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Case Name/Case #


Appellant C ounsel/ Area of Law


Systalex Corporation Benjamin Chew, Esq. v. Virginia Callahan 202-457-6000 453-1279


Business Litigation


Judge/ Jurisdiction The Honorable William J. Rowan, III


Circuit Court for Montgomery County


Issues


The corporate appellant argues that its former officer took a corporate opportunity for a competitor of the entity to benefit himself. It is alleged that while employed as an officer of Systalex, the appellee lobbied a government contracting officer and obtained a contract for a competitor of Systalex. It’s alleged that this was done during working hours while the officer was being paid by Systalex, using contacts devel- oped by Systalex and a false resume which suggested that the officer was no longer employed by Systalex. The question is whether the trial court was correct in


granting summary judgment to the appellee. The appellant alleges that the trial court improperly weighed competing evidence to determine that Systalex did not wish to pursue the corporate opportunity at issue and that Systalex had a contractual obligation with a third party which prevented it from pursing the corporate opportunity in any event. The appellant suggests that the resolution of these issues was for the jury.


Linda Jones v. Rebecca Leigh Bannister 554-1070


C. Williams Michaels, Esq. 410-321-5770


Motor Vehicle Accident/ Negligence


The Honorable


David A. Boynton Circuit Court for


Montgomery County


This case involves the fatal collision between a car and a bicycle at an intersection. The parties dispute the state of the traffic control light at the intersection and whether the car had a red or green light. The individual on the bicycle was crossing the road and within the crosswalk when struck by the automobile. The trial court granted summary judg- ment for the driver of the automobile holding that the boulevard rule applied to those riding bicycles as well as other automobiles. The defense also argued that the traffic light was green


that the automobile driver was the favored driver and that, as a result, she is entitled to the presumption that the bicycle driver was contributory negligent as a matter of law for not yielding to her vehicle. Therefore, the defense argued below that it is irrelevant whether or not the driver was exceeding the speed limit at the time of the collision a fact, also in dispute. The primary issue on appeal is whether or not the bou-


levard rule applies to a person riding a bicycle or only other automobiles. The appellant also argues that the boulevard rule does not apply because the bicycle rider was merely crossing the street and not “entering a favored roadway from an unfavored roadway”.


Winter 2009


Trial Reporter


65


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