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Q & A
ADM. JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN
■ A native of Butler, Pa., Greenert graduated in 1975 from the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Md., and served aboard five submarines, including in command of USS Honolulu (SSN-718). Other command assignments included U.S. 7th Fleet and U.S. Fleet Forces Command. Greenert was vice CNO when nominated for service chief. ■ In this interview, the CNO discusses the impact of the BCA on the fleet, the Navy’s missions and shipbuilding, and the controversial plan from the Joint Chiefs to slow military compensation growth with pay-raise caps, a dampened housing allowance, higher TRICARE fees, and a reduction in funding to operate commissaries. ■ The interview has been edited for length and, in some cases, clarity.


As CNO, you have operated continuously under the cloud of fiscal uncertainty created by the BCA. How has it affected your ability to resource the fleet, keep the right number of ships, and keep readiness where it needs to be?
We haven’t endured a lot of that law’s impact yet. We’re just getting started. We had one year of sequestration [in 2013]. That was difficult, though we were able to work through it because we got a defense bill eventually and some reprogramming authority. That helped get operating accounts to a level to manage near-term readiness and support our deployments. We deferred some training and were able to take some money laid in for procurement from previous years to pay some procurement bills in 2013 to keep critical programs on track.


Today, we have longer deployments. Those are the result in FYs 2012 and 2013 of not being able to get all the maintenance and training done. Folks weren’t ready to go on deployment on schedule. Somebody still had to stand the watch, so deployments are a little longer.


[Passage of] the Bipartisan Budget [Act] got us some budget stability for 2014 and ’15. The question now is what happens in 2016 and out. In terms of the 10 missions the Navy has under the current defense strategy, I can’t do at least four under a BCA scenario. It also will seriously hurt shipbuilding and our industrial base.


What are the four missions you can't do without more relief from the BCA?
One is presence. I won’t have enough forces to provide presence around the world. Another is power projection, the capability and the readiness with that capability to project power around the world. Third is strategic deterrence because the Ohio replacement [submarine] program would be at risk. Last is counterterrorism and Special Forces support. We are on the hook to Special Operations Command for support with joint high-speed vessels, littoral combat ships, drones, and ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] orbits. We would be below levels listed as appropriate [if the BCA is in effect].


I’m speaking now about the impact of sequester that causes all accounts to go down, affecting every program an equal amount, including the Ohio replacement. We would say, “That’s our No. 1 program. We have to correct that.” So we would reprogram money.


So your ability to carry out those missions hinges on whether the Navy is forced to make across-the-board cuts versus the easier challenge of dealing with lowered budgets and still having flexibility to reprogram among accounts?
We might be able to correct and do the strategic deterrence mission if we can adjust the BCA, taking us to what we refer to in DoD as the “alt POM,” or higher alternative budget. A concern of mine within those missions is keeping high-end capabilities we would need to deal with higher-end adversaries, as laid out in 2012 in the defense strategic guidance. We would keep slipping behind by not investing to levels needed in electronic warfare, antisubmarine warfare, counter cruise missile, counter ballistic missile, and air-to-air capabilities.


In the late 1990s, the Joints Chiefs also complained about tight budgets, saying the force was losing quality personnel because of a cheaper retirement plan, pay caps, and a health care program that couldn’t deliver on promises to retirees. Now the service chiefs, facing budget sequestration, say we need to slow growth in compensation. Why the difference today?


54 MILITARY OFFICER JULY 2014

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