T e Physics of “I am a Strange Loop”, Dr. Wolfgang Baer <baer@nps.edu> T e physics required to implement Douglas Hofsteader suggestion that “I am a Strange Loop” is can be derived


by assuming a self-measurement-explanation cycle exists as a physical event in which mental sensations are processed into explanations that are then measured to produce expectations of those sensations. T e physics needed to realize such transformation cycles were investigated in the April 2010 issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies. An explicit implementation of the consciousness process will be presented at the Non-Duality Conference. T is imple- mentation consists of an integrated mind-body activity that explains mental experiences with a model of the activity itself. Such a self-referential loop is shown to be both a fundamental physical process and a container of primitive self-awareness from which complex experiences can be built. Explaining consciousness requires an expansion of current physical theories. To develop this expansion I will fi rst associate the components of the consciousness process with individual operations occurring in the architecture of quantum theory. T is will provide explicit mathematical equations required to describe conscious phenomena and show their limits. Because quantum equations apply to the content of space, but not to the sensation of space itself, they can only represent an approximate description of the consciousness process and are hence incomplete. I will, therefore, go on to discuss the approximations which limit quantum theory from providing a complete explanation of consciousness and suggest the metaphysical underpinnings required to expand quantum physics into a more complete description of reality. Lastly, I will discuss the implications of a reality model in which all parts of the universe, including the reader, are fundamentally self-measurement processes and the sensation of space is not that of an a priori container, but rather a “what it feels like” to be a time-stable event.


 C7. Connecting the Dots


Multiplicity as A T eory Of Mind, Dr. Stephen Trichter <stephentrichter@gmail.com> (Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California) As we explore non-dual space, it is imperative that we consider not only multiple ways of knowing, but the pos-


sibility of multiplicity as a theory of mind. As contemporary psychoanalysis theorizes the spectrum of experiences as a result of the tension between associative and dissociative states, we can consider how the mind may need to create not only duality, but multiple dissociative states of consciousness in order to survive in health. T is presentation will explore this theory of mind and suggest ways to utilize psychoanalysis and mystical states of consciousness to bridge our multiple minds.


Nonduality And Neuropsychiatric Illness, Dr. Nathan Munn <munnn@umhelena.edu> (University of Montana – Helena) Neuropsychiatric illnesses such as schizophrenia, major depression, bipolar mood disorder, anxiety, and bor- derline personality disorder are fraught with dualism, conceptualized as either a biochemical brain imbalances or psychological disorders. Yet a vast body of evidence indicates the reality of neuropsychiatric illness is nonduality. Re-conceptualizing such illnesses within nondualistic scientifi c paradigms not only sheds new light on the balance between pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy treatments in neuropsychiatric illness, but has deep implications extending into information processing vs. meaning making, the nature of Self and suicide, parameters of free-will, and the stigma-reducing realization of the inter-connectedness between us all and the fundamental unity between consciousness and matter/energy.


Is “Pre-Refl ective Self Consciousness” a Solution for the Problem of T e Self?, Jorge De Almeida Gonçalves <jorgalvesenator@gmail.com> (Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas/ UNL) In this paper I will present an objection to the solution to the problem of the self proposed by Zahavi. T is objec-


tion is based on developmental psychology of the human individual. I phenomenally appear to myself as an entity that remains in time and diff erentiates itself from other selves. T e existence of such an entity has been questioned by several philosophers. Recently Metzinger denies the existence of the self: “the conscious self is the illusion which is no one’s illusion”, “no such things as selves exist in the world” Zahavi proposes a solution for the problem of the self. He distinguishes the notion of narrative self from the notion of core or minimal self. His idea is that phenomenal consciousness and the “what is it like” character of experience always presupposes a prerefl ective selfconsciousness. If this is true then any creature that has phenomenal consciousness will have to have that prerefl ective selfconscious- ness. T e same will be true for the human being in his early stages of life. Now, I believe that the scenery according to which babies begin their lives without any sensation of being subjects but still having psychological experiences


OCTOBER 20–24, 2010 | SCIENCE AND NONDUALITY CONFERENCE 2010 51


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