safety piracy
the program, the CEP is “now in the final stages of sorting out the final challenges that will allow us to go and buy naval assets and start building the organisation. There are two key remaining challenges: flag state is one and funding is another. Once we have resolved those challenges I think we can move fairly quickly.” The CEP has already been working with a shipmanagement company (Dobson Ship Management) in anticipation of taking in naval vessels. “We heard recently from EU Navfor, the European Union naval force policing the Gulf of Aden, that they have 48 per cent fewer assets on the ground versus this time last year. So I think there is not going to be a government initiative without end. Our initiative would allow the warships that are on station from the various independent navies, the Nato force, EU Navfor and so on to be redeployed into the greater Indian Ocean and to tackle the problem where it is becoming more serious. The Security Association for the Maritime
Industry (SAMI) has been set up as an independent regulatory trade association for maritime security companies. Presently SAMI is working on an accreditation programme for security companies in line with the IMO revised Maritime Safety Committee circular 1405 and uphold circulars 1406 and 1408 as well as additional industry best practices. The programme being formulated has three phases: due diligence of the company’s commercial standing, practices and supporting documentation; an office verification of the administrative, logistical and operational procedures to ensure that maritime security operations are conducted to a professional standard; and finally checks of deployed teams to ensure that company procedures are being followed. In practice, of course, owners are already, and have for a long time, been hiring armed
THE INCIDENCE OF ATTACKS ON TANKERS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA/INDIAN OCEAN FOR THE YEAR-TO-DATE
Failed
Hijacked Total
80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Crude oil tankers Chem/product tankers 29 3
39 3
32 42
LPG Tankers 4 0 4
Total 72 6
78
Failed
Hijacked Total
guards. Assuring their quality is a key challenge and responsibility. IMO held the first meeting of its Intersessional Maritime and Piracy Working Group in September. A key outcome was the release of new guidance and recommendations on the use of privately contracted armed security personnel. IMO has also been working on facilitating the passage of armed guards and weapons on merchant ships. For Jonathan Pethen of security consultancy Securewest International, armed security teams and initiatives like the convoy escort programme are a viable solution. They not only act as a visual and physical deterrent to the pirates, but also offer a very visible sign to the crew of the owner’s efforts to take measures to protect them.
An intelligent citadel
Intelligent Engineering is applying its sandwich plate system (SPS), more commonly associated with vessel repairs, for citadels or saferooms on ships. These bolt-holes offer crew refuge if they are hijacked and lose control of the vessel. SPS comprises two metal plates bonded
to a solid elastomer core: it can provide effective support for a main deck, inner hull and longitudinal bulkheads, preventing local plate buckling and eliminating the need for stiffeners. On the citadels the SPS panels are typically
located approximately 100mm inside the existing doorway and can be installed on new construction vessels or retrofitted on existing vessels. The SPS system comprises a solid steel frame, SPS panels and clamps. The solid steel frame is straightforward to install and is constructed from standard steel
32 I Tanker Shipping & Trade I October/November 2011
profiles. The frame is fully welded around the existing doorway and the SPS panels are then secured against the frame using specially designed clamps. The SPS barrier can either be constructed from a single hinged SPS panel or interlocking SPS panels that are manhandled into position. Once installed, the SPS barrier creates
a detail free surface that can be rapidly deployed within 2 minutes. The panels swing/ lift into position and are tightly secured. When closed, the SPS panels create an extremely strong barrier that can withstand far higher impact loads than equivalent steel structures with superb blast protection against ballistics and shrapnel damage. In the event the boundary is pierced by a bullet, the opening will reseal behind the projectile to retain a closed boundary.
“However, as the old saying goes, the door is
only as strong as its lock. ”With the increased attention to piracy, a number of security companies have popped up that are offering “solutions” that actually can put the owner more at risk. “Unfortunately, a lot of shipowners contact a security provider and only wish to know price and speed at which a security team can be provided.” As such, Mr Pethen says the company has received calls from shipping companies who had security teams either being held at port for not understanding weapons laws, delaying the vessel, or in one case showing up to defend the vessel with crossbows. Ince & Co lawyer Stephen Askins, who has
been involved in ransom negotiations for a number of years and worked on some of the industry’s highest profile cases, agrees there is a real problem within the industry of trying to impose some accountability and a general industry standard which would allow some shipowners to exercise due diligence in making sure that “the people who go on their ships, particularly if they are armed, are up to the task and haven’t just been medically discharged from the military for being unsuitable for carrying weapons, which has happened!” Danish owner Maersk has gone one step
further on the security issue by recruiting an anti-piracy manager to head its own anti-piracy co-ordination programme. Henrik Ehlers Kragh has a background in the Danish military. This role, as the programme’s title implies, includes internal dialogue with crews and masters as well as external contact with national and international partners and interest groups. This interaction forms the basis of recommendations for future countermeasures. Such positions are likely to become increasingly standard in the months and years ahead. TST
www.tankershipping.com
Crude oil tankers Chem/product tankers LPG Tankers Total
MaRisk by Risk Intelligence
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