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13 ■ AVIATION FROM A1 Aviation security threats and realities


We have answered such requests from readers, and we have done a number of media interviews, but we’ve resisted writing a fresh analy- sis on aviation security because, as an organization, our objective is to lead the media rather than follow the media regarding a particular topic. We want our readers to be aware of things before they become pressing public issues, and when it comes to aviation-security threats and the issues involved with passen- ger screening, we believe we have accomplished this. Many of the things now being discussed in the media are things we’ve written about for years. When we were discussing this topic internally and debating whether to write about it, we de- cided that since we have added so many new readers over the past few years, it might be of interest to our expanding readership to put to- gether an analysis that reviews the material we’ve published and that helps to place the current discus- sion into the proper context. We hope our longtime readers will ex- cuse the repetition. We believe that this review will help establish that there is a legiti- mate threat to aviation, that there are significant challenges in trying to secure aircraft from every con- ceivable threat, and that the re- sponse of aviation security authori- ties to threats has often been slow and reactive rather than thoughtful and proactive.


Threats


Commercial aviation has been threatened by terrorism for decades now. From the first hijackings and bombings in the late 1960s to last month’s attempt against the UPS and FedEx cargo aircraft, the threat has remained constant. As we have discussed for many years, jihadists have long had a fixation with attack- ing aircraft. When security measures were put in place to protect against Bojinka-style attacks in the 1990s— attacks that involved modular ex- plosive devices smuggled onto planes and left aboard—the jiha- dists adapted and conducted 9/11- style attacks. When security meas-


■ ISRAEL FROM A1 Israel’s security methods


posse of security people hurriedly dragged him through a rough and ex- tremely thorough multiple pat down that made him feel he had experienced something one notch below a mauling.” That never happens in Israel, which


is known to have extremely rigorous air- port security procedures. Yet, the Ben-Gurion Airport, Israel main international gateway will only have a full body scanner installed next year. And though its security staff have the power to pat down and even strip- search passengers, most only experi- ence the regular walk through metal detector arches. How do Israel’s airport become ap- parently safe from terrorist bombing while on the country’s city streets ter- rorist-jihadists blow up restaurants every so often? A Washington Post Foreign Service Re- port datelined Jerusalem, by Janine Zacharia, quotes an Israeli air security expert, one of several who “insist their methods are better than those of the US,” saying: “Taking the bottle of water from the


87-year-old woman at JFK, you will never find an explosive material that is coming from bin Laden,” said Shlomo Harnoy, head of the Sdema Group, an Israeli security consultancy that advises airports abroad. “You are concentrating on the wrong thing.”


Janine Zacharia writes that: “Israel’s approach allows most travelers to pass through airport security with relative ease. But Israeli personnel do single out small numbers of passengers for extensive searches and screening, based on profiling methods that have so far been rejected in the United States, subjecting Arabs and, in some cases, other foreign nationals to an extensive screening that comes with a steep civil liberties price.”


She also quotes Ariel Merari, a terror- ism expert who has researched aviation security at Tel Aviv University: “I know personally of people who came to Israel for a conference and were asked if they had met an Arab. After that, they were stripped and their laptop was confis- cated. There is a lot to be improved in this approach towards innocent, foreign citizens. Also, the attitude towards Israeli Arabs has to be reevaluated.” Merari told Zacharia Israel’s “profil-


ing system is good, but it has to be done with more sensitivity.’’ Apparently, some 2 percent of pas- sengers flying from Ben Gurion Inter- national are subject to the more inten-


sive screening process. “For the others, the air-travel experience can be a de- light, compared with flying in the United States,” says another expert Zacharia quotes. Zacharia’s story says a woman, who


arrived with her daughter at Ben Gurion from Philadelphia to attend a wedding, said: “The security here is far more pro- fessional. I think they know who they are looking for,” she added. “In the States, they don’t know.” “Israeli airport security authorities


don’t disclose the methods by which they single out passengers for extra scru- tiny. They say only that they have a list of suspicious signs that they look for,” Zacharia writes. People with Arab and Muslim sound- ing names get the special treatment. Zacharia writes that “Donna Shalala, a 69-year-old American of Lebanese de- scent who was President Bill Clinton’s secretary of health and human services and is now president of the University of Miami, was detained and questioned for 21/2 hours at Ben Gurion in July. The Israeli news media said she was subject to a humiliating security debriefing be- cause of her Arab last name.” The more intense watch on profiled passengers start even at the time they buy their tickets, says a report that came out in the Israeli newspaper, Hareetz. Then, when profiled passengers ar-


rived in their cars or taxis at the airport parking lots or unloading zones uni- formed security men approach them and subject them to questioning. When they walk into the terminal building another batch of intelligence and security officers follow them and sometimes talk to them again. Those whom security people suspect are brought to interrogation rooms. There are instances when a passenger might be made to take the seat, unknowingly, beside an air marshal.


