Arctic Council. Similarly, the U.S., Canada, Denmark, Canada would welcome American military capability
and Norway could explore a treaty with Russia to divide in helping to secure its remote Arctic north.
resource claims equitably. UNCLOS does not preclude NORAD could serve as a model. In fact, Renuart already
such a treaty. Moreover, like most U.N. regimes, UNCLOS is contemplating NORAD’s role in Arctic security, openly
is inherently weak, and allowing it to be the fi nal arbiter asking, “How do we posture NORAD for the future to work
could serve Russia’s interests. with nations in that region to provide the right kind of
However, if Russia shows no signs of cooperating, search and rescue; military response, if need be; and cer-
the U.S. and its Arctic allies are left with few other tainly security for whatever activities occur in the Arctic?”
options than standing fi rm — and standing together. Maritime surveillance was added to NORAD’s list of
Sharing the Arctic’s bounty, in a transparent manner responsibilities in 2006. Just as NORAD defends Canadian
governed by the rule of law and sound trade practices, and U.S. airspace, a joint or allied naval arrangement could
makes more strategic sense than allowing Moscow liter- provide for security in and around the Northwest Passage.
ally to divide and conquer.
To prevent that unhappy outcome, the allies might need
to agree among themselves on borders, transit routes, and
exploration rights — and then pool their economic and How do we pos-
military resources to protect their shared interests.
ture NORAD for the
A paradox
he U.S. and Canada should lead the way by
future to work with
T
resolving their dispute over boundaries in the
Beaufort Sea — splitting the difference down
nations in that re-
the middle in this so-called wedge area seems
reasonable — and by recognizing that cooperation on the
gion to provide the
Northwest Passage provides more benefi ts than costs.
Some have suggested the two should suspend their
right kind of search
differences over the legal status of the passage. Of
and rescue; military
course, the two allies could go even further. It seems
counterintuitive, but it might be in America’s strategic
response, if need be;
interests to support Canada’s claim on the Northwest
Passage as an inland waterway.
and certainly security
There are concerns that such an arrangement could
constrain America’s freedom of movement and set a prob-
for whatever activities
lematic precedent for other waterways. Yet if the North-
west Passage is deemed to be international waters, any
occur in the Arctic?
country could send its naval vessels through it or use it as
a fl ight corridor. Wouldn’t it be better for the passage to
— Gen. Gene Renuart
be under the purview of one of America’s closest allies?
Jr., USAF, NORAD and
Paul Cellucci, ambassador to Canada from 2001-05,
Northern Command
thinks so. “It’s in our security interests that the Northwest
Passage be considered part of Canada,” he argues.
Canada already exercises functional sovereignty in Such a united front could, paradoxically, keep the
terms of environmental regulations in its Arctic waters peace. As Churchill said of his Russian counterparts,
(under UNCLOS), including the disputed strait. The “There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and
U.S. closely cooperates with Canada on these issues, ef- there is nothing for which they have less respect than
fectively deferring to Canada’s Arctic Waters Pollution for weakness.” MO
Prevention Act.
Deferring to Canada on the sovereignty issue argu-
— Alan W. Dowd and Alexander Moens are senior fellows
ably would make it much easier for the U.S. to partner
with Fraser Institute (www.fraseramerica.org), an independent
with Canada in providing security and keeping threats
international research and educational organization with offi ces in
to Canadian territory and American interests at bay in
the U.S. and Canada. Dowd’s last article for Military Offi cer was
and near the passage. With the legal dispute put to rest, “Decline and Conquer?” January 2009.
SEPTEMBER 2009 MILITARY OFFICER 105
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