06
Opinion
LETTERS
TO THE EDITOR
We did not fight for democracy
There are two sides to every question and, in this case, it is as valid to ask what we were fi ghting against as much as to ask what were we fi ghting for. Capitalist countries of the West were eager to see Hitler’s hordes fi ghting against Russia, hoping to see the defeat of communism. However, with country after country falling to the Germans, the need to defend themselves became urgent. It wasn’t so much a question of fi ghting for “democratic ideals”, but of fi ghting for one’s existence. Also, following the capitalist crash in 1929, poverty was wide- spread in the West (I speak from personal experience). War brought relief from unemployment and gave purpose to life. When the war was fi nished, the poor’s pre-war experience convinced them of the need for something better than capi- talism and the profi t motive. Sadly, America had other ideas. It hated anything that restrict- ed capitalist activities. After the war ended, despite the enor- mous sacrifi ce made by the Russian people and the Red Army, the Americans cunningly undermined the left-wing govern- ments of Western Europe by spreading fear of Soviet commu- nism. The rest is modern history. The great irony is that in defeating the corporate power of Eu- ropean fascism, the wheel has turned full circle and we are now in a world that is dominated by corporations driven by the profi t motive under the guise of American imperialism. Why else the current confl icts?
DAVID KENNEDY, UK
More Russians believe in Perestroika
The number of Russians who are unhappy with the results of Per- estroika launched by former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in April 1985 has almost halved over the last 10 years, from 75pc to 42pc, according to a poll carried out in January by VTsIOM (the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Centre) among residents of 140 locations in Russia. Twenty-four pc of highly educated and affluent Russians consider that they gained from the reforms (as opposed to 11pc in 1999). The poorly educated and those with low incomes view the results of Perestroika negatively (60pc). Currently Russians do not share a single view on whether Per- estroika was necessary. Hence in the view of 41pc of respondents, everything should have been left as it was before 1985: 38pc do not agree. Those who are not sure has risen 20pc (from 7-10pc in previous years).
THE POLLS
FYODOR LUKYANOV
JOURNALIST
he idea of Russian membership in Nato has, until recently, be- longed in the realm of
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PLAYING THE POWER GAME
T
fantasy. However, in March 2010, a group of German po- litical and military leaders, including former defence minister Volker Ruhe and General Klaus Naumann, former chief of Nato’s mili- tary planning committee, called on Nato to invite Mos- cow to join the organisation. The thinking was simple: without Russia, there can be no adequate security system in Europe, and Nato’s capa- bility will not be sufficient to maintain stability in Eurasia. Developments in the past two years have made it clear that the future of Nato lies in increasing its membership. Second, most US allies are not prepared to engage in combat all over the world to further America’s strategic interests. Third, the US has revised its priorities in favour of the regions (the Middle and Far East) where the Eu- ropean states have limited interests. “The most success- ful military-political alliance in history”, as Nato calls itself, needs new goals.
A global Nato has not mate- rialised, and many commen- tators believe the Alliance may have to return to its ini- tial mission of safeguarding European security. American political analyst Charles Kupchan, comment- ing on the article by Volker Ruhe and his friends, notes that a European security structure that excludes Rus- sia makes little sense strate- gically. Without Russia, it can only make sense if the former line of confrontation is re- stored.
