In response to that Christmas Day attack, and the growing voices opposing current screening practices, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), called and hosted an Aviation Security Summit, less than three weeks after the event, at its offices in Geneva. The summit was attended by over a dozen airline Chief Executive Officers, the Secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Head of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Together they discussed an approach to change, producing five recommendations for the strategic future of aviation security. One of those was the urgent need to develop a new approach to passenger screening – a “Checkpoint of the Future”. 2010 therefore started with those four words written on a piece of paper, with no more detail, but a mandate to fundamentally review the way airport security was conducted and to develop a new, smarter system. It soon became clear there
“…the Checkpoint of the Future would not only look for bad objects, but also bad people…”
were a number of challenges to any fundamental shift, but also great opportunities presented by a ‘clean sheet’. IATA and a handful of thought leaders in aviation security therefore diligently set about developing a concept for how security could be done better in the future. Their aim was to achieve nothing short of a step change in outcome. What quickly emerged was a
realisation that the checkpoint today is characterised by two fundamentals. Firstly it is focused on the detection of bad (or prohibited) items and secondly it is uniformly the same procedure for every passenger, on every flight, at every airport (a one-size-fits-all approach). Both points meant it was entirely predictable and the balance
of time and effort was spent screening equally those who seek us harm and the vast majority of travellers who pose no risk to civil aviation. A new approach was therefore developed so that the Checkpoint of the Future would not only look for bad objects, but also bad people and that passengers would therefore be screened differently according to this identification, moving the checkpoint from one-size- fits-all security to ‘risk-based security’. Resources could therefore be targeted on high-risk passengers and the experience improved for the vast majority of low- risk passengers. Further study that year developed the concept of three risk categories – elevated-risk passengers for those where there is due cause for concern, known travellers who have voluntarily provided information about themselves enabling a risk assessment to be conducted prior to arrival at the airport and regular passengers who fall into neither category.
But what would this new checkpoint look like and how would passengers interact with it? A future screening
Jun 2011
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February 2013 Aviationsecurityinternational
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