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Reflections

FOREIGN POLICY WITH A SMILE ON ITS FACE

Fyodor Lukyanov

THE MOSCOW TIMES

the West is a heated topic for foreign policy analysts and journalists. This was sparked by the appearance of a foreign ministry docu- ment released to Russian Newsweek on how Russia could exploit certain exter- nal factors to help modern- ise the country and strength- en its position in the global arena. The document assumes that the global financial crisis has created new conditions in which the traditional glo- bal leaders – the US and the EU – are losing their advan- tage and new global power centres are emerging. Rus- sia should take advantage of these trends and should create “alliances for mod- ernisation” to promote its own development and strengthen its positions do- mestically and globally. But the West is not the only focus of the document. It puts particular importance on integrating the econo- mies of the former Soviet republics, opposing attempts by forces outside the region to weaken Russia and using the crisis to extend its eco- nomic influence into the Baltic states “given the sharp fall in their investment at- tractiveness for the EU states and the serious drop in value of their assets”. In addition, the document takes a firm stance on Rus- sia’s strategic interest in the Arctic and on “limiting ac- cess to the Arctic by play- ers from outside the region, including Nato and the Eu- ropean Union”. One of the document’s main leitmotivs, however, is that Russia should take advan- tage of the fact that the West is becoming weaker and less self-confident. Russia should assist the EU in solving its major international prob- lems in exchange for ad- dressing the Kremlin’s con- cerns and proposals on a new European security ar- chitecture. The main mes- sage for Europe is that Rus- sia wants closer business

T

he “secret plans” of the Kremlin and for- eign ministry to im- prove relations with

DRAWING BY IGOR DEMKOVSKY

Russia’s relations with the West really are changing, but because of any new strategy in Moscow

and political ties with the EU, but on an equal basis. There were no surprises in the list of countries that Russia considers priority. Russia is placing its bets on Germany, France, Italy and Spain, while relations re- main chilly with Britain. The final draft of this document will include an expanded list of priority countries and “national interests” once in- dustry lobbyists have had their say. The document has interest- ing references to China, sug- gesting that Russia “pay spe- cial attention to the growing role of China in internation- al affairs, including the im-

pact that activities by Bei- jing have on our global and regional interests”. That is probably the strongest lan- guage that Russia can afford to use publicly to express its concern over China’s stead- ily growing influence. This section of the document also mentions that Russia enjoys leverage in the United Na- tions Security Council where “under current conditions, the Chinese more frequent- ly need our support than we need theirs.” Furthermore, Moscow ex- pects to receive concrete eco- nomic benefits in return for supporting Iran, Syria and Cuba – states subjected to international pressure and sanctions. At the same time, Moscow apparently wants to avoid the type of experi- ence it had with Libya. After Tripoli voluntarily gave up its nuclear weapons pro- gramme, cooperated with the West on cracking down on global terrorism and was removed from the West’s list

of pariah states, it prompt- ly forgot the support it had received from Russia dur- ing all the years that it was on that list. The foreign ministry took a firm stance toward Russia’s strategic interests in the Arctic and the former So- viet republics, areas where the Kremlin feels the most pressure from the West, it is clear that the document places high priority on strengthening business in- terests with the West. But this is nothing new. For most of his presidency, Vladimir Putin attempted to establish business relations with his Western partners on a mu- tually beneficial basis. Start- ing with the now-forgotten idea of “debt for investment” in 2000 and ending with the desire to build relations based on an energy “asset swap” in 2005, all of Rus- sia’s proposals envisioned an intensive rapprochement with the West. But all of these plans fell

through. The US and the EU were focused on ideological, political and economic ex- pansion, while Russia was repeatedly turned away by the West. Competitiveness, envy and inflammatory rhet- oric eclipsed rational, prag- matic approaches. Europe and the US had planned to base their relations with Russia on the idea of com- mon values, but Moscow de- cisively rejected that ap- proach. In addition, Putin’s style of behaviour and pe- culiar sense of humour did not go over well in the West. Putin, who has always de- spised international politi- cal hypocrisy and who con- siders public candour to be a virtue, only managed to find a common language with a handful of Western politicians who shared his views. That was not enough to achieve closer overall ties with the West. But relations are more bal- anced now. Both sides have de facto recognised the lim-

