SBC1 - SEPARATION OF POWERS IN SMALL STATES
Adequate funding of the Judiciary is vital given they are the cornerstone of democracy that Small States rely upon.
Ms Heidi Jean Soulsby, Guernsey, said that for Commonwealth states to have progressive constitutions, the adequate resources in respect of the judicial system has to be funded without hesitation, and compromising the judicial system will aggravate the culture of impunity.
Unlawful practices are not prosecuted as long as state institutions supporting democracy, such as the judicial system, are not supported by those charged with public mandates.
It is against this backdrop that the Judiciary is significant to ensuring that the supreme law of the country is adhered to by every citizen. It becomes apparent that citizens are treated equal before the law despite their social status in a particular society or historical background. Above all, democracy is consolidated when neither of these powers (Legislature, Executive and Judiciary) abuses its responsibilities over others.
Recommendations from the session
also strengthen accountability through the system of checks and balances.
Shri Mata Prasad Pandey, MLA, Uttar Pradesh, indicated that Small States find it difficult to hold the Executive body accountable. Concerns in these small states occur when the Executive does not respond on time to the Auditor-General and the Executive authority exert adverse influence through powers supposed to promote good governance. A failure to hold the Executive accountable through democratic
means is a huge challenge facing Commonwealth developing countries. Hon. Patricia Gordon-Pamplin, JP, MP, argued that for governments to show accountability, it has to allow other state institutions, especially independent ones, to scrutinize its performance. Furthermore, accountability becomes a reality when state institutions (separation of powers) supporting democracy interact effectively and efficiently as assigned by the constitution. Mr M.R Pheto, MP, Botswana, raised the issue of contract
appointments for judges. Appointing extraordinary judges in this manner compromises the responsibilities of the judicial system. It allowed the executive body to take advantage for the Judiciary given that changes of personnel within a short period of time does not guarantee the effectiveness of the Judiciary. Further, it emerged that some Small States do not have enough resources to support the Judiciary. This is worrying given such institutions could not provide productive outcomes resulting from insufficient facilities.
Recommendation One: “As a parliamentary officer, the Auditor-General’s appropriation should be approved by the Parliament and not just by the executive to ensure their independence.” Recommendation Two: “Parliament should be amenable to embracing greater general oversight from other Commonwealth Parliamentary colleagues and committees, and should facilitate this interface with the requisite amenities.” Recommendation Three: “Parliaments should ensure that judicial appointments should normally be permanent, where contract appointments are inevitable, such appointments should be subject to appropriate security of tenure.”
While the first recommendation was endorsed by the participants, recommendations two and three were noted.
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