Strategic Models C
ounter-terrorism strategy has undergone a remarkable development in the early years
of the 21st century. Contrasting concepts and structures have been applied in different jurisdictions. Interestingly, 2013/14 has seen increasing convergence between the various strategic models. Encouragingly for the UK, the emerging consensus closely resembles the UK structure. Hence the appetite of foreign countries to learn more about the UK process of development of counter-terrorist strategy and to seek to apply this experience and its results as appropriate in local contexts.
This is good news for the UK Government, for UK Government and Overseas Government arrangements (G2G) and for the vital UK private sector support to these efforts, notably private sector security exports and private sector security services provided overseas.
Analysis of the paths of developments of counter-terrorist strategy is perhaps assisted by consideration of three broad approaches.
First is the classic combination of intelligence and law enforcement with an emphasis on criminal justice.
Second is a more formalised, integrated and inclusive arrangement with greater emphasis on prevention and international co-operation.
Third is counter-terrorism strategy which defines the threat as an act of war, necessitating national self defence including the use of military force.
The first model based upon intelligence and policing was applied throughout the Irish Extremist Campaigns on the UK mainland. The events of 9/11 in the US cruelly demonstrated a threat that was dramatically different. The intention was to inflict mass casualties in simultaneous attacks perpetrated by suicide terrorists pursuing a global agenda.
The greatest weakness of the first model is that it did not provide sufficient public protection. A threat on the new scale required a major shift to prevention.
The 9/11 Commission Report published in 2004 deals comprehensively with this defect and the barrier between intelligence and criminal investigation. The linkages between intelligence gathering and collating evidence were also a challenge in the UK. The traditional linear approach where intelligence activity was pursued until the case was ready to be handed over to the police for arrests to be carried out, did not meet the changed needs of public protection. A revised model of earlier engagement and shared objectives was essential and has been commendably achieved.
At the global level, the UN Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy adopted in September 2006 set out a wide-ranging plan of action.
12 © CI TY S ECURI TY MAGAZ INE – S P RING 2014 Sir David Veness, CBE, QPM
Formerly Under-Secretary General of the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) and Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner, dealing with counter terrorism and security writes for City Security magazine.
21st Century
Counter Terrorism Strategy
Many nations have adopted structures and passed laws which move forward from pre- 9/11 positions, but evolution to a more sophisticated over-arching strategy is not universal, especially as regards command and control and national security structures.
Evidence of the reality of the continuing need to close the gap in respect of counter-terrorist capabilities in many nations is the creation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) in 2011.
Twenty-nine countries plus the EU, co-chaired by Turkey and the USA, are seeking to strengthen the national and international architecture of counter-terrorism. Amongst its primary activities are capacity building in the Sahel, capacity building in the Horn of Africa and capacity building in South East Asia.
The second broad model of counter-terrorism strategy represented an elevation of strategic planning and delivery to the centre of government. For the UK this was CONTEST, which was designed in 2002 and published in 2006. Updates and reports upon CONTEST have followed thereafter.
The strength of CONTEST is that it was extremely well conceived and has continued to evolve to produce a balanced strategic package. The four strands – PURSUE, PREVENT, PROTECT and PREPARE – provide practical plans of action and encourage comprehensive multi-agency counter-terrorism.
The third model of counter-terrorism strategy was “The Global War on Terror”. The mass loss of life inflicted on US soil was
understandably defined as an act of war invoking the national right of self defence.
The US Congress authorised the use of military force within days of 9/11 and a state of war continues to this day between the USA and Al Qaeda, the Taliban and their associated forces.
The third model has sophisticated components in addition to military force, but the climate of armed conflict is the leading element and can produce initiatives outside the conventional framework. These extra legal aspects can hinder international co-operation.
The Global War on Terror also produced an immediate and radical overhaul of homeland security. The organisational, bureaucratic and accountability challenges associated with the Department of Homeland Security model have dissuaded many other countries from following this example. The preference has been for building upon the National Ministry of Interior. In the UK, the creation of the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) within the Home Office is one such case.
Convergence
Terrorism must be addressed at its points of origin as well as the places where terrorist acts occur.
This is especially the case in a world where terrorist threats are more diverse and diffuse and where the geographic footprint is spreading. This is the 2014 reality.
Contemporary counter-terrorism strategy therefore needs to encompass the
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