Single Campaign Medals
Calvert made important recommendations which would change the course of the war, including establishing and training a deep- penetration patrol unit to locate C.T. base camps and either destroy them or lead conventional forces to the area; the task was to interdict the C.T.s’ food, local intelligence,and military opportunities by denying them support and freedom of movement. ‘This suggestion was approved and I was told to form a force. The name I chose for the new unit was the Malayan Scouts (Special Air Service Regiment) and its role was to operate in deep jungle areas not already covered by other security forces, with the object of destroying guerrilla forces, their camps and sources of supply.’ (‘Fighting Mad’, by M. Calvert refers.)
However, it was stressed by General Neil Ritchie, Commanding Far East Land Forces, that Calvert’s force would be disbanded at the close of the emergency in Malaya; would exist only under Far East Command; and would have no linkage whatsoever to the S.A.S. Territorial Army organisation in Britain. Calvert worked like a maniac to establish the unit that he had envisioned, but he had been handed a somewhat poisoned chalice. He was only able to recruit personnel from the Far East Land Forces and his choice of officers was limited. Frequently, commanding officers would send him their ‘misfit’ junior officers and N.C.O.s. Moreover, he was not provided with a suitable administrative infrastructure. He found a hundred volunteers and ‘A’ Squadron, Malayan Scouts was formed. How Purcell came to be among them is unclear. His ‘A’ Squadron name list does not include any others from his regiment or from the Hong Kong garrison. There is no evidence in his service papers that his regiment wanted to be rid of him. Perhaps he learned of Calvert’s achievements and reputation while he was still in Hong Kong. Although John Woodhouse’s name is not on Purcell’s list, he is proof that Purcell was not the only Hong Kong-based soldier to volunteer to join Calvert: ‘One of my better acquisitions was Captain J W who was serving as G3 Intelligence to 40th Infantry Division in Hong Kong.’ (ibid)
‘A’ Squadron Malayan Scouts’ training included throwing grenades and diving for cover in the deep monsoon drains running through their camp area, one of several lessons with live ammunition that disregarded the normal safety rules for field firing ranges. Shortage of time and available facilities meant that all training had to take place on football pitches and other clear spaces around the camp. This and Calvert’s hard drinking (a result of the pressure and stress he was under) were criticised at the time by the more prosaic officers; they would continue to be a lingering criticism of S.A.S. standards for the next ten years. In 1981, the highly respected Lieutenant- Colonel John Woodhouse felt compelled to write a letter to the S.A.S. Regimental Association on 9 December 1981: ‘Calvert was under pressure to get results and get them quickly. Calvert’s comparison was that a building site can be a rough and mucky place until construction is finished.’
There is no doubt that special forces can only be effective if they combine special men with a huge amount of special training. Calvert could and did train ‘A’ Squadron, but he lacked enough trainers and above all enough time to do a thorough job. This in turn caused unfair bias and denigration, such as ‘the Great Malayan Scouts Beard Scandal’. Even in 2004, veteran officers would complain that ‘Men were allowed to grow beards in the jungle, which was a sensible idea in that they hid their white faces, but when the men came out they were allowed to keep them on, contrary to all the traditions of the Army. The sight of smelly, scruffy, bearded soldiers was one which caused almost apoplexy in the Staff and derision among all the other units in the Army. It was a very bad mistake.’ In Calvert’s own words: ‘Opinions differ on beards. Some people would not be without one while others can’t stand them at any price. I can take them or leave them. I grew a big, black bushy one on the first Chindit campaign; this time I stayed clean-shaven. But in wartime beards definitely have their uses. If a man thinks he looks tough he will often be tough and, more important, act tough.’ (‘Fighting Mad’, by M. Calvert refers.)
In actual fact, as revealed in Purcell’s photo archive, none of Purcell’s comrades, even in the informal shots, were less than well-turned out; all that appear clearly in shot seem to be clean-shaven. There were probably fewer scruffy beards in the Scouts than there were jealous backstabbers elsewhere in the military hierarchy. As Purcell’s photographs show, a Malayan Scout wore the head-dress and cap-badge of his parent unit, with Malayan Scouts shoulder titles on his deep-green jungle uniform tunic, and under the titles were the green patch and yellow kris (S-bladed Malay dagger) of Malaya Command.