its of their own capabilities. The West does not have the resources to dominate the former Soviet republics, and Europe is drowning in its own problems. Russia has recognised the vulnerabil- ity of its economy and has set realistic priorities. This means that the Kremlin should step back from its former obstinate positions and be more amenable to compromise. President Dmitry Medvedev made a revolutionary state- ment during an interview with a Danish journalist in April. When asked what face Russia should present to the outside world, Medvedev smiled and said: “It must be one that I have now: a smil- ing face. If this is the face of Russia, that of someone who smiles at other coun- tries, I think that it’s the right one.” What’s more, Rus- sia should not “gnash its teeth at anyone, get angry, sulk or feel offended,” Medvedev said. No Russian leader had ever spoken that self-critically. Russia’s relations with the West really are changing, but not because of any new strategy in Moscow. The for- eign ministry document sets forth the same objectives and now defines them even more clearly than before. But the tactics are becom- ing more flexible. More spe- cifically, Russia is now ready to offer “rewards” for con- structive relations with the West in addition to its ha- bitual and overused “retali- ation” for destructive rela- tions. Examples are the revised approaches to the US, Poland and Ukraine. If Putin’s policy was largely defined by the motto of “whoever offends us won’t last three days”, a remark he made in 2000, then 10 years later Medvedev has formu- lated a more positive ver- sion: “Smile at those who smile at us.” This latest attempt at prag- matism might prove to be more productive – that is, if unforeseen domestic or ex- ternal factors do not inter- fere.

Fyodor Lukyanov is editor of Russia in Global Affairs.

Originally published in

The Moscow Times

WHAT LONDON CAN LEARN FROM MOSCOW’S TANDEM

Paul Carroll

SPECIAL TO RN

to Britain. However, follow- ing the indecisive outcome in the general election of May 6, the conservative/liberal co- alition between David Cam- eron and Nick Clegg seems to have taken its lead from the East rather than the West.

In Russia, the so-called “tan- dem” arrangement between president Dmitry Medvedev and prime minister Vladimir Putin, in force for more than two years, has been quietly effective. While European dithering threatened to make matters worse, Russia’s han- dling of the economic crisis was praised in a World Bank report of November 2008: “The government’s policy re- sponse so far – swift, com- prehensive and co-ordinated – has helped limit the impact [of the crisis].” Although the Russian tan- dem is fundamentally differ- ent to the Cameron/Clegg model (Medvedev is a head of state, Cameron is not; Putin and Medvedev are both from the same party, Camer- con and Clegg are not; Medvedev is Putin’s anoint- ed successor, Clegg and Cam- eron are former adversaries),

R

eceived wisdom states that whenever a new trend grips America, it soon makes its way

they have a lot in common. On the face of it, both ver- sions match a tough-talking conservative traditionalist with a reforming, progressive idealist. However, in reality the protagonists are a lot closer in outlook to their re- spective tandem partners than we might first think. David Cameron has de- scribed himself as a “Liber- al Conservative”; Nick Clegg agrees they are discovering they have more in common than they realised; and Medvedev and Putin often

All four men are signed up to reform agendas – albeit within their own frames of reference

swap roles as “good cop, bad cop”. All four men are fully signed up to “modernising” or “reform” agendas – albeit within their own frames of reference – and all four men understand the need to con- trol and consolidate the cen- tre ground to marginalise dissenting voices from both Left and Right. All men share a strong sense of pragmatism. In the shell- shocked realpolitik of the post-crisis era, they under- stand the simple need to “get things done”. For example,

both tandems want to stream- line their armies of bureau- crats – Medvedev/Putin in order to shorten chains of command and combat cor- ruption; Cameron/Clegg to indicate they are deadly se- rious about getting on top of public finances. So, what can Nick and Dave learn from the Vova and Dima show? Medvedev and Putin have perfected the dou- ble act Clegg and Cameron must learn, because every- one – media, opponents and disgruntled supporters alike – will seize upon any per- ceived difference of opinion in order to drive a wedge be- tween them. To avoid discord, Medvedev and Putin have adopted the strategy of both saying the same things when questioned about their rela- tionship, exuding an aura of complete mutual under- standing. The Cameron/Clegg experiment will falter if they do not adopt a similar strat- egy. They will have to dem- onstrate their like-minded- ness and willingness to put party differences to one side “for the sake of the nation”. As with Medvedev/Putin be- fore them, Cameron and Clegg have locked themselves into the notion of partner- ship as an unbreakable, al- most sacred, gentleman’s agreement. A lot rides on this relationship, because the British tandem is inherently more unstable than its Rus-