American aviation security experts


don’t think such a system would be allowed by the US Congress and the US courts. Besides, Israeli is but a small terri- tory while the USA’s airports have a thousand times more millions of pas- sengers from more countries than those who go to Israel. How about the Philippines? Perhaps, even Philippine lawmakers and courts could be persuaded to adopt Israel’s profiling system, the problem is the cost of having so many qualified and high-quality security officers. That also goes for the United States.


ures were put in place to counter 9/ 11-style attacks, the jihadists quickly responded by going to onboard sui- cide attacks with explosive devices concealed in shoes. When that tac- tic was discovered and shoes began to be screened, they switched to de- vices containing camouflaged liquid explosives. When that plot failed and security measures were altered to restrict the quantity of liquids that people could take aboard aircraft, we saw the jihadists alter the para- digm once more and attempt the underwear-bomb attack last Christ- mas.


In a special edition of Inspire magazine released last weekend, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) noted that, due to the in- creased passenger screening imple- mented after the Christmas Day 2009 attempt, the group’s opera- tional planners decided to employ explosive devices sent via air cargo (we have written specifically about the vulnerability of air cargo to ter- rorist attacks). Finally, it is also important to understand that the threat does not emanate just from jihadists like al Qaeda and its regional franchises. Over the past several decades, air- craft have been attacked by a number of different actors, includ- ing North Korean intelligence offic- ers, Sikh, Palestinian and Hezbollah militants and mentally disturbed individuals like the Unabomber, among others.


Realities


While understanding that the threat is very real, it is also critical to recognize that there is no such thing as absolute, foolproof secu- rity. This applies to ground-based facilities as well as aircraft. If secu- rity procedures and checks have not been able to keep contraband out of high-security prisons, it is unrea- sonable to expect them to be able to keep unauthorized items off air- craft, where (thankfully) security checks of crew and passengers are far less invasive than they are for prisoners. As long as people, lug- gage and cargo are allowed aboard aircraft, and as long as people on the ground crew and the flight crew


have access to aircraft, aircraft will remain vulnerable to a number of internal and external threats. This reality is accented by the sheer number of passengers that must be screened and number of aircraft that must be secured. Ac- cording to figures supplied by the Transportation Security Administra- tion (TSA), in 2006, the last year for which numbers are available, the agency screened 708,400,522 pas- sengers on domestic flights and in- ternational flights coming into the United States. This averages out to over 1.9 million passengers per day. Another reality is that, as men- tioned above, jihadists and other people who seek to attack aircraft have proven to be quite resourceful and adaptive. They carefully study security measures, identify vulne- rabilities and then seek to exploit them. Indeed, last September, when we analyzed the innovative designs of the explosive devices employed by AQAP, we called attention to the threat they posed to aviation more than three months before the Christmas 2009 bombing attempt. As we look at the issue again, it is not hard to see, as we pointed out then, how their innovative efforts to camouflage explosives in everyday items and hide them inside suicide operatives’ bodies will continue and how these efforts will be intended to exploit vulnerabilities in current screening systems. As we wrote in September 2009, getting a completed explosive device or its components by security and onto an aircraft is a significant chal- lenge, but it is possible for a re- sourceful bombmaker to devise ways to overcome that challenge. The latest issue of Inspire magazine demonstrated how AQAP has done some very detailed research to iden- tify screening vulnerabilities. As the group noted in the magazine: “The British government said that if a toner weighs more than 500 grams it won’t be allowed on board a plane. Who is the genius who came up with this suggestion? Do you think that we have nothing to send but printers?” AQAP also noted in the magazine that it is working to identify innocu-


■ ALERT FROM A1 On heightened alert, NAIA praised by travelers He said that the alert level for the Christmas


season would be the same as in the November All Saints’ and All Souls’ holidays. The MIAA and Philippine National Police


have bomb-sniffing dogs to detect explosives at the airport. Some critics have attacked the government’s alleged lax security at airports. They point out that the body scanners, TV monitors and sensors are there only for show. They are not connected to a central computer brain or to a database. Only human beings, who are not as well-trained as Israeli or even US security staff, see the monitors. These probably contribute to the foreign


governments’ decision to issue advisories urging their citizens to avoid travel to the Philippines.


