06


Opinion Oksana


Antonenko SPECIAL TO RN


n November 20, Russia and Nato drew a line under two decades of fric-


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GETTING INTO BED WITH NATO? O


tion since the end of the Cold War and declared a new era of “strategic partnership”. But what grounds are there to suppose that this can deliv- er a genuine transformation of relations? Several factors underpin this, but one word is paramount: pragmatism. Remarkably, the new-look relations were launched without grandiose joint dec- larations, fraught with con- tradictory expectations, lead- ing to new disappointments. Instead, the Lisbon declara- tion is geared towards prag- matic co-operation on issues of common concern. These areas have been identified not as a matter of “political ex- pedience”, but are the result of the jointly carried-out threat assessment. Then there is the context. Nato and Russia share more security concerns today than at any point since the Cold War, including instability in Afghanistan and the sur- rounding region; escalation of regional conflicts; prolif- eration of WMD and missile technology; and threats posed


by terrorist networks and or- ganised crime. In the aftermath of the glo- bal financial crisis, both Nato and Russia have fewer re- sources to spend on defence and security policy, and would significantly benefit


from a more cost-effective co-operative approach to common threats. Nato coun- tries and Russia today share a sense of vulnerability about the changing global balance of power. And the recent re- sets in US-Russian and


Polish-Russian relations helps to develop a greater consensus within Nato in fa- vour of more constructive and ambitious relations. The conflict in Afghanistan plays a significant role. Rus- sia and Nato share concerns


over current and future de- velopments there, particular- ly in the context of efforts to achieve a political settlement among different Afghan groups, and to prepare the exit strategy for the Interna- tional Security Assistance


Force (Isaf). Russia already provides Isaf with land routes to the north, through which almost 50pc of all non-lethal goods are supplied. Russia has been training and equip- ping Afghanpolice and army. And in Lisbon, the sides dis- cussed ways to promote re- gional strategy, including co- operation with Central Asian states on expanding existing routes. The summit also launched Russia’s co-operation with Nato over European missile defence, complementing the separate US-Russia dialogue. Russia has much to contrib- ute as it has both technology and funds to develop its own system. If developed to be fully compatible with the US and Nato systems, this could provide an important com- ponent for defending the East European and Central Asian sectors of the global missile defence system. Such complementary systems would ensure that Russia participates as an equal part- ner integrated with Nato under common information- sharing and monitoring ar- rangements. Russia would no longer be concerned over op- erational control, technology sharing and possible impact of any US/Nato system on its nuclear deterrence. More- over, such a system will in-


crease inter-dependency to such a level as to rule out a future confrontation between Russia and Nato. The Lisbon summit fell short in some areas, however. There was no move to implement overdue reform of the Nato- Russia Council, thus trans- forming it into a policy-mak- ing body rather than a tool


Most Russians no longer view Nato as a threat, partially due to its difficulties in the Afghan conflict


for managing relations with Russia. Nor were changes proposed to the Nato Stra- tegic Concept to offer Rus- sia an explicit, albeit condi- tional as for all members, open-door policy. Sceptics will also note that previous spells of optimism failed to deliver. In the Nine- ties, the partnership built around the Nato-Russia Founding Act was interrupt- ed by war in Kosovo. After the Rome declaration and the Nato-Russia Council there was the war with Georgia. But a chief cause for opti- mism is the continuing change in Russia itself, which


today is more ready than ever in its recent history for clos- er integration with Nato. Mr Medvedev has declared a comprehensive modernisa- tion strategy, which would require a favourable exter- nal environment, as well as closer economic ties with de- veloped Western countries. Russia has embarked on a deep reform of its armed forces which, if successful, will make them more close- ly resemble those of Nato. It has also signalled interest in expanding military-industri- al co-operation with these states, while already up to 30pc of the components in its modern weapons systems are foreign-made. Most Russians no longer view Nato as a threat, partially due to the alliance’s difficulties in Afghanistan and its inter- nal divisions over Iraq. In the last year, public support for “improving relations” rose by more than 10pc. And while Russia’s new military doc- trine lists potential Nato en- largement as the greatest “danger” to its security, most Russians accept it will not enlarge in the foreseeable fu- ture – a perception shared within Nato.


Oksana Antonenko is a sen- ior fellow, International In- stitute for Strategic Studies.


