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Ambiguous Deadly Force Decisions Under Stress: Josh Shemenski’s Second Shooting


Tell Us About It! Police Marksman intends to run an “Offi cer Down”


article every few months. In order to obtain incidents that provide clear and relevant case studies, we would like to draw from our largest available resource—you, the reader. If you have, or can obtain, factual informa- tion on actual incidents you think we can use, please contact Brian at:


7412 Lynn Grove Ct. Hazelwood, MO 63042 E-mail: pmbrianod@charter.net Tel. 314/921-6977 (call collect) Cell: 314/941-2651


ABOUT THE AUTHOR


Brian McKenna is a retired lieutenant from the Hazelwood (Mo.) Police Department, where he served in patrol, traffic, mobile reserve and training. He is a 32-year police veteran, with a strong background as a police trainer at both the recruit and in-service levels, and served his department as lead firearms instructor as well as in various other training functions. He is a state certified police instructor, a certified force science analyst, and holds a Master’s Degree in human resource development. Brian is a member of ILEETA and IALEFI, writes extensively on officer safety topics, and trains police officers nationwide in winning mindset and other topics related to officer safety. His book, Offi cer Down: Lessons from the Streets, is based on this column and is only available for purchase on his website. Contact him at pmbrianod@charter.net or visit his website at www.we-training.com.


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would probably have been misunderstood by the media and public, and hard to explain in court. In fact, depending upon how his deci- sion was articulated and the perspective of the judge or jury deciding the case, it’s possible that it would have been seen as not being a se- rious enough threat to justify the use of deadly force, especially in some of the more liberal parts of the country. T is is not to say that Deputy Shemenski’s decision was the wrong one, because there would have been good rea- son to fear for his life if Rusk had gone for the shotgun or charged him. But the point here is that the situation fell into one of those grey areas in which the need for deadly force is ambiguous. Most deadly force decisions are relatively simple to make (e.g., an armed perpetrator points a gun at you; so you shoot him), but not always. In this case, Shemenski came uncomfortably close to having to make one of those “but not always” decisions. T e reason why this kind of decision re- quires even more mental fl exibility than Sh- emenski’s earlier decision not to shoot Mr. Rusk is that it involves more than just cor- rectly observing and identifying a potential threat. In addition, it involves making a cru- cial judgment about an ambiguous legal issue


42 The Police Marksman Sep-Oct 2014


that would be diffi cult to make under even the most favorable circumstances. Worse, the observations and other factors that go into making that judgment are often dangerously incomplete and/or rapidly changing. In such high-stress situations with lives on the line, it’s easy to make a mistake that can have far- reaching consequences for everyone involved. So, what can we do about this problem? First, as with any other decision requiring mental fl exibility under stress, the ability to make appropriate decisions in ambigu- ous deadly force situations can be improved through stress reduction, increased con- fi dence, enhanced observation skills, and proper training.


Among these, training is the most impor- tant, but it must go far beyond the training required to develop any other kind of mental fl exibility. T e training should begin with the establishment of a solid foundation of knowl- edge regarding department policy, statutory law, and case law related to police use of force. Well thought-out classroom lectures that encourage questions and discussion can be used to build this foundation, but this is just the beginning. T e goal is to develop an understanding of use-of-force law that is suf-


fi ciently in-depth to enable offi cers to respond appropriately to a wide range of tough, real world situations, and this cannot be achieved with classroom lectures alone. Much more is needed. Case studies about actual incidents involving questionable use of force, followed by in-depth classroom discussions about why the offi cer’s actions were justifi ed or unjusti- fi ed, are one very eff ective way to do this. An- other is to thoroughly study and discuss key court decisions regarding use of force, starting with the two landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Tennessee v Garner and Graham v Connor. T is encourages deep thought and helps offi cers gain a better understanding of the way the courts view and analyze use of force by police.


Finally, this knowledge should be honed to


a fi ne edge through the use of scenario-based training that requires offi cers to make tough use-of-force decisions. Scenarios that chal- lenge observation skills (e.g., distinguishing between a cell phone and a handgun) aren’t good enough. Trainees should also be put into tough situations in which they must make increasingly more challenging shoot/ don’t shoot decisions under stress. T ey will no doubt make some mistakes, but the time


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