The Operation NYONair offered low-altitude doors-off photo flights over New York landmarks under the brand name FlyNYON. As demand grew to exceed the company’s capabilities, it contracted with sightseeing tour company Liberty Helicopters Inc. to conduct additional flights using Liberty’s aircraft and pilots. To open the field of view and allow the passengers to swing their legs outside the cabin, both right doors and the front left door were removed from the helicopter, and the sliding door on the left rear side was locked open. The arrangement accommodated five passengers, one in front and four in back. To prevent passengers from falling out in flight,
FlyNYON devised its own restraint system consisting of a commercial fall-protection harness of the type used by window washers or ironworkers and a tether made by a supplier of climbing gear. The tether, fabricated from multiple loops of 11 mm
webbing, was secured to a D-ring on the back of the har- ness and to an anchor point within the cabin. Locking carabiners with screw-type threaded sleeves to secure their gates were used to connect the tethers to the vari- ous anchor points; unlocking each carabiner required multiple turns of the sleeves. To accommodate passengers of different sizes, the D-ring on the harness could be clipped to any one of the tether’s loops. The remaining length of the tether was allowed to dangle free. A pouch containing a seat-belt– cutting tool was attached to one of the harness’s upper shoulder straps. The front-seat passenger’s tether was fastened to a
floor anchor located just behind that seat’s right armrest. The rear-seat passengers’ tethers were routed in a criss- cross fashion, with each outboard seat secured to the outboard anchor point on the opposite side of the aircraft and the inboard tethers likewise crossed over. Notably, the anchors to which the rear-seat passengers were tethered were designed by their manufacturer for lap- belt installation only. Post-accident testing showed that unless the inboard passengers were to lean forward, they would obstruct the outboard passengers’ access to their tethers. Additionally, outboard passengers’ efforts to turn to reach their restraints would end up tightening the teth- ers enough to restrict their ability to reach the straps. Rapid evacuation thus would require a degree of coordi- nation unlikely to be achieved without practice. The passengers were required to fasten the helicop-
ter’s installed, FAA-approved occupant restraints over FlyNYON’s harnesses during takeoff and landing. Once
authorized by the pilot, the two inboard rear-seat passen- gers were allowed to unbuckle those restraints and sit on the cabin floor with their legs outside, while the front and two outboard rear-seat passengers could loosen their lap belts and run their shoulder harnesses under their arms to pivot in their seats.
The Flight The flight departed from New Jersey’s Helo Kearny Heliport at about 6:50 pm and flew south to the Statue of Liberty, past other landmarks, and then northward along the East River. The helicopter climbed to 1,900 feet after the pilot received clearance from LaGuardia Airport’s (KLGA) control tower to continue to the north end of Central Park at or below 2,000 feet. Just after 7:06, the pilot heard an alert for low main-rotor rpm and saw the engine-oil and fuel-pressure warning lights illuminate. He immediately lowered col- lective and entered autorotation. Ruling out landing in Central Park because of the number of people on the ground, he turned toward the river. He found the fuel- flow control lever secure in its detent and turned the starter, but the engine didn’t respond. At about 600 feet above the river, the pilot reached
down for the fuel-shutoff lever (FSOL) to prepare for ditching and found it already turned off. He “slammed it down” and tried the starter again, but though the engine temperature immediately began to rise, the engine didn’t have time to catch. At about 100 feet above the water, the pilot pulled the handle to deploy the emergency floats. He recalled hear- ing a “pop” sound, seeing parts of both front floats, and noticing additional drag; onboard recording equipment
2020 Q2 ROTOR 73
The March 11, 2018, accident flight route.
NTSB
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