TRANSPORT | ADVANCED REACTORS
Transport security considerations for advanced reactors
With the nuclear industry poised to contribute to energy security and climate target efforts through advanced reactor systems, the consideration of transport security requirements will play a key role in enabling these future reactor designs to reach their full deployment potential
George Burnett
Strategy and Security Advisor at Nuclear Transport Solutions
ADVANCED REACTOR SYSTEMS, SUCH AS Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and Advanced Modular Reactors (AMRs), boast a promising ability to be deployed in locations previously deemed unsuitable for nuclear sites. When considering the application of these reactors in remote locations for areas with poor grid connectivity or disaster relief scenarios, the benefits are profound. The adoption of modular manufacturing and installation principles ensure that lower capital risk is associated with the designs from the outset, in addition to incorporating the latest safety and security enhancements. These benefits paired with growing pressure to meet climate targets make advanced reactors a desirable energy solution, most notably even in areas with no previous civil nuclear programme.
Thinking about transport security Transport of nuclear material forms a crucial part of the nuclear fuel cycle, and it is widely recognised that security during transport presents distinct challenges to that of a licensed nuclear site. Nuclear transport operations are subject to many variables, such as transiting multiple threat environments or varying regulatory requirements during international movements. In practice, this means that a
‘one size fits all’ approach to transport security is never quite suitable, and instead requiring case-by-case analysis and planning to ensure the appropriate physical protection system is in place. However, while transports see individual consideration, security is bound by key security principles, all of which are still pertinent when considering advanced reactors. Physical protection requirements for nuclear material are laid out in The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment, which are the only legally binding international instruments in the area of physical protection of nuclear material. The annexes of this convention specify the approach to categorising nuclear material based on type, form and quantity. This shapes the first step in developing physical protection arrangements for nuclear transport.
Above: Transport of advanced reactors needs to be just as secure as for conventional nuclear materials
34 | July 2022 |
www.neimagazine.com
The influence of fuel The categorisation process ensures the application of a commensurate approach to security through analysis of the material being transported. This is a fundamental principle known as “The Graded Approach”. Many advanced reactors are considering new fuel types due to increased efficiencies and safety characteristics, and this will have an important influence on the transport security requirements. Take Tristructural-isotropic (TRISO) fuel for instance, fissile material contained within a ceramic pebble proposed for use in high temperature reactors. This fuel shows significant proliferation resistance and enhanced safety characteristics in accident scenarios. These characteristics are also important features when considering the arrangements for transport security. In line with the graded approach, a proliferation resistant and less dispersible fuel type may warrant a less onerous approach to security, when taken in tandem with the threat analysis conducted for the transport. Similarly, molten salt fuel types in which fissile material is dissolved into a salt before use in a reactor offer security advantages. The use of fluoride salt benefits from a difficulty of extraction alongside not being easily spread, factors supporting transport security from a theft and sabotage perspective, respectively. At the outset these appear to be security enhancements when compared to typical fuel transports conducted today, yet the variation in potential fuels reiterates the need for a case-by-case approach to transport planning.
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