The Russian-Georgian war, Afghanistan and a dramatic shift of America’s focus toward China have made it clear that the future of Nato lies in mechanically increas- ing its membership
This is, essentially, also the message of an article by mil- itary strategy expert Andrew Bacevich in the latest issue of Foreign Policy. In his opinion, the US should no longer count on its European allies, who have lost their appetite for doing battle. However, Washington will probably preserve its minimum pres- ence in Europe in order to keep the alliance together as
a safeguard for European stability. But that would still not provide a solution for the future of Nato and European stability, and that means that the Russian question cannot be sidestepped. The idea of admitting Russia is clever. On the one hand, Nato will not depart from the enlargement doctrine and, most importantly, will pre- serve the function of the
main, if not the only, security structure in Europe. On the other, it provides an answer to Moscow’s complaints that it does not take its interests into account and harms it by its actions. Certainly, the opinion of Volk- er Ruhe is not universally shared: the majority in Amer- ica and in many European countries cannot imagine a formal alliance with Russia. But let us imagine that the pro-Russian view prevails and Moscow is offered the opportunity to seriously dis- cuss joining Nato. The fi rst knee-jerk reaction would be that this is simply impossible. Russia sees itself as an independent power centre in a multi-polar world and therefore should not bind itself by commitments to an- other power centre. While all the Nato member countries are formally equal, the US is the undisputed hegemonic force. Washington has no tra- dition of equal alliances. One can imagine America relin- quishing its dominance only if it is dramatically enfee- bled. But in that case one could imagine a new version of “Fortress America”, with- drawing from Europe, rather than the US becoming a rank-and-fi le ally. The same is true of Russia. All this is valid today, but one should never say never. China is the variable that can change the whole equation. Neither the USA nor Russia knows how to deal with that country which, after the end of the Cold War, has managed to benefi t from global chang- es. If China’s economic and political clout continue to grow at the present rate, both Moscow and Washington will have reason to consider vari- ous options of balancing its infl uence. That would throw a totally different complexion on the
whole problem of Russia’s Nato membership. But the situation will not cease to be controversial. One would have thought that an alliance between Moscow and Wash- ington would make both more confi dent in the face of Chinese might. But Russia and America’s fears are dif- ferent. For America, China is a potential global problem and a challenge to its world leadership; for Russia, it is the danger of being depend- ent on its economically much more powerful neighbour. Accordingly, Washington would gain more if it induces China to pursue a policy of regional expansion, in other words in the direction of Rus- sia. Moscow, on the contrary, would like to see China seek- ing global dominance rather than consolidating its grip on adjacent territories. To depart from political cor- rectness, in the event of the further rise of the PRC, Rus- sia would be interested in set- ting Beijing and Washington against each other, while the US would seek to do the same with Beijing and Moscow. Europe would then fi nd itself in an odd situation: em- broiled in the settling of ac- counts between big geopolit- ical players thereby risking its own tranquillity.
A stable security system aris- es when there is a balance of forces and interests between key players. Nothing remote- ly like it has been observed in Europe or the world since the end of the Cold War. Each of the potential members of the new system will be afraid of being short-changed and misjudging the likely devel- opment of events. For this reason, serious discussion of Russia’s Nato membership is yet to take place.
First published in
The Moscow Times
SOURCE: WWW.WCIOM.RU
It is mainly supporters of the CPRF (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) (73pc) and elderly respond- ents (57pc) who believe eve- rything should have been left as it was before Perestroika. As a rule, supporters of A Just Russia (48pc) and 25-44 year old Russians (45-46pc) op- pose them.
Most Russians still think that the main result of Perestroika was “a rise in uncertainty about the future” (46pc against 59pc in 1999). In second and third place are “a rise in chaos and confu- sion in the governing of the country” (35pc as opposed to 66pc) and “a crisis in ethnic relations” (30pc as opposed to 38pc).
The sociologists noted that over the last 10 years there has been a signifi cant rise in the number of Russians who are pointing out the positive results of Perestroika. The number of those who think it was “the start of the econom- ic strengthening of the coun- try” has risen from 7pc to 21pc.
A further 18pc (as opposed to 2pc in 1999) see “the strengthening of the coun- try’s international posi- tions” among the results of the reforms of that time. On March 5 Mikhail Gor- bachev presented his report “Breakthrough towards freedom and democracy”, which was dedicated to the 25th anniversary of Per- estroika. In the former presi- dent’s opinion, the multi- party system in Russia only exists on paper, while “in practice many of the fl aws of a one-party system are being reproduced”. “The current Russian real- ity convinces me that the breakthrough towards free- dom and democracy which was started by Perestroika remains relevant. Moreover, new impulses and actions by the authorities and soci- ety as a whole aimed at de- mocratisation are needed. Otherwise the ambitious plans for the country’s mod- ernisation cannot be real- ised,” Gorbachev noted.
