PACIFIC [CONTINUED FROMPAGE 53]


of the Seventh Fleet, describes such incidents as a “tactical trigger with strategic implications.”


Some argue the risk of war — even an accidental, unanticipated war — is precluded by the economic links between China and its neighbors. After all, China needs the Asia-Pacific region’s markets, and the region needs China’s cash. China owns $900 billion in U.S. debt. China’s annual trade with the U.S. is some $450 billion, with Japan $300 billion, with South Korea $200 billion, and with Australia $90 billion.


We can hope such intricate trade ties mitigate the likelihood of conflict, but it pays to recall that European nations enjoyed deep commercial connections a century ago. German iron-ore imports from France, for instance, grew “almost 60-fold from 1900 to 1913,” according to historian Dale Copeland. Then came the summer of 1914.


Crumbling credibility?
Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 China has “a deep respect for U.S. military power.” We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the U.S. in the midst of massive military retrenchment, how long will that reservoir of respect last?


Even before Washington forced hundreds of billions in cuts onto the Pentagon, the size of the U.S. combat fleet had shrunk to 285 ships. Pressed by budget-cutters, the Navy might decommission aircraft carriers and lengthen the carrier procurement cycle. Just 45 percent of the Navy’s deployed aircraft are combat-ready. One in five ships are deemed less than satisfactory or unfit for combat. There are plans to cut Marine Corps end strength below 187,000.


Yet given the capabilities of the U.S. military, the balance of power still would seem to favor the U.S. — that is until one considers that America’s military assets and security commitments are spread all around the globe, while China’s are concentrated solely in its neighborhood.


Without mentioning China, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno warns, “We’ll have those who attempt to exploit our vulnerabilities, if we’re required to cut too much. … They will challenge our credibility, and they could miscalculate.”


Those words should sober all Americans. An atrophied, hollow force makes miscalculation more likely — and a peaceful Pacific far less likely. MO


— Alan W. Dowd writes on international security issues. His most recent article for Military Officer was “Another Look at Missile Defense,” October 2011.


APRIL 2012 MILITARY OFFICER 75

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