sian countrepart, for two rea- sons. First, theirs is a mar- riage of convenience. Second, in a way that the Russian tandem does not, Cameron and Clegg have to carry their respective parties – and, by extension, the country – be- hind them on the strength their personal bond. It prob- ably helps that the men seem to like each other. The Medvedev/Putin tandem has reached a point of bal- ance, not through the weak- ening or strengthening of one of the participants, but by maintaining something clos- er to parity between them. In order to maintain this par- ity, they operate a veto sys- tem where each can block the proposals of the other. Here, once again, the Cameron/ Clegg axis seems to be ahead of the game. Their recent 32- page manifesto reads as a paean to collaborative action, with many long-held policies from both sides dropped or kicked into the long grass to facilitate the action they agree on. Mirroring the situation ex- isting in pre-2008 Russia, Britain is totally unused to the concept of a tandem ar- rangement based on the per- sonal mandates of two men, so changing existing power structures was always going to be the order of the day. While in Russia this has re- sulted in the creation of nu- merous committees and com-

missions set up by both Putin and Medvedev, and tinker- ing with the presidential term of office, in Britain, in- itial moves by the coalition include controversial propos- als to increase a Commons dissolution vote majority to 55pc, and “realigning” the House of Lords. Cameron has also succeeded in bouncing his Tory MPs into accepting front-bench interference in their influential (and poten- tially obstructive) backbench group, the 1922 Committee. So what of the future? In

Both tandem agreements can be seen, to a greater or lesser degree, as works in progress

Russia, amid signs of frac- tures in the tandem, there is a growing feeling that Medvedev the protégé has been quietly establishing his own power base – which may or may not threaten the sta- bility of his agreement with Putin. While the British tan- dem promises a brave new world of political co-opera- tion, it’s far too soon to say that we are witnessing the death throes of traditional party politics. Cameron and Clegg are sure to incur the wrath of at least part of the

electorate, especially when their much-trailed “tough de- cisions” begin to bite. And, as career politicians both, David Cameron and Nick Clegg must surely foster the ambition to wield power alone. Both tandems will always have to contend with the dis- senting voices of opponents who fundamentally disagree on policy. In Britain, there is a rump of disaffected voters which, despite voting Lib- Dem to keep the Tories out, got David Cameron; in Rus- sia, there are those who be- lieve a vote for Medvedev is just a vote to keep Putin in power. As it stands, both tandem agreements can be seen as works in progress to a small- er or greater extent. In Brit- ain, it’s an exciting time even, perhaps, for opponents of the ruling coalition. The prospect of a new politics, combined with a back-to-the-wall at- titude towards economic belt-tightening, has bred a kind optimistic determina- tion in the country; this will ensure that the Cameron/ Clegg tandem gets the ben- efit of the doubt, at least in the short term. In the longer term, as with Russia people will want to see how the fine talk is converted into action before deciding the overall success of the venture. Nothing lasts forever, and a week is a long time in poli- tics. But don’t be surprised to see the British political elite following developments in Moscow just a little bit more closely. Who knows, the experience of riding the tan- dem may even draw the two nations closer as they at- tempt to create the consen- sus politics of the future.

GREEK FREEFALL

Simon Novoprudsky

GAZETA.RU

When such a small economy has a budget deficit of hun- dreds of billions of euros, it can’t be interpreted simply as evidence of an irrespon- sible parliament. In Greece, governments change fre- quently – the actively work- ing population is responsi- ble for this. And when the European Union extends a hand of help to the coun- try – albeit, in part to main- tain global financial security – this should be gracious- ly accepted, under the pro- posed terms, without rallies that don’t have the slightest chance of achieving the or- ganisers’ objectives. Greece, with its long-history of civi- lization, should ideally react differently to the current cir- cumstances than, say, Kyr- gyzstan. However, at least according to the video foot- age from both countries, the differences don’t seem that great.