anger is often directed not only at the perpetrators, but against the government. A terrorist attack is therefore a powerful weapon with deep repercussions for soci- ety: that is the goal of these psychological attacks. It’s impossible to cover up the image of unpunished pub- lic murder with any statistics. Terrorist attacks clearly dem- onstrate the weakness of the powers that be and peoples’ vulnerability. The point of an attack is simple: show the ter- rorists’ strength, and make all of society a victim. The terrorists’ logic is simple: all’s fair in war. We’re weaker in direct combat, so instead we
UNITED WE MUST STAND
S
Leonid
Radzikhovsky
ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
ociety’s first reac- tions to a terrorist attack are predict- able – confusion, fear and anger. This
turn the entire country into a war zone. That is how terror- ists act all over the world. Yes – terrorism is indeed a global phenomenon. It’s equally clear that many terrorist attacks are commit- ted by Muslims. To deny this obvious fact out of political correctness is as stupid as col- lectively blaming millions of Muslims peacefully living in predominantly Christian countries for the terrorist at- tacks. Yet that is exactly what terrorists want – for all Mus- lims to be labelled as “poten- tial extremists.” There is clearly a lack of soli- darity in the fi ght against ter- rorism. Terrorists have this sol- idarity. There exists a well-or- ganised “worldwide web” of terror. This system – within which people recognise each other by their “ideological odour” from afar – allows them to work together and coordi- nate very effectively. Therefore, a “terrorist international” of Islamist extremists exists.
Therefore, whether we like it or not, we are allies with the United States. In Afghanistan, they are fighting also in de- fence of our interests. Just like in the North Caucasus we are fi ghting in defence of theirs. At the same time, unfortu- nately, there’s no “anti-terror-
Terrorists have solidarity. They recognise each other by their ‘ideological odour’ from afar
ist coalition” .What is prevent-
ing this? Deep political and ideological disagreements. Even though the disagree- ments between the US and the USSR in 1941 were more sub- stantial than those today, dif- ference is that in those days we understood that a common threat unites. Today, we all lack that understanding. At the same time, it seems our
ambitious ideological differ- ences are almost made up. I will speak on our behalf. I can’t count the number of times I’ve heard idiotic con- versations about “Western forces” being behind the ter- rorist attacks. To be fair, such rumours have seen their pop- ularity fall as of late. But this isn’t enough. Not seeing the real threat, and confusing one’s potential enemies and allies is the best way to lose the war. In Russia, we have a unique un- derstanding of terror. Let’s be honest, we believe that terror is what happens “in Russia”. And we understand “Russia” not as the territories within our borders, but all of them except for the North Cauca- sus. In the minds of many Rus- sians, there’s a mark that sep- arates the North Caucasus from the rest of Russia. Only extreme attacks on a shocking scale – like Beslan – are able to shine through this prism of understanding that perme- ates our minds.
“Normal” terrorist attacks that occur almost daily there rarely register as something out of the ordinary in our col- lective mindset. We’ve gotten used to them, and I feel the res- idents of those regions may have a symmetrical attitude toward the rest of Russia. And maybe these feelings are coming back to us like a boo- merang. Terror is connected like the veins and arteries of an organism. The peak of this terror occurred in 2004: at- tacks in the Moscow Metro, plane bombings, Beslan and Kadyrov’s assassination. Over 500 people died in that year alone.
Then came a certain quiet. Battles continued in the North Caucasus, but, we were as- sured, with less intensity. Only a few remaining “demons” were left to be fi nished off. Of course, there was no way to objectively determine whether the number of these “demons” was decreasing or not, and just what exactly
they were demanding. And now we’re again seeing more attacks: the Nevsky Ex- press bombing (27 dead) on November 27, now – only four months later – 34 dead, dozens injured, an explosion “right under the nose” of the FSB. And ahead of us, the big polit- ical game of 2011-12 (parlia- mentary and presidential elections).
Not being an expert on secu- rity, I’ll limit myself to one modest comment. The FSB can’t work any more profes- sionally than the rest of our government (which leaves much to be desired). Therefore – that is the quality of their work. So the question is: what do we have to change in our government as a whole? Today, the government is equally “strong” in all its facets: left unchanged, it could not make it through the 2011-12 gutter.
