BOOKMARKS library.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan
Sources on Afghanistan
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11
www.comw.org/warreport Documents and articles
SECTION SPONSORED BY ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, RUSSIA
on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan DISTRIBUTED WITH THE DAILY TELEGRAPH TUESDAY_DECEMBER 22_2009 History
Afghanistan What was it that made the Soviets
decide that they should intervene?
The trap snapped shut
30 years ago
This year’s calendar contains dreds of documents and inter- um-range missiles in Europe
two memorable dates for viewing people who were direct- that would be aimed at the East.
Russia’s Afghan veterans. ly or indirectly involved in those Losing political infl uence in Af-
February 15, 2009, was widely events 30 years ago, I came to the ghanistan meant, from Ustinov’s
celebrated as the 20th conclusion that the fateful deci- perspective, that such missiles
anniversary of the day Soviet sion, which was documented in would inevitably appear close to
troops pulled out of Afghanistan. a secret hand-written resolution the Soviet southern border, vast-
On December 27, veterans will of the Politburo on December ly shifting the existing balance
mark the 30th anniversary of the 12, 1979, was compelled by a of power.
Soviet invasion. combination of circumstances. Admittedly, the defence minis- ALEXANDER LYSKIN_RIA NOVOSTI
The ageing Soviet leader, Leonid ter was also eager to combat-test The invasion of Afghanistan: Soviet soldiers on the move
VLADIMIR SNEGIRYOV
Brezhnev, was deeply disturbed the enormous Soviet arsenals
SPECIAL FOR RUSSIA NOW by the murder of the 66-year-old built over the years of the arms
Nur Muhammad Taraki, presi- race. continue to expand their cor- their previous experience of ashamed of taking part in the
On that day in 1979, KGB and dent of Afghanistan, who was Yuriy Andropov, head of the rupting infl uence northwards to suppressing Eastern Europe – war, which is receding quickly
military intelligence spetsnaz killed at the order of Hafi zullah KGB, was affected by the heav- the Muslim republics of the So- Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslo- from modern sight, and they
(special forces) assaulted and se- Amin. Given that the Afghan ily biased intelligence coming viet Union. vakia in 1968 – where opposition come to these traditional gath-
cured all the key government government was overthrown from his agents in Kabul indi- Finally, the Soviet decision- was quickly and almost blood- erings wearing their decora-
buildings in Kabul, killed Hafi - just months after Brezhnev wel- cating that the Afghan armed makers associated with the Af- lessly removed by several large tions and awards, happy and
zullah Amin, the second presi- comed the Afghan president in forces were unable to cope with ghan invasion had a common tank units. But Afghanistan excited.
dent of Afghanistan, and in- Moscow and promised his sup- the threat of Islamist extremism. phobia as the Cold War reached proved to be far beyond any They did their duty protecting
stalled the KGB-approved Ba- port and protection, the general By that time, the Mujahideen its peak and both blocs were comparisons with Europe. the interests of their homeland.
brak Karmal in his place. secretary took the murder as a had attacked government forces consumed by mutual fears. All the main fi gures of that epic For some years, they have been
That day is often regarded as the personal affront and an open from multiple locations, and Who would fi nally outplay the drama are long gone. And those inviting war veterans from the
fatal point, from which the challenge that begged for a re- Amin as well as Taraki before other? Whose nerves would who had to fight and sort out United States and other West-
countdown began for the fate of sponse. him implored the Kremlin to prove to be stronger? Ultimate- the mess for 10 years – soldiers, ern countries to join them. I
the Soviet Union. It is common- Marshal Dmitri Ustinov, the So- provide full-scale military sup- ly, Moscow faltered under the officers and generals – meet think it is a good idea. Lan-
ly believed that the armed inva- viet defence minister, was con- port, lest Kabul be taken over by pressure and was lured into a twice a year, on February 15 and guage barriers disappear as
sion of Afghanistan, followed by cerned by a US announcement bearded fanatics. trap with no exit. December 27, to remember their they communicate in the com-
a decade of fierce fighting be- that same autumn that the Unit- They argued that Islamic guer- Curiously, the Soviet leadership fallen comrades in arms and mon language of the soldier and
tween the “limited contingent” ed States would station medi- rillas would not stop, but would was fundamentally misled by past battles. They are not veteran.
