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Infection prevention


isolation ward, while patient management and monitoring was also unsatisfactory, with delays in sending off samples. Some of the common themes from both


investigations included: l Difficult mergers. l Preoccupation with finance. l A demanding agenda for reconfiguration and PFI.


l Poor environments, with many Nightingale Wards and few single rooms.


l Unacceptable examples of contamination and unhygienic practices.


l Low levels of nurses, due to financial pressures.


The learning and positive outcomes from these investigations included: l An emphasis on clinical safety over financial and other strategic objectives.


l Recognition of C. diff infection as an important clinical disease.


l Recognition of vulnerability of IPC when not addressed/maintained as a priority for patient safety.


l Implementation of the Code of Practice (under the Health Act 2006), and regulation as part of HCC/CQC standards for all providers.


l Clear accountability and governance for IPC. l A focus on the role of leadership and narrative. l Increase in patient/public confidence. l Cleaner hospitals. l Adjustments to antibiotic prescribing and prescribing culture.


l Interest in IPC and its value clinically, politically and ethically.


The session moved on to explore some of the key findings of the COVID-19 inquiry. Rose Gallagher emphasised that a key lesson from the pandemic is the importance of understanding the “lived experiences of those who are the


recipients of IPC practice and guidelines.” She also outlined some of the fundamental


flaws in the UK’s approach, as highlighted by the COVID-19 inquiry, which included: Assumptions were made about respiratory


viruses: There was an over-reliance on historical assumptions about how to distinguish between modes of transmission for respiratory viruses. This led to an initial misunderstanding of the level of risk posed by aerosol transmission and a failure to recommend sufficient protections against it. There was insufficient caution: Alternative


routes of transmission other than droplet or contact were prematurely ruled out. This meant that pre-existing assumptions that COVID-19 was not ordinarily spread by aerosols became the received wisdom until the contrary was proved. There was a lack of structure and expertise


of the UK IPC Cell: In reality, the UK IPC Cell acted as the decision maker as to the content of guidance. However, its remit was insufficiently defined, leading to uncertainty over its role and a lack of accountability. The backgrounds of its experts were also insufficiently broad. The combined effect of these interconnected


flaws led to a failure to properly protect patients and healthcare workers against the risks posed by COVID-19. The Inquiry sought to outline 10


recommendations (not all directly relating to IPC), from guidance on visiting restrictions (taking into consideration not just the IPC risks, but the social and personal implications), better preparation for fit testing of PPE, systematically recording and publishing healthcare worker deaths, and psychological and emotional support for healthcare workers. “These recommendations are designed


to inform future pandemic planning and management, but there are clearly opportunities for business-as-usual infection prevention and


control,” commented Rose Gallagher. She went on to outline the learning from the pandemic, as highlighted by the inquiry: l A lack of evidence should equate to uncertainty and therefore demand a cautious approach.


l There is a need for formal mechanisms for decision making and governance of the ‘IPC cell’.


l The value of multi-professional liaison and expertise needs to be understood.


l The importance of easily understood guidance for consistent application and trust of healthcare workers – the use of jargon, euphemisms or opaque concepts (wholly, predominantly, etc) needs to be avoided.


l An under-resourced workforce compromises IPC.


l There needs to be provision of adequate and appropriate PPE. Diversity, size, sex, disability (e.g. opaque masks) are important considerations.


l Further research is required on the effectiveness of different mask types (FFP and Type 11R) – as well as research on comfort, supply and sustainability.


l There needs to be better appreciation of the impact of moral distress and the importance of support programmes/visits on healthcare workers in all care settings.


Avoiding ‘lessons repeated’ She also highlighted the need to avoid ‘lessons repeated’ – Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells failed to learn the lessons from Stoke Mandeville, but there have also been “multiple examples” where actions haven’t been initiated from previous incidents. ‘Lessons learned’ can be described as “vacuous language that we need to avoid”, she warned. “Every single one of us, here, is part of the


system and we all need to play our role in terms of making sure those lessons are identified and that we put in place actions to support improvements in IPC and strengthen the specialty,” she urged the audience. Ultimately, Rose Gallagher likened infection


prevention and control to “a bridge connecting technical knowledge and skills with practice”. What is important is that you look at the bridge from “different views and angles”, she advised. She shared a personal anecdote of how her son in Vancouver suggested she “go under the Lions Gate Bridge” to see it from a different perspective – which made her reflect on the parallels in her working life. Another relevant analogy she shared was the image of an overtaking car – guidelines need to be adjusted to fit the context. “It’s ok to overtake – providing it is safe to do so, and you revert to driving in


26 www.clinicalservicesjournal.com I September 2026


Yura Yarema - stock.adobe.com


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