, another change of ownership saw Spyker become Force India.
AERODYNAMIC CHANGES Part way through 2008, the FIA released the 2009 regulations, which saw substantial changes to the aerodynamic specification. In March 2008, Aerolab staff started work on what would become the Force India VJM02, with the diffuser and rear wing being the major areas of focus. At the end of the year, Gascoyne left Force India, and it seems this was the first step on the road to
But barely a month later, Force India defaulted, leaving Aerolab again out of pocket. So much so that, at one point in March, Aerolab stopped work due to non- payment, but re-started when the team needed some development work done on the diffuser and cleared two outstanding invoices in order to facilitate this. Force India claimed it was
short of funds due to a late shareholder payment, but it was becoming clear that Force India did not want to use Aerolab any more. Updates to the VJM02 model were few and far between and the Silverstone engineers stopped sending updated geometry from its own wind tunnel sessions to their
May 2012 •
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