Industry News


Grenfell inquiry hears of questionable behaviours


in the refurbishment project which ultimately resulted in 72 people losing their lives. Actions by a number of staff at the Kensington


T


and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (KCTMO) have come under sharp focus, as the hearings have revealed:


• Cost cutting negotiations were started with Rydon’s ‘in a secret meeting’ before they had been awarded the contract, in contravention of legal advice obtained by the KCTMO;


• Tenants were excluded from discussions over cuts to the project’s budget;


• Opportunities to appoint experienced project managers and fire safety experts were missed;


• The impact of swapping zinc cladding for combustible aluminium composite panels was not understood by any of the decision makers in awarding the works contract;


he public inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire has continued to reveal a series of questionable behaviours by key participants


• KCTMO staff focussed on the cost and appearance of the ACM cladding, rather than on its fire safety qualities;


• Tenants who raised complaints about the standard of work, such as faulty fire doors or poorly fitted windows, were labelled as ‘antagonists’ and ‘rebel residents’; and


• Notebooks and diaries kept by key staff during the refurbishment project were either thrown away, or their existence was not disclosed to the Police or inquiry staff.


There have been many occasions during the inquiry when the atmosphere was very tense with legal representatives of the inquiry reacting with incredulity and sometimes frustration and anger at the evidence being given by former staff of the KCTMO. Previously the inquiry heard that Kensington and


Chelsea Council had driven the cuts to the project’s budget without giving sufficient thought to the consequences.


© Natalie Oxford The council had also made swingeing cuts to


it’s building control department, while the inspector in charge of the Grenfell project was covering three roles on his own, with 130 projects on the go at once. He also had no experience of the type of works undertaken at the Grenfell Tower and his training was not sufficient to fill his knowledge gaps.


Claims of professional negligence made at Grenfell inquiry


The Grenfell inquiry’s fire safety expert has said the advice given by specialist fire engineers during the design stage of the tower block’s refurbishment, amounted to professional negligence. Exova was employed to put together the fire


strategy for the refurbishment of the Grenfell Tower, this included comments on how the construction changes may impact on the building’s fire safety performance. In two written reports assessing the changes


and their affect on external fire spread, Exova stated "proposed changes will have no adverse effect on the building in relation to external fire spread” but would be “confirmed in a future issue of this report”. These comments were made


despite Exova not making an assessment of the cladding proposals. Dr Barbara Lane, fire safety expert for the


inquiry, who put together a report assessing the performance of Exova, said: “Critically, Exova fails to identify that overcladding the entire building is a part of the definition of the refurbishment works in their report, but of more grave concern is they still go on to provide their advice that this part of the works would have no adverse effect. “Yet the records show the staff at Exova had


never analysed the external wall construction proposals and so were not in any position to make this statement. Therefore, I conclude this was very serious evidence of professional negligence, from


my perspective as a practicing fire engineer.” When asked at the inquiry if her position


with regard to these comments had changed after hearing evidence from Exova employees, she said no. Representatives of the firm have previously told


the inquiry that Exova was not part of the process of selecting the cladding, the choice of materials used, nor was it responsible for designing, installing, or approving the system. They maintain that after the lead contractor


(Rydon) was appointed in March 2014, it chose not to appoint Exova nor did it ask Exova to update the advice that it had given previously, before the cladding system had been chosen.


Building control checks on Grenfell Tower contained ‘fundamental failings’


The building control system and processes used by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea were fundamentally flawed and failed to properly assess the planned refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, according to an expert witness for the inquiry. Beryl Menzies identified a litany of failures including not asking about the tower’s cladding


system or the materials to be used, failing to spot out-of-date and contradictory information; and failing to recognise that no cavity barriers had been indicated in initial designs to seal the cavities or opening in the walls. Ms Menzies said that she believed the initial full plan application to the building control department


18 | HMM December/January 2021 | www.housingmmonline.co.uk


should have been rejected before work started. She said the fire strategy from the refurbishment’s fire engineer Exova “did not address the actual proposals” put forward. Ms Menzies described the role of building


control as the “third line” of protection for a construction project and that it should ensure the construction meets building regulations. When asked about the performance of John


Hoban, the council’s building control officer who worked on the Grenfell Tower project, Ms Menzies said she felt that he was struggling and that he was badly managed.


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