wanton in its failure to pay maintenance and cure, and awarded Clausen an additional $37,420 in compensatory damages and $1.3 million in punitive damages on that issue.


In a post-trial motion before the judge, Clausen requested attorney’s fees. Icicle opposed the motion on the grounds that only a jury can award attorney’s fees as punitive damages. The court granted Clausen’s motion, but only as to fees incurred on his maintenance and cure claim, which the court found amounted to 90 per cent of the total fees he incurred. The court found that attorney’s fees on Clausen’s claim for willful or wanton failure to pay maintenance and cure were compensatory damages, not punitive. Icicle appealed.


The Washington Supreme Court addressed two questions of federal maritime law on appeal:


(1) whether the court, and not the jury, determines the amount of attorney’s fees related to a jury’s award of punitive damages for the willful failure to pay maintenance and cure; and


(2) whether punitive damages for the willful failure to pay maintenance and cure must be capped at a ratio of 1:1 to the compensatory damages.


As to the first question, the court held that attorney’s fees in the context of a claim for maintenance and cure are compensatory, not punitive, even though they are only available where a jury finds the ship- owner’s denial of maintenance and cure was “callous or willful.” This is because an award of attorney’s fees is necessary to make the plaintiff whole following a successful claim for maintenance and cure.


Since the fee recovery is not part of the plaintiff ’s substantive claim for damages, the court reasoned that it “makes procedural sense” to have that issue decided post-trial by the judge.


Next, the court turned to the question of whether a jury’s award of punitive damages for a willful failure to provide maintenance and cure should be capped. Icicle argued that Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), required the court to cap the jury’s punitive damages at a 1:1 ratio to the compensatory damages. The court disagreed.


The court stressed that the goal of punitive damages is to punish egregious behavior and to deter similar conduct. The court did not read


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Exxon as establishing a broad, general rule under maritime law limiting punitive damages. To the contrary, the court read Exxon as approving of a variable punitive damages scale based on the wrongdoer’s level of culpability. The conduct at issue in Exxon was not “at the extreme end of the scale of egregiousness,” there was no profit motive, and there was already a substantial recovery for compensatory damages. Accordingly, it made sense to limit the punitive damages award to a 1:1 ratio to compensatory damages in that case.


On the other hand, the court found that Icicle’s conduct was “egregious.” Specifically, the court noted that Icicle intentionally disregarded Clausen’s health by refusing to pay for treatments recommended by Icicle’s own “hand-picked” doctor, provided only $20 per day in maintenance while knowing that Clausen was “practically homeless,” made false state- ments in its federal complaint seeking to terminate Clausen’s maintenance and cure, and was motivated by profit.


Finally, the court found that the sizeable amount of punitive damages awarded was appropriate because it was necessary to substantially deter Icicle from treating other seamen as it treated Clausen. The court therefore upheld the jury’s award of $1.3 million in punitive damages.


Since Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc. is a Washington state decision interpreting federal maritime law, it is only binding law in Washington state courts. Nevertheless, it serves as an important reminder to shipowners to err on the side of caution when deciding issues related to maintenance and cure.


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