Somehow, the Argentine patrol vessel managed to limp back to the mainland. Her captain and seven others members of the crew had been killed. The bridge had been badly damaged and her compass, radio and all her other navigational aids had been wrecked. All this destruction, writes Robert Mitchell, had been caused by just two Royal Navy helicopters.


n the first few days of May 1982, the war in the South Atlantic reached a critical stage. The Argentine naval forces, considered a significant threat up to the beginning of that month, were about to suffer a heavy blow.


I


The Argentine military junta had begun to reinforce the islands in late April when it was realized that a British Task Force was heading south. As part of these movements, the Argentine fleet was ordered to take positions


around the islands. But the Argentine navy had only two major surface units, the light cruiser ARA General Belgrano and the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo.1


Having been the flagship of the original task force that invaded the Falkland Islands, it was the Veinticinco de Mayo which found itself the principal target of the British SSN (Ship Submersible Nuclear) vessels deployed to the South Atlantic. On Saturday, 1 May 1982, the Veinticinco de Mayo had been positioned


north of the Falkland Islands, part of three groups of the Argentinean Navy’s Task Force 79; one of the others, led by the ARA General Belgrano, was in the waters to the south of the islands.


Through the night and into the early hours of 2 May, preparations were being made for a strike to be made against the British ships which had been located some two hundred or so nautical miles to the south-east. As dawn approached, the six Douglas A-4 Skyhawks tasked for the


By the renowned aviation artist Daniel Bechennec, this painting shows HMS Glasgow’s Westland Lynx, XZ247 crewed by Lieutenant Commander J.A. Lister RN and Lieutenant R.J. Ormshaw RN, engaging the ARA Alférez Sobral with their Sea Skua missiles, 3 May 1982. This Lynx is carrying the type’s normal complement of four Sea Skua missiles, though photographs taken during the conflict often show just two being carried – some accounts state that this became normal practice inside the Total Exclusion Zone in an effort to increase a helicopter’s operational range. Both Lister and Ormshaw, along with the crew of Coventry’s Lynx, were Mentioned in Despatches for their actions during the Falklands War. (Courtesy of Daniel Bechennec; www.danielbechennec.com)


MAIN PICTURE:


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72  |  Page 73  |  Page 74  |  Page 75  |  Page 76  |  Page 77  |  Page 78  |  Page 79  |  Page 80  |  Page 81  |  Page 82  |  Page 83  |  Page 84  |  Page 85  |  Page 86  |  Page 87  |  Page 88  |  Page 89  |  Page 90  |  Page 91  |  Page 92  |  Page 93  |  Page 94  |  Page 95  |  Page 96  |  Page 97  |  Page 98  |  Page 99  |  Page 100  |  Page 101  |  Page 102  |  Page 103  |  Page 104  |  Page 105  |  Page 106  |  Page 107  |  Page 108  |  Page 109  |  Page 110  |  Page 111  |  Page 112