NAIA praised for polite security people What is generally heard and read from visitors to


the country from abroad is their impression that our security people are polite and pleasant. These words of praise come not only from


tourists but also foreigners who are longtime resident of the Philippines. One blogger, John M, who is a “very frequent


traveler” and has been to every country in the world and been incensed by security people in the US and in London, writes: “So, after this rant, to the Philippines. NAIA is


never much fun, even under the best of circum- stances. However, I can say that I’ve always been treated respectfully by security here, which is saying far more than in the US or, especially, the UK. There are no idiots marching along the queues barking orders and screaming at people. Yes, some of the procedures here are nonsensical also (the thing with the shoes, a printed “e-ticket” to get to


■ PROTEST FROM A1 PNoy’s protest against travel advisories gets


Manila—“is a significant development because it removed the contentious part.” Valte said, “We are very happy it has happened. It shows us our efforts to have the advisories revised are bearing fruit.” The President, during the Leaders summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in Yokohama, Japan, in mid-November questioned the basis for the advisory issued by the six countries.


The United States, according to Philippine Ambassador to the US Willy Gaa was reported to have said he had received assurances from Washington that it would


“exercise caution” in issuing travel advisories. Ed Malaya, Foreign Affairs spokesman, said Gaa had received the assurance after he called the US State Department in Washing- ton to relay President Aquino’s message about the travel advisories. The Foreign Affairs department, complying with a directive from President Aquino, fired off notes verbale to embas- sies of the six countries that had issued the travel advisories. For his part, US Ambassador to the Philippines Roger Thomas was quoted in an ABS-CBN report saying that “it’s very safe to


travel in the Philippines” and “I feel safe here in the country.”


Thomas explained that the travel advisory of the State Department had been in the website for seven years. It was just updated in November. He said the advisory was updated every six months. He reminded his hearers that “There’s terrorism going on all around the world . . . look at what’s happening in Yemen, the cargo ships, Athens, Berlin, none of these is direct to the Philippines. This is a global threat that we have to work together to protect all of our citizens.”


■ An airport security man with his K-9 unit inspects baggages at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Parañaque. PHOTO BY RENE H DILAN


the counter), yet if you are treated with respect, the idiocy is much easier to swallow. I’ve never felt like a criminal at NAIA. I’ve never felt that anyone was going to steal from me or arrest me there. I’ve


never been threatened there. This is the key. The Philippines does what needs to be done, but they do it politely. Put some dignity into the process and people won’t lose their cool.”


24 28 36 38 45 06 07 16 18 25 41


A special report 2 The Sunday Times SUNDAY D e cember 5, 2010


ous substances like toner ink that, when X-rayed, will appear similar to explosive compounds like PETN, since such innocuous substances will be ignored by screeners. With many countries now banning cargo from Yemen, it will be harder to send those other items in cargo from Sanaa, but the group has shown it- self to be flexible, with the under- wear-bomb operative beginning his trip to Detroit out of Nigeria rather than Yemen. In the special edition of Inspire, AQAP also spe- cifically threatened to work with allies to launch future attacks from other locations. Drug couriers have been trans- porting narcotics hidden inside their bodies aboard aircraft for decades, and prisoners frequently hide drugs, weapons and even cell phones in- side body cavities. It is therefore only a matter of time before this same tactic is used to smuggle plas- tic explosives or even an entire non- metallic explosive device onto an aircraft—something that would al- low an attacker to bypass metal de- tectors and backscatter X-ray inspec- tion and pass through external pat- downs.