Vindication
Purcell participated in early operations in the deep jungle, where resupply was dropped by parachute, Chindit-style, and patrolled the Pahang and Kuantan rivers. The Scouts gained a reputation for dealing effectively and empathetically with the indigenous population, such as the Orang Asli. These tribes lived in the jungle and C.T.s blistered onto them for secure bases providing food and early warning of attack. There was the danger of natives betraying or killing Scouts, who would always be at a disadvantage, however clever they might be in the jungle. In 1951, Sakai aborigines are thought to have murdered one of the men on Purcell’s ‘A’ Squadron list, Trooper J. A. O’Leary, from Brixton. O’Leary became detached from his patrol and then got lost in the jungle. No reprisals against the Sakai occurred. (O’Leary’s remains were located by a patrol behind an ambush position they were about to use and recovered by an officer of the Malayan Police who had been attached to the Scouts. O’Leary was identified by a gold earring he wore.) Two others on Purcell’s list were killed in action, while two of his close friends were wounded in ambushes and an officer was blinded during training.
On 22 December 1951, General Headquarters, Far East Land Forces (GHQ, FARELF), sent a comprehensive report to the Under Secretary of State at the War Office about the employment of the Malayan Scouts. Their role was defined as ‘to operate in the deep jungle areas not already covered by other Security Forces with the object of destroying “bandit” forces, their camps and their sources of supply.’ The report stated that no other units in Malaya were sufficiently organised or equipped for this task, which was vital for bringing the bandits to battle. The result, the report stated, was that the unit was becoming a ‘Corps d’Elite’ in deep jungle operations and a most valuable component of the armed forces in Malaya. This report, prepared only some 18 months after Calvert had been given the task to establish a Special Force but with virtually no assets to do so, was a comprehensive vindication of Calvert’s vision and achievement against the odds. Moreover, the report recommended that the Malayan Scouts title be amended to 22 Special Air Service Regiment and added to the Army’s permanent order of battle. (PRO – WO216/494 – Report on the Malayan Scouts – Special Air Service Regiment refers)
On 27 July 1951, Lieutenant Colonel John Sloane, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, fresh from Korea and an infantry officer, with no experience of either special forces or the jungle, took over command of the Malayan Scouts from Calvert, who had fallen badly ill and was invalided home. Sloane brought in more conventional measures of discipline and ‘normal military order’. He and John Woodhouse understood the paramount importance of selection and training, and as the war was going better, he had enough time to put them on a firmer basis. Sloane pulled the squadrons out of the jungle and instituted a period of solid retraining for all personnel in late 1951 and early 1952.
“An honest and trustworthy man with a smart appearance. A hard worker who will obtain good results”
On 15 February 1952, Purcell embarked to return to Europe after 18 months of active service. It was probably determined that he was too close to the end of his engagement for further jungle training to be a useful investment, given that there was now an ample pipeline of volunteers and Purcell must have decided against engaging for another period of five years in the army. After a spell at the Royal Artillery depot at Woolwich, he was posted to 12 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (40 mm Bofors) in Germany for the remainder of his service, which ended on 19 April 1953. His military conduct was assessed as Very Good, and he was given the glowing testimonial at the top of this paragraph. In view of the Malayan Scouts’ reputation for drunkenness, it is significant that he was certified as having “sober habits”. After leaving the army, he and his wife settled in Willesden, London. A fairer charge against the Scouts/S.A.S. under Calvert than the vague pejorative ‘lacking discipline’ was that their administration was haphazard. This is probably the reason why Purcell’s G.S.M. was not issued until 1960.
Purcell later became a Toolmaker, and died in the Royal Free Hospital, Camden.
Sold with original ‘Red Book’ Certificate of Service; identity discs; a collection of original photographs of the Malayan Scouts, mostly captioned, including of the recipient; his service papers; and an important copied hand-written name list of 35 members of ‘A’ Company Malayan Scouts.
www.dnw.co.uk all lots are illustrated on our website and are subject to buyers’ premium at 24% (+VAT where applicable)
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