FROM THE EDITOR
Politics and the power of the atom
Russia continues to capitalise on its civil nuclear
dominance to project influence around the globe, but could the West capitalise on this strategy?
new report from the Bellona Environmental Transparency Center argues that the Russian nuclear giant Rosatom has become one of the state’s most important geopolitical instruments. Highlighting the transformation of the corporation into a
comprehensive projection of the Russian state and now operating at the intersection of energy, military technology, strategy, and geopolitical influence, the Norway-headquartered international science-based non-profit organisation suggests that expanding its areas of activity into sectors such as logistics, mineral extraction, Arctic infrastructure, and space programmes reflects the state’s intention to use the corporation to implement its strategic objectives. The Bellona analysis explores the transformation
of Rosatom with the context of its global nuclear role given the formal absence of direct sanctions against the nuclear sector. For example, the Bulgarian Council of Ministers recently granted a targeted sanctions derogation to allow the Kozloduy nuclear power plant to import critical components and technical assistance from Russian suppliers for its VVER-1000 units under technical safety and security requirements.
It is also certainly the case that Rosatom remains active in the nuclear sectors of both Europe and the US, as well as across the global south and the Middle East where the company is not only building multiple nuclear power plants – El Dabaa in Egypt, Kundankulam in India, Akkuyu in Türkiye and Rooppur in Bangladesh, for example – but has also signed multiple nuclear cooperation agreements with prospective nuclear nations across Asia and Africa. In June, Russia and Laos signed such a contract and, in May, a similar deal was agreed between Russia and Equatorial Guinea, for instance. However, the Bellona report is not alone when it also
notes potential clouds on the horizon for Rosatom. The final shipment of Russian nuclear fuel for Kozloduy was delivered to the plant last year after a contract with Rosatom’s fuel company TVEL was terminated early. The plant has subsequently been supplied with fuel from Westinghouse. And, while the Paks II project allows Rosatom to retain its position as the only company currently building a large nuclear power plant in the EU, after the April 2026 elections and the defeat of Viktor Orbán, the project faces new political uncertainties. More widely, conditions for the Russian state-owned
corporation are becoming less favourable. In 2024, the US banned the importation of Russian enriched uranium with quotas for calendar years 2024-2027 before a complete ban that will effectively come in at the end of next year. At the same time, Western competitors are ramping up investments in capacity and capability. Urenco, for example, recently announced a multi-billion-dollar investment to build a new enrichment plant in New Mexico, expanding its domestic capacity by nearly 50%. Rosatom’s involvement in managing the Zaporizhzhia NPP in the occupied part of Ukraine and its other growing functions in projecting state power may be a strategic move, but also a step too far. The resultant threats from market diversification and shrinking prospects due to tightening restrictions, as well as intensifying competition, may yet prove to be the unravelling of Rosatom’s previously unassailable nuclear hegemony. If the West wants to resume its place in projecting soft nuclear power, it must take this opportunity to establish a new nuclear hierarchy that offers a real choice to the world. ■
David Appleyard
www.neimagazine.com | July 2026 | 3
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45
