RADIOLOGICAL THREATS
Border check of a vehicle’s trunk for radiation on the Austro-Hungarian border, Nickelsdorf, Austria conducted during IAEA, WCO and Interpol training course for customs and police investigators from Eastern Europe to combat nuclear trafficking. IAEA
O
f all the many paradoxes that exist in today’s multi-faceted threat environment, the absence of terrorist
attacks involving a radiological dispersal device (RDD) is one of the most puzzling. On the surface, this is one area in the spectrum of CBRN threats where the gap between intent and capability should surely have been bridged. If many analysts are to be believed, history should be replete with examples of RDD attacks by now. To date they have been wrong. The predictions of numerous attacks have all proven incorrect. But is this absence likely to continue? The trans-national terrorist group Al-Qaeda has made public statements of its intent to gain access to radiological and nuclear weapons for a long time. Osama Bin Laden is on record as having said it was an ‘obligation’ for Muslims to have access to all forms of CBRN weapons. So far however that statement of intent has not turned into an attack. So why have we not seen at least the use of a RDD in a terrorist attack?
Is smuggling increasing? To build a RDD it is obviously important to have access to an appropriate source of nuclear material that is suited for that form of attack. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna continues to record incidences of attempts to smuggle nuclear material, there is little published evidence that this is on the increase. If anything the reports are slowly
decreasing, although this analysis can be misleading as sometimes there is a time-lag in the reporting cycles of up to three years. A superficial analysis of the Agency’s own analysis would suggest that a peak occurred in 2006 which was coincident, for example, with a peak of insurgent activity in Iraq. Maybe the international market in stolen nuclear material had peaked as the insurgency was at its height in Iraq. The truth is that the apparent peak in
the figures in 2006 was due to a change in the reporting procedures instigated by the IAEA. The graph published by the IAEA does show that the numbers of incidences reported to the Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) declined markedly after an initial peak in 1994 which was obviously linked to the end of the Cold War and the speed with which the Soviet Union disintegrated. Once that initial peak reduced, a steady
drumbeat of reports averaging around 15 a year related to unauthorised possession emerged. Apart from a small increase in 2004, 2005 and 2006 the pattern has been quite consistent with little variation to suggest a causal link with other major world events. Ironically, the lowest figure was recorded in 2001. In the latest analysis published by the IAEA, in 2011 147 incidents were added to their ITDB, taking the total number recorded to 2,164 in the period 1993-2011. This is an average of 120 a year over the period. The reports originate from 113 states which participate in the ITDB programme. Of the total of those 2,164 incidents, 588 involved the theft or loss of nuclear or radiological material.
Of the 147 reported incidents, 20 involved possession and related criminal incident. A further 31 involved loss or theft and 96 were labelled as being ‘involved in other unauthorised activities.’ In the total, four incidences involved attempts to smuggle highly enriched uranium (HEU) of which one was an attempted sale.
Less is more? This analysis suggests that low levels of nuclear material are still emerging from a number of locations and reaching criminal organisations who seek to market larger quantities on the basis of relatively small sample sizes. The most extreme example of this occurred in 1994. Czech police seized 2.7 kg of Russian-originated
HEU. When interviewed, the smugglers claimed to be able to deliver an additional 40 kg of HEU in short order - followed by a regular supply of 5 kg a month for the next year. This would be more than enough for a state or non- state actor to get seriously involved in a nuclear programme. This example was only surpassed by an incident in Chelyabinsk, where a systematic effort to remove 18.5 kg of HEU by a group of people was thwarted at the last minute. More frequently the amounts of material
being smuggled are quite small in comparison with what would be needed to create a nuclear device. As far as an RDD is concerned, however, smaller amounts are quite sufficient to create the kind of impact terrorists desire. In the last decade numerous reports have emerged of operations conducted by police forces across Europe that have seen arrests of people carrying a few hundred grams of HEU – albeit often enriched to very high levels - around 89%. These are thought to be samples that are touted to potential buyers. In one well documented incident in 2009, Ukrainian security officials intercepted a businessman carrying 3kg of americium. He apparently had thought it was plutonium. Paradoxically, americium is arguably more effective in developing an RDD.
Hard to get So one possible explanation of the lack of use of an RDD by terrorists is that they have yet to be able to get hold of the material in the quantities they need. Although it is widely acknowledged that some relatively simple sources, such as cesium-137 used in medical applications, are quite vulnerable to being stolen. Chechen separatists are the only organisation to have planted an RDD to date, in Ismailovsky Square in Moscow in December 1995. That was based on a very simple cesium-137 source. If Chechen separatists
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