NUCLEAR POWER IN ASIA | SPECIAL REPORT


India has a large and sophisticated nuclear R&D and


manufacturing base, having launched its first research reactor, supplied by the UK, in 1957. Initially nuclear development was supported mainly by the UK, Canada, the US and France. However, after India’s nuclear bomb test in 1974, all support was withdrawn. The newly established Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), from which India was excluded, prevented India from importing any nuclear technology or fuel, setting it on a path of independent nuclear development. With limited uranium resources, India embarked on


a three-stage programme aimed at using its abundant thorium resources based on an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle. Stage 1 would use PHWRs and LWRs. Plutonium from these would fuel the fast reactors planned for Stage 2. Advanced Heavy Water Reactors (AHWRs) in Stage 3 would burn thorium-plutonium fuels in a self- sustaining fuel cycle. An alternative end stage could be molten salt breeder reactors (MSBRs). India immediately embarked on construction of small PHWRs and by 2008, 12 200-220 MWe units were in operation at five sites, as well as two 540 MWe units at Tarapur NPP. In 2002 the regulatory authority approved construction of a 500 MWe prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam, which is now nearing completion, while research is underway on molten salt reactors (MSRs). Only Russia continued cooperation based on a 1988


agreement that pre-dated the NSG, and in 2002 began construction of two VVER-1000 units at the Kudankulam NPP. Then, in 2005, India signed a civil nuclear agreement with the US, leading in 2008 to an NSG waiver for India, despite its not signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). This enabled nuclear trade to resume but negotiations to include India as a full NSG member have so far stalled on Chinese opposition. Nevertheless, the waiver enabled India to sign nuclear cooperation agreements with numerous countries and to start discussions with the US, France, Japan and South Korea on possible construction. However, India’s nuclear liability regime impeded


progress. Following the 1984 Bhopal disaster India passed a law, making equipment suppliers responsible for any future accident. Amendments in 2010 made plant operators primarily liable but still allowed possible recourse to suppliers. A compromise was reached with Russia, which continued construction at Kudankulam, where two units are now operating with two more under construction and others planned. Other suppliers remained hesitant. While projects were agreed with France for six EPRs at Jaitapur and with the US for six AP1000s at Kovvada, they have not been finalised. India, meanwhile, embarked on a programme to build larger 700 MWe PHWRs, the first of which began operating at the Kakrapar NPP (unit 3) in 2021, with plans for 10 more.


Pakistan Pakistan has six operable reactors at two sites supplied on a turnkey basis by China, with a total capacity of 3,262 MWe. Four CNP-300 reactors (300-315 MWe) at the Chasma NPP site began operation between 2011 and 2017. In June 2023, Pakistan and China signed an agreement for construction of a 1,100 MWe Hualong One (HPR1000) reactor for Chasma 5. Unit 1 at the Karachi NPP site, a 137 MWe Candu supplied by Canada that began operation in 1971 and closed in 2021


was the first nuclear power unit in Asia. The site also hosts two Chinese supplied 1,017 MWe Hualong One units that began operation in 2021 and 2022. Over the coming decade Pakistan plans to expand its nuclear power generating capacity to 8,800 MWe. Pakistan has a significant R&D base but much of it is


linked to the military programme. The Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science & Technology (Pinstech) at Rawalpindi with a US-supplied research reactor focuses on civil research and is under IAEA safeguards. Other facilities in Rawalpindi and Khushab continue to support weapons development. Like India, Pakistan is excluded from the NSG. However,


all its power units are under IAEA safeguards and IAEA oversight and support is ongoing. In 2018 four IAEA national technical cooperation projects were amalgamated into a single project, PAK2007, “Strengthening and Enhancing Capabilities of Pakistan’s National Institutions to Support a Safe, Reliable & Sustainable Nuclear Power Programme”. This aims to streamline workflows, reduce delays and costs, enhance cooperation and harmonise safety and waste management approaches.


Taiwan Two of Taiwan’s three US-supplied two-unit NPPs (Chinshan, Kuosheng and Maanshan) have now been closed in line with a nuclear phase-out law adopted in 2016. A fourth NPP under construction, Lungmen, was cancelled. Taiwan’s six operable power reactors are to be decommissioned as their 40-year operating licences expire. Chinshan 1, Taiwan’s oldest plant, closed in 2018, followed by Chinshan 2 in 2019. These 600 MWe General Electric (GE) Mark I BWRs began operation in 1978 and 1979. Kuosheng 1&2, 985 MWe GE Mark III BWRs, which began operation in 1981 and 1983, were closed in 2021 and 2023. Construction of Lungmen 1&2 (both GE 1350 MWe ABWR units) began in 1999. Lungmen 1 was completed but mothballed in 2015, and construction of Lungmen 2 was suspended in 2014. Taiwan now has two operable nuclear units at the Maanshan plant, both Westinghouse 936 MWe PWRs, whose operating licences expire in 2024 and 2025. Owner-operator Taipower also operates coal power plants, which are to be replaced by natural gas turbines. Taiwan’s first deliveries of liquefied natural gas (LNG) are expected in 2023. While there is strong anti-nuclear sentiment in Taiwan, the opposition Kuomintang Party, which is expected to win the forthcoming elections, opposed the nuclear phase out.


Asia’s nuclear outlook While early nuclear development in Asia was largely influenced by regional rivalries, today it is the focus of a global power struggle between China and the US. India has so far largely avoided involvement in this geopolitical game. Pakistan’s close ties with China are evident, as are South Korea’s and Japan’s ties with the US. China would clearly like to increase exports of its Hualong One and also SMRs, including floating NPPs, and is increasingly becoming a competitive vendor. There are numerous other runners and riders looking to embrace nuclear power, especially with the emergence of smaller modular reactors that are more appropriate in places where a full-sized NPP might be more challenging to justify. Longer term, it seems likely that Asia will continue to expand both its nuclear capacity and capabilities. ■


www.neimagazine.com | August 2023 | 17


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49