Interim MAIB report on fatal accident between Seadogz and a buoy - plus urgent safety


recommendation - published The Marine and Accident Branch has issued an interim report and safety recommendation on the investigation of the collision between the high-speed passenger craft Seadogz and a navigation buoy resulting in one fatality in Southampton Water on 22 August 2020.


At 1008, Seadogz passed the car ferry Red Falcon, which was proceeding on a south-east course down Southampton Water. This offered the skipper an opportunity to drive Seadogz across, and so to jump over the ferry’s wake. As Seadogz passed astern of Red Falcon for the fifth time the RIB accelerated on a steady easterly heading for 10 seconds until, at 1011:09 and at a speed of 38.4kts (44.2mph), it collided with the North-West Netley starboard hand buoy.


The force of Seadogz’s head-on impact knocked the buoy over to an almost horizontal position and threw the RIB’s bow upwards. The impact and abrupt deceleration forces caused all on board to be thrown violently forward from their seats. Two of the passengers seated in the front row of jockey seats were thrown out of the boat and into the water where their lifejackets inflated automatically.


Injuries and damage Everyone on board Seadogz, except for one passenger, sustained injuries during the collision, including broken limbs, fractured vertebrae, dislocations and a punctured lung. Emily Lewis, a 15-year-old passenger who was sitting on the bench seat in the middle, sustained fatal internal injuries.


Initial findings


Seadogz collided with the North-West Netley buoy because the RIB’s skipper was concentrating on conducting high-speed manoeuvres in close proximity to another vessel and did not see the fixed navigational mark in time to take avoiding action. The reasons why the skipper did not see the buoy and the factors that contributed to the tragic consequences of the collision will be discussed in detail in the full investigation report.


Urgent safety considerations The voluntary CoP was issued following an accident to recommend and promote common safe working practices for the industry. The investigation so far has found, and it is of concern, that few of the safe working practices in the voluntary CoP were being followed on the day of the accident. The implementation of the guidance in the voluntary CoP and the conduct of safe navigation will be further discussed in the final report, but of particular note are:


• During the trip, the passengers became accustomed to passing close by large navigation buoys at high speed, so they were unconcerned that the RIB was heading directly towards North-West Netley buoy immediately prior to the collision and so did not attempt to alert the skipper.


• High-speed figure-of-eight turns increase the risk of the RIB hooking or spinning out. • The skipper was operating single-handedly, at high speed and did not see the navigation buoy, which was directly ahead, for 10 seconds before impact.


• Crossing the ferry’s wake at high speed increased both the risk of the passengers suffering spinal injuries and of the RIB coming close to a craft or object previously obscured from view by the ferry’s hull, leaving the skipper little time in which to react.


MAIB recommendation All UK Operators of small commercial high-speed craft such as Rigid Inflatable Boats, sports boats and other vessels engaged in carrying passengers on trips and charters are recommended to: Review the risk assessments for the operation of their vessels and take measures, as appropriate, to ensure that they comply with the safe working practices and standards contained in the Passenger Safety on Small Commercial High-Speed Craft & Experience Rides voluntary Code of Practice. Where an operator cannot comply with the provisions outlined in the Code of Practice, steps should be taken to mitigate against risk, and details of those measures included in the relevant operating procedures.


Read the full report and download the interim report at: https://bit.ly/3yAZnma.


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