As for potential changes following Costa


Concordia: “Te safety and evacuation of all passenger ships, large and small, are governed by the regulatory framework set forth by IMO, but the industry is always looking for ways to understand the complexities of safety and evacuation better. “We can expect a renewed regulatory


scrutiny on the safety performance of large passenger ships. Whether this focuses on design issues or operational issues, or both, will depend on the outcome of investigations into the loss of Costa Concordia.” The major operating lines are carrying


out their own comprehensive safety reviews and this, coupled with the conclusions from the authoritative investigations into Costa Concordia, will dictate the direction of the changes for the industry. “The Cruise Lines International


Association (CLIA) announced a review of operational safety in January, which includes an internal review by CLIA members of their own operational safety practices and procedures concerning issues of navigation, evacuation, emergency training, and related practices and procedures. Other components of the review include:


consultation with independent external experts,


identification and sharing of


industry best practices and policies, as well as possible recommendations to the IMO for substantive regulatory changes to further improve the industry’s operational safety and collaboration with the IMO, governments and regulatory bodies to implement any necessary regulatory changes. According to Hicks: “LR is also undertaking


a review of areas which may be affected. Tis includes our processes, policies and practices in a number of areas to ensure that we remain well-placed to support the industry as the events from the incident investigation unfold. Given that a passenger ship is a complex system and one where the crew are a vital factor in the system operating efficiently and effectively, one early area of concentrated effort is in the human element/human factors realm across all stages of the asset lifecycle.” According to Robert Ashdown of the


European Cruise Council (ECC) while the causes of the incident will only be known once the report has been released “every indication is that the people failed the ship rather than the ship failing the people”. Te ECC he said retained full confidence in the current design


The Naval Architect May 2012


and building regime, and unless the report indicated otherwise, it saw no reason to go back on that stance. Design and construction of ships was


reviewed on an ongoing basis, he said and the ECC had “full confidence that the current regime was fit for purpose”. Te cruise lines’ operational safety review


and its four stages will clearly take some time, but Ashdown said that as soon as an improvement in best practice was identified, it would be implemented by the cruise industry ahead of any mandatory requirements coming from any new regulation. An example of this is new mustering requirements, which have already been put into force since the review was first announced in January. Responding to the Costa Concordia accident


the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) put out an information sheet on progress that has been made since Titanic as regards to passenger shipping. A number of areas are the subject of ongoing work at the IMO, according to the ICS’s James Langley. The FP Sub-Committee is reviewing the interim recommendations on evacuation analysis for new and existing passenger ships and the SLF Sub-Committee is revising, in the context of its work on subdivision and damage stability, the guidelines on safe return to port for passenger ships and revising SOLAS chapter II-1 subdivision and damage stability regulations. Nautilus International senior national


secretary Allan Graveson says that he believes that the safe return to port concept is a modern version of “unsinkable” and “brings about a false sense of security”. One major concern that he raises is the


rate of heel in a turn. Tis should be no more than 10deg when the wheel is put hard over, and Graveson cites one of the most prominent occurrences of large angles of heel as being Crown Princess in 2006. He points to RINA’s recent paper presented


to the Sub-Committee on Stability Loadlines and Fishing Vessels proposing changes to the Intact Stability Code 2008, since the formula used takes no account of the vessel’s turning ability - hence no guarantee of minimum stability margin in full-helm turns. As far as cruise ships are concerned: “Some


of the ships are on a knife-edge stability wise, not all of them, but some of them. Tis is typified by the fact that they are putting a lot of aluminium up top on these ships to reduce the weight.” Tat in itself brings with it a risk of fire,


he adds. Although he says in Crown Princess it was possible to blame the officer of the watch or the autopilot for the ship taking on a large angle of heel, “the fact is the ship should not heel over that far. It is OK to say that the wheel should be applied in a timely fashion to alter course, but what happens if the officer of the watch is faced with a yacht and has to put the wheel over?” Turning to the situation of when the hull


is breeched, Graveson says ships are only being built to two compartment survivability, which he states is no better than Titanic, “in fact it is worse”. Compartments on the ships go from one


side of the ship to the other, he explains. One of the recommendations in Lord Mersey’s report following the sinking of Titanic was a longitudinal, vertical, watertight bulkhead on each side of the ship as a means of preventing water flooding from one side of the vessel to the other. Turning to the present Graveson says: “You can look at a centre line bulkhead; you can look at double side skin and certainly more transverse subdivision. More transverse subdivision and two longitudinal bulkheads – it’s all there in Lord Mersey’s report.” With today’s technology it can be


achieved, he believes. It is not size that matters, he stresses: “it is how we apply the rules of construction”. You are never going to get an unsinkable ship, he argues: “what you hope to do is get the ship to sink gracefully. It must not capsize or plunge. If you have two longitudinal bulkheads you can counter-flood from port to starboard, starboard to port and along the length of the vessel as well”. One thing, he stresses, is that the report on


Costa Concordia must be as comprehensive as possible as, he says, there are “whispers” that it will be narrowly focused. “So what are we looking for? Simply, a safe


and sustainable cruise industry. In order to achieve this it needs to be acknowledged that there are problems and owners and regulators need to respond positively and, where possible, anticipate and mitigate the consequences of incidents. Firstly, acknowledge that humans make mistakes. While we can and must do a great deal to minimise this, something else is required. A good start would be to implement in full the recommendations of the Titanic inquiry. It is not too premature to implement the recommendations of Lord Mersey.” NA


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