FOOD CHAIN SECURITY
Unintentional contamination of the food chain due to negligence, such as the fatal
E.Coli outbreak in Germany in June 2011, can cause many fatalities and severe disruption to food supplies and economies internationally, as well as widespread panic. But deliberate mass contamination could be catastrophic. So what measures are in place around the world to protect the food supply chain from terrorist attacks?
The Threat
In the late 1970s, there were reported alleged incidents of Israeli citrus fruit on sale in Europe having been poisoned with liquid mercury injections. A letter from a supposed Palestinian group calling itself the Arab Revolutionary Army (ARA) was posted from Germany to various European health departments, claiming responsibility and saying they wanted to damage the Israeli economy. However, although a small number of cases of poisoning, none of which were fatal, were confirmed, many turned out to be hoaxes or a panic-stricken public reporting symptoms of poisoning that were in reality either psychosomatic or attributable to other causes. Leading Palestinian groups claimed no connection to the poisonings and furthermore claimed no knowledge of the ARA. The Palestine Liberation Organisation said that the poisonings were an attempt to discredit them and that they would never sully their cause by poisoning innocent people. Investigations by European and Israeli security services failed to identify the group or the culprits. The facts surrounding these incidents remain sparsely documented and unclear to this day. The most likely theory espoused by investigators is that radical German groups (of which there were several during the 1970s) had been behind the threats and small number of actual poisonings, in a misguided show of support for the Palestinians. One thing is certain; Israel’s citrus exports were severely affected during this period. There was another hoax involving poisoned Israeli citrus fruit in Italy in 1988, which further harmed Israeli citrus exports.
T AUTUMN 2011 EDITION
he only alleged ‘terrorist’ attacks against the food chain occurred in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.
A study by Israel’s Institute of Counter
Terrorism (ICT) published in 2002, asked former Palestinian militants for their views on the use of bioterrorism. All of those interviewed stated that such a tactic would either amount to national suicide, with the consequences of Israel’s full military and political wrath, or to significant loss of international public support. Many of the militants stated that they simply did not need to engage in such unconventional warfare. Following the 11th September 2001
attacks, the World Health Organisation (WHO) published a report on the terrorist threat to food. The report stated: “Threats from terrorists, criminals and
other anti-social groups who target the safety of the food supply are already a reality. During the past two decades, WHO Member States have expressed concern about the possibility that chemical and biological agents and radio- nuclear materials might deliberately be used to harm civilian populations. In recent months, the health ministries of several countries have increased their state of alert for intentional malevolent use of agents that may be spread through air, water or food.”
Countermeasures SecuFood – Security of European Food Supply Chain – was a 12 month study conducted under the auspices of the Biomedical University of Rome and the University of Navarra and co-funded by the European Commission, between 2009-2010. The aim of the study was to discover
what strategies were in place in sample EU member states to prevent criminal and terrorist attacks against the food chain. The project found that there are currently no specific EU directives or initiatives for the prevention of such attacks, even if there were at member state level. SecuFood investigated data relating to 450 malicious incidents worldwide from 1950 to 2008. The results found no evidence of any terrorist attack against the food supply chain (with the exception of the Israeli citrus fruit contamination) but that the number of malicious (criminal or disgruntled individuals) incidents had increased over recent years. SecuFood found
the most effective countermeasures were video surveillance, area control and traceability. In the United States, following
11th September 2001, the food and drinks industry was encouraged by the government to adopt heightened
“results found no evidence of any terrorist attack against the food supply chain”
measures to protect food supplies from terrorist contamination. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced in April 2004 that it would support a research programme to help develop methods of protecting US food supplies. The National Centre for Food Protection and Defence (NCFPD) was launched as a Homeland Security Centre of Excellence at the University of Minnesota in July 2004, and over a three year period received $33 million in research funding from the DHS, with a further $20 million over six years announced in February 2010. The mission of the Centre is to find cost-effective ways to secure the US food chain from malicious contamination, and draws together expertise from universities, research facilities, private consultancies and large branded food and drinks companies. Some initiatives to improve security identified include ensuring the physical security of processes, certification of trade partners and carriers and the application of technology, such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS), to track the movement and location of food consignments. In 2010, the Centre hosted representatives from Thailand and Peru, in an effort to build the capacity of other countries to prevent the deliberate contamination of the food chain. One challenge the NCFPD is currently working on is how to distinguish between intentional and unintentional food- borne illness outbreaks.
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