Thursday 12 April 2012 at 16:00 - 17:30 THEORY


BOURDIEU, CRITIQUE AND PROBLEM-SOLVING Desan, M.


What's 'Critical' about 'Critical Sociology': Bourdieu, Historicism, and Economism


Pierre Bourdieu's sociology is often called a 'critical sociology.' But of what precisely does this critique consist? I contend that Bourdieu in fact employs multiple modes of critique, depending on his particular object. In his cultural sociology, for example, Bourdieu writes within a Bachelardian epistemological framework according to which theory is inherently critical


in that it seeks to theoretically construct the mechanisms that phenomenal experience


conceals. But in his economic sociology, Bourdieu deploys a historicist problematic whose critical move consists in demonstrating the contingent historical character of a given phenomenon, while still recognizing its phenomenal reality. Although different objects might call for different modes of critique, Bourdieu's ambition to connect his cultural and economic sociologies within a 'general science of the economy of practices' presents difficulties for the critical sociologist. Bourdieu persuasively argues that seemingly disinterested cultural fields dissimulate and reproduce relations of domination, but his reference point for these fields is a surprisingly undertheorized conception of the economic field. Although Bourdieu historicizes the economic field, he nonetheless checks his epistemological suspicion at the door of the economy, where everything supposedly takes place on the surface. While some critics (Rancière, Boltanski) have taken Bourdieu to task precisely for his dependence on Bachelard, I argue that Bourdieu in fact abandons this critical epistemology at a key juncture in his theoretical system. I argue that Bourdieusian sociology would benefit from a rapprochement with Althusserian Marxism, whose project it was to develop the Bachelardian reading of the economy that Bourdieu seems to lack.


Susen, S. City University London


Towards a Dialogue Between Pierre Bourdieu's 'Critical Sociology' and Luc Boltanski's 'Pragmatic Sociology of Critique'


This paper examines the controversial relationship between Pierre Bourdieu's 'critical sociology' and Luc


Boltanski's 'pragmatic sociology of critique'. The works of these two scholars have gained increasing recognition in various academic fields, and their


contributions to social science have been discussed by numerous


commentators. It is striking, however, that the main points of convergence and divergence between Bourdieu and Boltanski have rarely been studied in a systematic fashion. In the literature on contemporary debates in French sociology, most commentators focus on the profound intellectual differences between Bourdieu and Boltanski, rather than on the similarities between their research programmes. As a consequence, it appears almost inconceivable to reconcile, let alone to integrate, their approaches. The main purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic account of the main differences and similarities between Bourdieu's 'critical sociology' and Boltanski's 'pragmatic sociology of critique', thereby demonstrating that they share a number of theoretical presuppositions and, more importantly, that they converge on several normative issues, particularly with regard to their critique of social domination and their interest in the social conditions underlying processes of human emancipation. By way of conclusion, the paper argues that important theoretical insights can be gleaned from cross-fertilizing Bourdieu's 'critical sociology' and Boltanski's 'pragmatic sociology of critique'.


Cruickshank, J. Abstraction, Problems and Theory: A Critique of Rorty


Rorty argues that theoretical abstraction in the social sciences and humanities is based on the problem of trying to 'represent' reality. This is held to be a pseudo-problem by Rorty who argues that all putative knowledge is so heavily mediated by concepts that there can be no criterion to establish representation. He also argues that theory can mislead intellectuals into thinking that reality and justice can be held together in a single vision, with theory seeking reductively to explain and overcome injustice within one doctrine. Rorty produces two alternatives to this, which are an argument that we ought to celebrate individual agents' creative capacity to rework their identities, and an argument about social problems being solved by a critical dialogue between different parties. It will be argued that Rorty is correct to criticise some forms of theory for seeking such a single vision and correct to regard reformism in terms of problem-solving whereby concepts are developed as attempted solutions to practical problems rather than 'representations'. However, it will also be argued that Rorty was incorrect to reject theory per se, because a nominalist approach to theory, as developed by critical rationalists, avoids the problems Rorty takes to be intrinsic to theory. Further, it will be argued that such a nominalist approach is needed to support the argument about problem-solving reformism and that the argument about agential creativity is in error because it detaches creativity from any meaningful notion of real shared problems.


233 University of Birmingham ROGER STEVENS 05 University of Michigan


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