-
(as the Soviet forces were dubbed
by the Communist press) and the
Mujahideen, dealt a crushing
blow both to the reputation and
economy of the Soviet Union,
Archives reveal strategy switch on Afghanistan
driving the existing cracks deep-
er into the system, before the From the transcript of the troops, the situation in your the role of persuading the other the Democratic Republic of Af- ation to move in a more than
USSR collapsed together with March 19, 1979, meeting of country, far from improving, Politburo members to vote in ghanistan at 3pm Moscow time. 50,000-strong force was light-
the Communist regime. the Politburo of the Central would become more complicat- favour of an invasion.” American and Nato observers ing swift, and involved practi-
An unbiased analysis, however, Committee of the Communist ed. It is obvious that our troops would later note that the oper- cally no casualties.
-
requires consideration of anoth- Party of the Soviet Union KGB would have to fi ght not only the Special File. Top secret.
er view with which an increas- chairman Yuri Andropov external aggressor, but part of Resolution of the CC CPSU
ing number of Russians tend to “I believe that we can only bol- your people. And the people do №176/125 of December 12,
agree, particularly in the context ster the revolution in Afghani- not forgive such things.” 1979
of continued coalition efforts to stan with our bayonets, which The situation in “A” (Afghani-
curb the Taliban insurgents in is not an option for us. We can- Ambassador extraordinary and stan – RN)
Afghanistan. The Soviet mili- not run such a risk.” plenipotentiary Dmitri Ryurikov 1. To approve the considera-
tary presence beyond the Pyanj Foreign minister Andrei Gromyko: (President Yeltsin’s aide in the tions and measures set forth by
and Amu Darya in the Eighties “Our army will become an ag- Nineties) comrades Andropov, Ustinov,
checked the spread of religious gressor if it goes into Afghani- “It is still a mystery why the Po- and Gromyko. To allow them to
extremism and prevented this stan.” litburo made such an about- make corrections of a non-fun-
large region from slipping into Defence minister Dmitry Ustinov: face in its policy by deciding to damental character in the
unrestrained anarchy. The Tali- “Like the other comrades, I do introduce a fairly large military course of these activities. The is-
ban of today, in fact, has its roots not support the idea of intro- force. Throughout 1979, Soviet sues that require a decision of
in the radical Mujahideen move- ducing troops into Afghani- leaders repeatedly discussed the CC to be submitted to the
ment, which fought the Red stan.” the issue and invariably came Politburo in a timely manner.
Army in the Eighties. General secretary Leonid Brezh- to the unanimous conclusion Comrades Andropov, Ustinov
Whichever is closer to the truth, nev: “I think the Politburo mem- that a military solution was not and Gromyko are to be respon-
the obscure history of the Sovi- bers are right in saying that it practicable. The foreign minis- sible for implementing all these
et-Afghan confl ict still holds un- does not behoove us to be try was against the introduc- measures.
resolved questions. One of the dragged into this war.” tion of troops, and so were the 2. Comrades Andropov, Usti-
most intriguing mysteries con- council of ministers and the de- nov and Gromyko shall inform
cerns the motivation behind the Prime minister Alexei Kosygin fence ministry. And then things the members of the CC Polit-
Soviet government’s decision to (from a conversation with were miraculously reversed. buro on the progress in imple-
launch the invasion. Historians Afghan head of state Nur “I remember well that, in the menting the measures
still do not understand why the Muhammad Taraki, March 20, summer of 1979, reports began planned.
Kremlin bosses, who had unan- 1979) coming in from all sides that the CC Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
imously objected to an open in- “I would like to stress again Americans could deploy their
tervention against a neighbour- that we have examined the op- missiles in Afghanistan if the At midday on December 25,
ing state in the summer of 1979, tion of introducing troops from government were defeated in 1979, Russian troops received a This is the hand-written, top-secret document, of which a single copy
suddenly changed their minds every angle, we have carefully the civil war there. One had to directive from defence minister was produced, that formed the basis for all the directives ordering
several months later. After I had studied every aspect of this ac- react to this information. How- Dmitry Ustinov ordering the the Soviet invasion. The weasel word “measures” refers to the intro-
spent many years trying to fi nd tion and have come to the con- ever, it is still unknown which 40th army and the air force to duction of forces, as well as the violent liquidation of Hafizullah Amin
the answer by scrutinising hun- clusion that if we introduced of the Soviet leaders undertook start crossing the border with and the capture of all strategic facilities in Kabul.
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