Leonid Radzikhovsky is a columnist at Rossiyskaya Gazeta.
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question asked – usually by a foreign journalist – “How is your relationship with president Putin developing?” There is a million variations of asking this question, but the subtext is always the same: “When will you quar- rel, at last?” So, two years have passed, but the predicted quarrel never materialised. The rea- son for that was certainly not the absence of news. On the contrary, two years of presi- dent Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential term were a dif- fi cult time for the country, a time of upheavals on both
MEDVEDEV, A HI-TECH PRESIDENT
E
Dmitry Babich
RIA NOVOSTI
very time Russia’s president Dmitry Medvedev meets the press, there is always the same
domestic and foreign fronts. The war in Georgia in Au- gust 2008, global financial crisis, several “waves” of un- employment, an upsurge of violence in North Caucuses and now two terrorist acts in Moscow do not provide a rosy background for a “quiet pres- idency.” In similar circum- stances, in the late Eighties members of the Soviet Un- ion’s communist elite quar- reled badly with each other, at a certain moment leaving the country rudderless and fi nally making the collapse of the Soviet Union inevitable. Both Putin and Medvedev belong to two generations which lived through this pe- riod of Russian history, with their lives profoundly marked by the upheaval born out of a confl ict inside the country’s elite. They witnessed the sad end of this elite, with some of its top members, once the
masters of the country, living on meager post-Soviet pen- sions. Before making Medvedev his successor in 2007, Putin obviously agreed with him not to make the country a hostage to the power ambi- tions of two men, as it was the case between Mikhail Gor- bachev and Boris Yeltsin in 1991. So, whatever the differ- ences between Putin and Medvedev, they so far man- age to find consensus or at least to keep the divisions “in the house,” much to the dis- tress of “sympathetic” Russia watchers in East European countries and other coun- tries further to the West. Eagerly expecting the two
men’s quarrel for power, Rus- sia’s “sympathisers” in the West in fact prevent this quarrel by their own policies. Attempts to sideline Russia as a source of energy for the rest of Europe and an impor-
tant transit country, constant “Russia bashing” at interna- tional forums and in the media destroy any Gor- bachev-style illusions about “Western help” if Medvedev ever nurtured them. Finding a consensus with
the premier, however, did not mean that Medvedev would limit his reformist ambitions. As a lawyer, Medvedev tack- led Russia’s worst problems, long neglected by successive Kremlin administrations: police brutality, a slow and ineffective justice system, the appalling situation in some of the prisons, corruption in law-enforcement bodies. As the president, Medvedev has enormous powers in the sphere of personnel policy and he did not hesitate to use them. In the last six months alone, Medvedev made more firing orders than Putin in the fi rst fi ve years of his pres- idency. The head of the fed-
eral prison service, the chief of Moscow police, the top fi g- ures in Russia’s sports estab- lishment – some of these peo- ple had the reputation of being “irremovable” until Medvedev signed his decrees. Insistence on strict executive discipline, making state offi- cials pay with their position for neglect of their duties – these are Medvedev’s own qualities, running counter to the tradition of cozy cama- raderie which fl ourished in Russia’s state service since the mid-Nineties.
Being a modern man,
Medvedev is trying to put technology at the service of democracy, eagerly embrac- ing the ideas of “electronic government,” digital televi- sion and internet revolution. In fact, technology has al- ready done important serv- ice to democracy in Russia. All cases of misconduct by state officials (“forgotten”
car accidents with the par- ticipation of infl uential peo- ple or their relatives, abuse of powers by policemen, etc.) immediately become topics of hot debate and video ex- change on the internet, with Medvedev, himself an ardent blogger, never failing to take an action in the framework of his powers. In his inter- view to Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria several months ago, Medvedev said that in the in- ternet connected world there can be no “forbidden sub- jects,” and Russia is no ex- ception from this rule. One could not agree more with the president. In the modern world, being a pres- ident on the internet is some- times even more important than being the president in your own warm presidential office.
Dmitry Babich is a RIA Nov- osti commentator.
PERSONAL ARCHIVES
RG
PERSONAL ARCHIVES
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