BIBLIOPHILE

WORDS OF PITY AND DESIRE

Nora

FitzGerald

RUSSIA NOW

V

era Pavlova is a best- selling poet in Rus- sia whose collection,

If There is Something

to Desire, has been translat- ed into English by her hus- band. Her compact poems ca- ress and assuage. They also burn, brilliantly.

Pavlova’s taut, often erotic works probe the intensity of her feelings and the murk of her interior life with ferocity: “Your arms are the sleeves of a straitjacket / A life vest to stay afloat.” That this poem is directed at her husband and translator, Steven Seymour, heightens the intimacy of

If There Is Something to De-

sire, Pavlova’s first collection of poetry to be translated into English (Alfred A Knopf). Pavlova has an almost cult- like following. She is a dev- astating beauty; in inter- views, she wears her vulnerability without ap- pearing addled. Pavlova’s two college-aged girls have in- herited the poet’s talent and beauty, and mother and daughters have been photo- graphed together for Russian Elle. On their website, Sey- mour appears like a ballast to sirens. On paper, he is deft, precise, loving and never pre- cious. He has become Pav- lova’s conduit to the English- speaking world. At times, we wince with her as she revels in self-pity: “You will step out and get ciga- rettes and realise I have aged / Lord what a pitiful, tedi-

ous pantomime.” Other poems suggest she is composing words while still on her back, alone, after love-making. When the inevitability of cer- tain solitude returns, she compares loneliness to a rap- ist. “Begged him / Do not fall asleep / But he did, and in the dark of the night loneli- ness took hold of me, like an incubus / Furious and rough was the onslaught of un- chaste hands.” Pavlova can’t help but beck- on the spirit of Anna Akhma- tova, whose early collections were also about love, jealousy, guilt and torment. Akhmatova, an epic beauty in her youth, wrote poems that were tight, short, and deceptively simple in their precise metre. Joseph Brod- sky’s words about Akhma- tova apply to Pavlova, too. He once wrote that Russians learned Akhmatova’s poems by heart to help them weath- er the drama of their own life and their own history. This could be said of Pavlo- va today. Brodsky also wrote that Akhmatova wrote poems as if she was average, just like everyone else. Pavlova’s persistently per- sonal verse is spoken in the voice of everywoman. She in- vites her readers into her pri- vate world, at the same time reminding us that we are all sensuous creatures raging against loneliness and mor- tality. She documents her raging for us: “The voice. The handwriting. The gait. Maybe the smell of my hair. That’s all. Go ahead, resur- rect me.”

07

PRESS

REVIEW

THE GREEK TRAGEDY

democrats who were fighting for the downtrodden. It’s not a coincidence that the nation- al parliament recently passed a measure requiring veter- ans’ pension payments to be made to those who fought on the side of the Reds. As a consequence, today’s belief in state paternalism – and animosity toward severe fiscal cuts, culture of revo- lutionary violence and blos- soming of anarchistic and other extreme elements – is the price the Greeks are pay- ing for their ignorance of a different reality. The obstinate position of a significant portion of the Greek population (“let capi- talism pay”) and the infantile hope that the crisis can be overcome without losses, and that anyone is responsible for it except the Greeks, are the result of the comfortable life enjoyed based on falsified economic data.

TO THROW OUT GREECE, AND TAKE ESTONIA INTO THE EUROZONE?

Anna Kaledina

KP.RU

LESSONS FROM THE GREEK REVOLT

Maxim Artemyev

VEDOMOSTI

The Greeks, having missed a period of “true social- ism” thanks to a US-backed victory in their civil war (1946-49), were left with the illusion of a missed op- portunity. Greek Stalinists and communists are viewed not as a group dedicated to instilling an authoritari- an regime, but as antifascist

On the same day the Euro- commission approved a meas- ure to unify the economic policies of its member states, it recommended accepting Estonia as a full member from January 1 of next year. It seems that in order to sta- bilise the currency, it would be better to proceed under the logo “no one in, no one out”. I can only guess that the Eurocommission’s logic is as follows: the Eurozone’s bosses want to show that in Baghdad, excuse me, Brus- sels, everything is calm. There are, as they said in the USSR, isolated weaknesses, but they are local. And they are being dealt with. The bailout alone cost 750m euros. Therefore, life – apparently – goes on and the door to the Eurozone is open to countries meeting the strict Maastricht require- ments.

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