INTRODUCTION 11
ment of market-oriented RPOs in social activities is often driven by external pressures from administrative agencies of the state, foreign donors, non- governmental organizations (NGOs), or interest groups in a community (Chirwa et al. 2005; Bernard, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2010).
With open-membership policies, such a broad portfolio of activities may entail other costs as well. As a marketing-oriented RPO expands its activity portfolio, it attracts new members with different levels of interest in its various activities. Expansion thus increases both the size of the RPO and the heterogeneity of membership’s interests, raising coordination costs in the organization. Importantly, although these additional members raise coordi- nation costs, they are likely to contribute less than the original members (or not at all) to product aggregation and hence to lowering transaction costs. Eventually, this rise in coordination and management costs may negatively affect returns for the initial members, who are primarily interested in the commercialization services offered by the organization, and discourage them from further participation.
The salience of increased coordination costs depends on the type of decisionmaking rule in the RPO. Where consensus of all members is neces- sary (participatory decisionmaking), reaching a decision in large and hetero- geneous groups may be very costly. In such cases, concentrating the power to make decisions in a restricted number of informed individuals may help reduce coordination and management costs, provided these individuals’ decisions are respected by other members (see, for example, Tendler 1983; Bianchi 2002; Bernard, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2010). Some studies argue, however, that participatory governance is a valuable means of enhancing the sustainability and effectiveness of the organization by facilitating decisions adapted to local conditions and customs (for example, Attwood and Baviskar 1987). Particularly for an RPO engaged in the provision of public goods, this form of governance can result in outcomes that are more desirable to a larger share of members (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001). The overall picture is that of a trade-off model. A market-oriented RPO is likely to exhibit only two of the following three attributes: (1) inclusive membership; (2) participatory governance; and (3) marketing performance.
Data and Methods
The present study focuses on the recent (re)development of cooperatives in Ethiopia. Data are drawn from two main sources: (1) a nationally represen- tative survey of smallholder commercialization conducted in 2005 and (2) a relatively large survey of smallholder cooperatives conducted in 2006. The 2005 Ethiopian Smallholders Commercialization Survey (ESCS 2005) was jointly designed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI),
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84 |
Page 85 |
Page 86 |
Page 87 |
Page 88 |
Page 89 |
Page 90 |
Page 91 |
Page 92 |
Page 93 |
Page 94 |
Page 95 |
Page 96 |
Page 97 |
Page 98 |
Page 99 |
Page 100 |
Page 101 |
Page 102 |
Page 103