THE END OF THE ATOMIC OPTION T


Yevgeny Primakov Igor Ivanov


Evgeny Velikhov


Mikhail Moiseyev IZVESTIA


he year 2010 has seen important events in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and non-


proliferation, bringing a pos- itive impact on global secu- rity. The presidents of Russia and the United States have signed a new Strategic Arms Reduc- tion Treaty in Prague. If rat- ified by national parliaments, it will make strategic relations between the two nuclear pow- ers more stable, transparent and predictable. A summit on nuclear securi- ty in Washington has also passed resolutions to enhance the safety of nuclear materi- als worldwide. The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) con-


THE POLLS Nuclear arms reduction


DO YOU SUPPORT FURTHER REDUCTION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR ARSENALS?


Recent research conducted by Russia’s Public Opinion Re- search Centre (VCIOM) reveals that Russians’ attitudes on the necessity of nuclear reduction and non-proliferation has signifi- cantly changed. Opponents and critics of nuclear reduction have increased, perhaps surprisingly, since the Cold War. They say that Russia needs large nuclear stockpiles to protect the country in case of attack from abroad.


SOURCE: WWW.WCIOM.RU


cluded with the signing of the final document on strength- ening the treaty, its institu- tions and regimes. All of these are certainly very useful steps. So far, however, they have not touched upon the strategic nuclear ideolo- gy of mutual deterrence. It is the paradox of nuclear de- terrence that it largely ad- dresses the threats of the last century, while in the new glo- bal and multi-polar world, any major armed conflicts be- tween great powers and their allies are highly unlikely. At the same time, nuclear de- terrence is not effective against the new threats of the 21st century, including pro- liferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery sys- tems, global terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts, and cross-border crime. Moreover, nuclear deterrence in some cases can provoke prolifera- tion of weapons of mass de- struction and rocket technol- ogy, hindering co-operation


among great powers in their fight against such threats (joint development of anti- ballistic missile systems). To prevent the negative im- pact of nuclear deterrence on co-operation among global players, it is necessary to de- crease arms levels through agreements based on the prin- ciple of minimum sufficiency. Also to promote strategic sta- bility to ensure equal and in- divisible security for all and exclude the possibility of nu- clear first strike or rocket launch due to technical error or erroneous interpretation of the other party’s intentions, or a lack of time for decision- making by political leader- ship. The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty meets all these requirements, but much remains to be done. The next stage of nuclear dis- armament cannot be exclu- sively bilateral. It will require restrictions and confidence- building measures towards other nuclear countries. Un-


like the United States, Rus- sia’s geostrategic position makes it accessible to all nu- clear countries, which has to be taken into account in the process of further deep dis- armament. The concept of nuclear de- terrence has become an in- surmountable obstacle on the


Nuclear deterrence is not effective against 21st-century threats, among them global terrorism


long and difficult road to glo- bal nuclear disarmament. It is no secret that there are not just supporters but also op- ponents of nuclear disarma- ment in the United States, Russia and other countries. Some are still guided by Cold War stereotypes, but many voice specific and justified concerns related to the proc-


ess of disarmament. Their ar- guments cannot be simply shrugged off, but must be con- sidered seriously in order to remove existing obstacles in the way of further deep nu- clear reductions. For example, there is a wide- spread belief in Russia that the country’s nuclear poten- tial is the main element of Russia’s great power status, without which its political in- terests would not be respect- ed by the United States and other countries. We are convinced that Rus- sia’s foreign image will be largely ensured by its eco- nomic modernisation, rising living standards, social and political rights and freedoms, and development of science and culture. However, as long as the threat of “power pro- jection” and its direct appli- cation are used in interna- tional relations, Russia will have to retain sufficient mil- itary, including nuclear, po- tential to protect itself, its al-


lies and its lawful interests. Thus, nuclear disarmament requires greater confidence among nations, along with greater international securi- ty and stability. The Barack Obama admin- istration has revised its glo- bal security agenda, shifting to a new multilateral ap- proach focusing on strength- ening global security regula- tions and institutions, the use of diplomacy in dispute set- tlement, and equal partner- ship with Russia. It is important that these principles are reflected in the foreign policy of the United States and its allies. This ap- plies to anti-ballistic missile defence, conventional weap- ons and strategic non-nucle- ar weapons, as well as space militarisation plans. New far- reaching measures to boost confidence will soon be need- ed in these and other areas of arms reduction. Considering the long-term perspective, we came to the


conclusion that the world without nuclear weapons is not our existing world minus nuclear weapons. We need an international system based on other principles and institu- tions. A nuclear-free world shall not become a world free of wars using other weapons of mass destruction, conven- tional arms, advanced non- nuclear weapons and systems based on undiscovered prin- ciples of physics. It is not just about major wars, but about local conflicts as well. Today, small countries view nuclear weapons as a means to offset the huge ad- vantage of great powers in terms of conventional weap- ons. It is this idea that pro- vokes nuclear proliferation at the regional level, triggering the threat of nuclear terror- ism. To eliminate such threats, it is necessary to build reli- able mechanisms for peace- ful settlement of both major and local international and border conflicts.


