menting similar schemes in districts throughout Nepal, the Kulekhani PES has had its problems. Under the scheme pay- ments are made indirectly, through government bodies. Tis has made the PES vulnerable to political instability and con- flicts between rival local bodies with various disputes holding up ongoing implementation of the scheme (FAO 2011).
Lessons Learned It is now clear that several basic factors need to be in place for a PES scheme to succeed. Perhaps the most important factor is to ensure that communities have a ‘stake’ in projects: this nurtures self-interest which in turn encourages community involvement and responsibility.
Allied to this is a need for less complexity in PES schemes. Again, individuals and communities selling environmental services must be able to enter the schemes voluntarily and understand what their responsibilities are and what benefits
66 VITAL GRAPHICS ON PAYMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
they will receive. More information on PES needs to be made available, both for buyers and sellers. More funding for pre- liminary work on assessing PES schemes is needed too, with greater efforts to match sellers of services to a range of buyers.
Implementing PES has not been helped by groups and or- ganisations who have used questionable methods to persuade communities to sell environmental services. Typically such people offer to represent communities in negotiations on car- bon-credit contracts, holding out the promise of large sums of money. Tere are frequent demands for community represent- atives to sign contracts on their first visit. Tis sort of unscru- pulous behaviour can undermine genuine PES schemes. Less complexity in the system matched with a greater availability of information about the workings of PES can help counter such activities. More training for communities on PES will empow- er them to act on an equal footing, capable of negotiating with potential buyers or working with intermediaries.