Ergonomics
In healthcare, for instance, some hold the evidence-based organisational systems cohere, focusing EHF on teams may be
view that EHF has little or no value to safety unless its particularly useful for safety. Effective teamwork may provide
application links to mortality. Afocus on ultimate outcome is the synergy that amounts to reliability and safety. Furthermore,
logical, but it ignores the fact that accidents usually have a by modelling teamwork, it may be possible to provide a
complex network of causation and that the range of EHF common reference for both managing human error through the
interventions necessary for dealing with that network may be conventional decomposition of systems that serves safety
very difficult to model and link to outcome measures cases and for prospective composition of future systems.(3)
statistically. Accident frequency may be high enough to be very
concerned with for its impact on people’s lives, but not high
EHF holds considerable value for achieving and maintaining
enough to relate statistically to EHF interventions.
safety, if organisations realise the complexity of accident
causation and the role of EHF in building safer systems. We
Even if we were able to model a set of EHF interventions and can measure the direct value of EHF in terms of its effect on
measure their impact on safety outcome, this might not be so the conditions, interactions and processes of those systems,
intuitively helpful. Consider that once an organisation achieves which will influence ultimate safety in subtle ways. We can
zero accidents that logic might dictate to the evidence based readily measure the effect of EHF utility on improved product
minded that the organisation would no longer need EHF. quality, ease of action and cognition, efficiency and job
However, the general lessons of failure across domains indicate satisfaction. Collectively when modelled, these measures of
otherwise, in that past safety records will not guarantee future process might relate to ultimate safety, but this will demand a
safety. The problem is that there are a great many factors sufficient sample size and a unifying reference model to
influencing organisational safety and so the application of EHF integrate those measures.(4)
may only be as effective as the strategic framework used to
deal with those factors prospectively in their entirety.
Organisations should realise the limitations of applying EHF
according to ultimate outcome measures and ideally seek to
An existing framework for safety, particularly the nuclear apply EHF strategically in light of the developing theory of
industry, derives from external regulation and the need to organisational safety. For this, they might pursue a systems
develop a case for safety in order to obtain the necessary approach to safety and concentrate the applications of EHF on
license to operate. Essentially, this involves a detailed the teams who comprise and integrate their organisational
decomposition of a system and the identification of hazards. systems. Measuring EHF value and clarifying its utility in terms
EHF assessments will provide the evidence for the adequacy of of building high-reliability through teamwork might give some
systems to support human performance with human error indication as to where EHF should fit in achieving and
probabilities for the given tasks. The analyst may also identify maintaining organisational safety, though research has some
contextual performance shaping factors and suggest alternative way to go in translating this theory into practice.(5)
task designs. Some regulated industries have succeeded in
becoming highly reliable and relatively safe through this
regulatory framework.
However, while it is essential to eliminate, control and
quantify human error from an engineering point of view, this
cannot be the sole strategy for achieving and maintaining
organisational safety from an EHF point of view. People
working in complex systems do not operate in conveniently
Further information
isolated units of linear work. They are less likely to learn,
1. The [Baker] Report of the BP US Refineries Independent
develop and refine their skill and performance from models of
Safety Review Panel, 2007. www.safetyreviewpanel.com.
error than they would from models of performance observed in
context. Moreover, their systems of work do not remain static;
2. Sinclair, MA(2007). Ergonomic issues in future systems.
they may experience change and disturbance over time. For
Ergonomics, 50, 12, 1957-1986.
long-lived organisations, the loss of domain knowledge and
expertise or rapid change in cultures through the succession of
3. Burke CS, Wilson KA, and Salas E, 2005. The use of a
people may create further instability. The tendency of
team-based strategy for organizational transformation: guidance
organisations to increase in size and diversity may exacerbate
for moving toward a high reliability organization. Theoretical
these problems. It follows that such disturbance to
Issues in Ergonomics Science, 6(6), 509-530.
organisational systems, coupled with the complexity emerging 4. Brusberg A, 2008. Presenting the value of Human Factors
from within them will inevitably lead to unpredictable Integration: guidance, arguments and evidence. Cognition,
consequences.(2) Technology and Work, 10: 181-189.
EHF practitioners must therefore help to organise safety and 5. Healey AN, Catchpole K, and Yule S, 2008. Enhancing
compose organisational systems in coherent meaningful ways surgical systems. Cognition, Technology and Work, 10, 4, 251-
to ensure people can operate them effectively and reliably. As 254.
teamwork rather than individual work is likely to make
15
Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32