Look for the Bomber,


Not Just the Bomb This ability to camouflage explo- sives in a variety of different ways, or hide them inside the bodies of suicide operatives, means that the most significant weakness of any suicide-attack plan is the operative assigned to conduct the attack. Even in a plot to attack 10 or 12 aircraft, a group would need to manufacture only about 12 pounds of high ex- plosives—about what is required for a single, small suicide device and far less than is required for a vehicle- borne improvised explosive device. Because of this, the operatives are more of a limiting factor than the explosives themselves; it is far more difficult to find and train 10 or 12 suicide bombers than it is to pro- duce 10 or 12 devices.


A successful attack requires opera-


tives who are not only dedicated enough to initiate a suicide device without getting cold feet; they must also possess the nerve to calmly pro- ceed through airport security check- points without alerting officers that they are up to something sinister. This set of tradecraft skills is referred to as demeanor, and while remain- ing calm under pressure and behav- ing normally may sound simple in theory, practicing good demeanor


under the extreme pressure of a sui- cide operation is very difficult. Demeanor has proved to be the Achilles’ heel of several terror plots, and it is not something that mili- tant groups have spent a great deal of time teaching their operatives. Because of this, it is frequently easier to spot demeanor mistakes than it is to find well-hidden explosives. Such demeanor mistakes can also be accentuated, or even induced, by contact with security personnel in the form of interviews, or even by unexpected changes in security protocols that alter the security en- vironment a potential attacker is anticipating and has planned for. There has been much discussion of profiling, but the difficulty of cre- ating a reliable and accurate physi- cal profile of a jihadist, and the adaptability and ingenuity of the jihadist planners, means that any attempt at profiling based only on race, ethnicity or religion is doomed to fail. In fact, profiling can prove counterproductive to good security by blinding people to real threats. They will dismiss potential malefac- tors who do not fit the specific pro- file they have been provided. In an environment where the po- tential threat is hard to identify, it is doubly important to profile indi- viduals based on their behavior rather than their ethnicity or nation- ality—what we refer to as focusing on the “how” instead of the “who.” Instead of relying on physical pro- files, which allow attack planners to select operatives who do not match the profiles being selected for more intensive screening, security person- nel should be encouraged to exer- cise their intelligence, intuition and common sense. A Caucasian U.S. citizen who shows up at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi or Dhaka claim- ing to have lost his passport may be far more dangerous than some ran- dom Pakistani or Yemeni citizen, even though the American does not appear to fit the profile for requir- ing extra security checks. However, when we begin to con- sider traits such as intelligence, in- tuition and common sense, one of the other realities that must be faced with aviation security is that, quite simply, it is not an area where the airlines or governments have allo- cated the funding required to hire the best personnel. Airport screeners make far less than FBI special agents or CIA case officers and receive just a fraction of the training. Before 9/ 11, most airports in the United


States relied on contract security guards to conduct screening duties. After 9/11, many of these same of- ficers went from working for com- panies like Wackenhut to being TSA employees. There was no real effort made to increase the quality of screening personnel by offering much higher salaries to recruit a higher caliber of candidate. There is frequent mention of the need to make U.S. airport security more like that employed in Israel. Aside from the constitutional and cultural factors that would prevent American airport screeners from ever treating Muslim travelers the way they are treated by El Al, an- other huge difference is simply the amount of money spent on salaries and training for screeners and other security personnel. El Al is also aided by the fact that it has a very small fleet of aircraft that fly only a small number of passengers to a handful of destinations. Additionally, airport screening duty is simply not glamorous work. Officers are required to work long shifts conducting monotonous checks and are in near constant con- tact with a traveling public that can at times become quite surly when screeners follow policies established by bureaucrats at much higher pay grades. Granted, there are TSA offic- ers who abuse their authority and do not exhibit good interpersonal skills, but anyone who travels regu- larly has also witnessed fellow travelers acting like idiots. While it is impossible to keep all contraband off aircraft, efforts to improve technical methods and pro- cedures to locate weapons and IED components must continue. How- ever, these efforts must not only be reacting to past attacks and attempts but should also be looking forward to thwart future attacks that involve a shift in the terrorist paradigm. At the same time, the often-overlooked human elements of airport security, including situational awareness, observation and intuition, need to be emphasized now more than ever. It is those soft skills that hold the real key to looking for the bomber and not just the bomb.


[“Aviation Security Threats and Reali- ties is republished with the express per- mission of STRATFOR and may not be republished by any other parties with- out STRATFOR’s consent. To access STRATFOR’s original version, go to: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/ 20101123_aviation_security_threats_and_realities.]


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