we protect your digital worlds Exposing Stuxnet


In his presentation at the Infosecurity Europe 2011 event, David Harley, security author and senior research fellow with ESET, will be analysing the threat that the now- infamous Stuxnet malware poses to the critical national infrastructure.


In what promises to be an entertaining and incisive presentation, David will give the audience his thoughts, as a highly experienced veteran of the IT security industry - and the IT arena in general - of what Stuxnet is, and why its development matters.


But not in the way you might think.


SCADA - Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition - systems are often robust Windows-based platforms that control electro-mechanical infrastructures ranging from local electricity grids, all the way to critical elements of regional/national telecommunications systems and, of course, nuclear facilities.


But whilst a robust - and usually embedded - operating system is running on a similarly robust


hardware platform, the electro mechanical systems that a SCADA system ultimately controls can vary immensely.


This means that, whilst the operating system is predictable, the software that is executing on the computer system is likely to be quite diff erent for each SCADA platform, except where a country-based entity has coordinated the development of the software, as would be the case with a national energy grid.


Since the SCADA operating system is embedded, a worm like Stuxnet will not always be portable between diff erent SCADA systems.


In fact, as David will explain, Stuxnet was almost certainly coded by a `tiger team’ including experienced programmers with advanced knowledge of the targeted applications platform, and exploited a set of attack vectors that are quite specifi c to the target.


Does this mean we should be worried about whether clever


hackers can modify Stuxnet for use as an attack vehicle against SCADA- based systems in countries other than Iran?


You’ll have to attend David’s presentation to discover the complete answer to this question, but he will make the point that Stuxnet is not quite the security game changer that some experts have opined.


It was, he says, a very sophisticated amalgam of attack techniques, probably coordinated by a team of IT attack professionals assembled specifi cally for the task at hand.


While decompiled code for Stuxnet is in circulation, David says that hackers will need much more than source code or reverse engineering skills in order to apply similar techniques to other SCADA systems.


Stuxnet, he will say, displays notable complexity and sophistication that taps into an unusually wider range of zero-day attack methodologies and is signed with stolen digital certifi cates.


David Harley CITP FBCS CISSP is Senior Research Fellow at security company ESET LLC. He is also Chief Operations Offi cer at AVIEN (Anti-Virus Information Exchange Network: a coalition of security vendors and their customers), and a Director of AMTSO (the Anti-Malware Testing Standards Organization). He is a prolifi c blogger and author of security-focused conference papers and articles. His books include “Viruses Revealed” (Osborne/McGraw-Hill) and the “AVIEN Malware Defense Guide” (Syngress).


ESET develops software solutions that deliver instant, comprehensive protection against evolving computer security threats. We pioneered and continue to lead the industry in proactive threat detection.


www.eset.co.uk


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