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sia (which has been an inconsistent ally in attempting to keep Iran from developing a weapon) to veto reim- position of sanctions. The biggest weakness of the

agreement is that the restrictions, particularly on uranium enrichment, start coming off in years 10 and 15. It would have been preferable for this time period to be longer. But the most important elements of the agreement are inspections and in- trusive monitoring to prevent Iran’s attempts to covertly produce a weap- on. Those stay in place forever. No other realistic option buys

13 to 15 years with a breakout time that is longer than today — not even military action. Fifteen years is a long time in the Middle East. Let’s not forget that, even after 15 years, all of the options the U.S. has today will still be on the table.

It is true some of the $100 bil- lion that Iran receives after it has implemented the key provisions of the agreement may go toward ter- rorism, but most will go toward repairing Iran’s economy. The sanc- tions on Iran, and the economic turmoil brought on by those sanc- tions, threatened the very stability of Iran’s regime. It was that threat that brought Iran’s leadership to the table. Iran’s leadership’s highest priority will be putting the Iranian economy back on its feet. A few billion dollars in extra funds to Iranian terrorism can be countered through a more aggres- sive policy of training partner spe- cial operations forces, intelligence sharing, joint covert action, and in- terdiction policies. But what would be much more difficult to counter is an Iran that is

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— Ilan Goldenberg is director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C. He is a foreign policy and defense expert with exten- sive government experience covering Iran’s nuclear program, the Palestin- ian-Israeli-conflict, and the broader challenges facing the Middle East.

agreed to release an estimated $100 billion to $150 billion in Iranian funds held in escrow, dismantle the sanctions regime built through a decade of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, and readmit Iran to the global financial system. This is like disarming a knife-wielding assailant by handing him a bazooka: No one should be surprised when the region turns from bad to worse. Undoubtedly, as the Obama admin-

istration has argued, substantial sums also will flow into the Iranian econo- my — and thus, to the Iranian Revo- lutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is more than a special military force; it is also an industrial empire whose tentacles reach into all aspects of the economy. Perhaps someday, moderates will be on the ascendancy in Iran. But as Henry Kissinger and George Shultz have argued, “What

PHOTOS: RIGHT, COURTESY THE HUDSON INSTITUTE; TOP, COURTESY THE CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

gives us the confidence that we will prove more astute at predicting Iran’s domestic course than Vietnam’s, Afghanistan’s, Iraq’s, Syria’s, Egypt’s or Libya’s?” By dismantling the sanc- tions regime, the U.S. not only surren- ders its leverage but also strengthens Iran’s hardliners. Nuclear program. In return, the

JCPOA constrains Iran’s enrichment activities and requires the refitting of its plutonium reactor in Arak. However, even if Iran abides by the terms of the agreement — a dubious assumption, given Iran’s record of flouting its international obligations — the JCPOA contains a fatal flaw: It grants Iran an industrial-scale nucle- ar enrichment program tied to a sun- set clause of approximately 10 years. Moreover, after a maximum of eight years, Iran is permitted to fine-tune its ballistic

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— Peter Rough is a fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., where he researches a wide range of national security issues and alternate geopolitical futures. A former associ- ate director in the White House Office of Strategic Initiatives, he also served as director of research in the Office of George W. Bush.

MARCH 2014 MILITARY OFFICER 55

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