Therefore, nuclear disarma- ment, which shall remain a strategic goal, necessitates a thorough overhaul of the en- tire international system. This will also help solve other key problems of the 21st cen- tury relating to the global economy and finance, energy supplies, environment, cli- mate, demography, epidem- ics, cross-border crime, and religious and ethnic extrem- ism. In this context, nuclear disarmament is not a goal in itself but rather an important area, precondition and meth- od for reorganising interna- tional life on more civilised principles and according to the demands of the new cen- tury.


Yevgeny Primakov is Rus- sia’s former prime minister and minister of foreign af- fairs.


Igor Ivanov is a former min- ister of foreign affairs.


Evgeny Velikhov is president of the Russian Scientific Cen- tre “Kurchatov Institute”.


Mikhail Moiseyev is former chief of the general staff.


WHY ARE JOURNALISTS BEING KILLED? E


Georgy Bovt


SPECIAL TO RN


arlier this month, Oleg Kashin, a reporter for the leading Russian daily Kommersant,


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was beaten half to death near his home in the historic cen- tre of Moscow. The same day, a CCTV recording was “leaked” on the web in which you cannot discern the faces of the attackers, but can clearly see that they were beating the reporter not merely to intimidate or “warn” him, but to kill him. It is a miracle that he sur- vived after being clubbed so many times over the head with an iron bar. This is yet another brutal at- tack on a journalist in Rus- sia, where eight media work- ers have fallen victim to violence this year alone, mur- dered “for their profession”. A total of 40 assaults have been reported. About the same time anoth- er journalist, Anatoly Adam- chuk, was assaulted – thank- fully with less severe injuries – in the Moscow region town of Zhukovsky. A writer for a local newspaper, Adamchuk has been a vocal critic of ex- tensive tree removal in a neighbouring forest as part of a road-building project. Two days before Kashin’s beating, Konstantin Fetisov, an environmental activist, was savagely battered in


Legislative protection is clearly welcome, but to make such safeguards work, Russian society must undergo a course of ‘political therapy’


Khimki, another town on the outskirts of Moscow. He re- mains in a coma. All these attacks have made headlines in both the print and web-based media, but it was the murderous beating of Oleg Kashin that caused a firestorm across the jour- nalistic community. It was covered, uncharacteristical- ly, by all the national televi-


sion channels. The same day, President Medvedev made a public statement offering as- surances that the culprits would be punished and that he would personally oversee the investigation. The police have committed huge re- sources to investigating the crime. Although not one high-profile attack on a Rus- sian journalist has been suc-


cessfully investigated (hit men have been caught, but never those who commis- sioned them), this time the authorities appear more de- termined to get results. Why are journalists beaten and murdered in Russia? Un- less it is in the Caucasus, where homicidal score-set- tling is a common pastime that can be easily provoked by a variety of pretexts, other Russian regions are not so politically vibrant as to make killing of one’s opponents worth the risk. As a rule, the real causes lie in commercial interests — often associated with government corruption — that were or could be po- tentially jeopardized by pub- lic revelations. Obviously, campaigns by local environ- mental groups against road construction as in Khimki is at odds with the aims of some vested interests, which are commonly intertwined with corrupt local or federal offi- cials who are lining their pockets off big contracts. The media and a share (though not the majority) of the public not indifferent to such outrages keep wonder- ing who would want Kashin dead, and why. Everyone in- variably trots out the line that the police will probably find the attackers, but there is little chance of getting at those who ordered the kill- ing. Some also propose new laws to protect journalists. Such legislative protection is


clearly welcome, but to make safeguards work, even if passed into law, Russian so- ciety must undergo a course of political therapy. There are many countries in the world where journalists are mur- dered, including the wealth- iest nations. But as a rule they are in greater danger in societies that have little re- spect for genuine discourse and real information. For Russia, this “therapy” should have the primary ob- jective of making society more open, achieved through pressuring authorities to publish information; forbid- ding the arbitrary classifica- tion of documents as “secret”; putting an end to the offi- cial-use-only game; system- atically punishing those who withhold information and ig- nore data requests from the press; and adopting a law on freedom of information. All these steps combined will reduce risks for journalists. The more accessible infor- mation about government bodies and businesses be- comes, the more ingrained the habit of talking to the press through something more than clenched teeth will be.


And the weaker the motiva- tion for killing those who say or write what to some seems a word too much.


Georgy Bovt is a Moscow- based political commenta- tor.


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