challenges for Olympic organisers and principles of risk management across organisations can vary due to differences in functional objectives or professional background. The level of ‘acceptable risk’ is, for example, quite different in Games security compared to construction. For some, zero tolerance is the norm, while for others the slack built into budget contingencies or project timelines provides scope for absorbing risk.
“ There is increasing concern
with formalised and standardised anticipation and management of risk The importance of reputational risk is a subject
of ongoing debate in planning for London 2012. For some organisers, reputation is a consequence of operational factors, so if functional objectives are delivered, reputation should look after itself. Others are more concerned with reputation. In one of the early feasibility studies for the London bid it was noted that: ‘The Atlanta experience showed the media can play an important role in defining the perception of the success or otherwise of the Games.’ A recent Foreign Affairs Committee report recommended creation of a ‘rapid response unit’ to rebut negative stories in the international media during the Games, to manage reputational risks to the UK. On top of concern with project risks and operational risks, then, is increasing preoccupation with the framing of risks and adverse events. The idea of risk has been argued to be
inextricably interlinked with control of the future. One of the oldest solutions to the management of
22 SOCIETY NOW SPRING 2011 ”
Olympic risk, observed as early as the Paris 1900 Olympics, was the purchase of insurance to cover liabilities for personal injury claims from workers, athletes and spectators, or loss of revenues from cancellation or postponement of events. What has changed in governance of the Games in recent times is increasing concern with formalised and standardised anticipation and management of risk, beyond taking steps to cover the costs when things go wrong. While London 2012 might be said to be risk-
based in terms of its general organising principles and integration of risk throughout its programme and its frontline operations, these cannot guarantee that the Games will pass without minor or more serious incident. Such possibilities often remain uncertain because the likelihood of threats and hazards is difficult to quantify and, moreover, inherently probabilistic. Even in the governance of risk there is such a thing as bad luck. The case of the London 2012 Olympics
highlights the degree to which the concept of risk, which 30 years ago would have been rarely mentioned in the same organisational contexts, has become central to the practice of administration and our desire to anticipate and control future events. n
i
Will Jennings is Hallsworth Research Fellow at the School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester. From October 2008 to September 2010 he held an ESRC Research Fellowship on the Olympics, Risk and Risk Management. This article is based upon interviews, meetings and documentary research undertaken during the ESRC Fellowship.
Email
will.jennings@
manchester.ac.uk Telephone 0161 306 6560 ESRC Grant Number RES-063-27-0205
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