BIO-TERRORISM


realistically be feared as a potential weapon of bioterrorism. Should pathogenicity be increased by enhanced person-to-person transmission, and simultaneously, a protective vaccine developed, but only controlled by bioterrorists, a fearsome biological weapon could be produced. However, another fact to consider is that, simply because a genetically manipulated influenza virus can be readily transmitted in ferrets, the preferred animal model to study human influenza virus susceptibility does not mean that it will be readily transmitted among humans. For example, the 2009 H1N1 influenza virus was found to cause severe infections in some studies that used ferrets, but the virus subsequently caused mild illness in humans. The ‘incontrovertible proof’ experiment


(Paul Keim and Michael Osterholm), and Bruce Alberts (the Editor-in-Chief of the journal Science) at the American Society for Microbiology Biodefense Conference in Washington, DC in February, 2012. By the end of March 2012, both laboratories had resubmitted their papers to the NSABB for reconsideration for publication.


The NSABB’s decision After two days of deliberation, the Kawaoka manuscript was unanimously accepted for publication, and the Foucier manuscript was accepted by a Board vote of 12 to 6. The NSABB used analytical evaluation tools that it had developed for considering the risks and benefits associated with the communication of dual-use research of concern, available for


most certainly will, perhaps their experiences from handling this H5N1 research publication controversy will help them to be better prepared for the next such dispute. It can be hoped that a path may be found that enables a more streamlined and harmonious process for all concerned, and to achieve agreement with each other’s Board findings.


International guidelines At the minimum, the controversy about the publication of the Foucier and Kawaoka papers has engendered a great deal of media attention. This has not surprisingly resulted in both the Dutch and US governments calling for a closer examination of all the facets of such influenza virus research. Cooler heads in both government and science are calling for


(left) Colourised transmission


electron micrograph of avian influenza A H5N1 viruses. Cynthia Goldsmith; Jacqueline Katz; Sherif R. Zaki, CDC. Negative-stained transmission


electron micrograph (TEM) depicts the ultrastructural details of an influenza virus particle, or ‘virion’. Cynthia Goldsmith


of observing an influenza virus readily transmitted from person-to-person can never be conducted by researchers, and therefore only occurs in nature.


Dual use? It has been argued by some that the NSABB has few virologists among its membership, and hence may have reached an incomplete understanding of the issues surrounding the H5N1 controversy, unlike the WHO board, containing influenza researchers. According to the NIH, the Foucier and Kawaoka studies were dual-use studies, as they contained “biological research with legitimate scientific purpose, the results of which may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public health and/or national security”, and they were “of concern” as experiments that could lead to bioterrorism. Also, according to the NSABB logic, it


was appropriate for the Board to decide the publication fate of this research. An interesting twist to this story is that Foucier’s research in the Netherlands was funded by the US government, and therefore the NSABB appears to be able to exert control over the suitability of this laboratory’s published research. Considerable communication ensued


between both research groups and the NSABB. This included a public debate held between Foucier and two prominent NSABB members


examination at www.biosecurityboard.gov. The Board based its revised decision on the


facts that: >> The data in the revised manuscripts do not appear to provide information that would immediately enable misuse of the research in ways that would endanger the public health or national security. >> New evidence has emerged that underscores the fact that understanding specific mutations may improve international surveillance and public health and safety. Global cooperation, critical for pandemic influenza preparedness efforts, is predicated upon the free sharing of information and was a fundamental principle in evaluating these manuscripts. What will be the overall effect of this


controversy on further influenza research? Will future influenza virus research be hampered by either the unwillingness of science grant- funding agencies to finance such research, or the hesitancy of researchers to ‘make waves’ and not perform similar research, or to not publish any findings that could be construed as ‘dual use’ by the NSABB? Many opine that such a ‘chilling effect’


would be a tragedy for the future of influenza virus research and also for public health infectious disease prevention measures. If the learned NSABB and WHO committee members do face such future decisions, as they


28 | CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL & NUCLEAR WARFARE | 2012/02


the convening of an international meeting to reach a valid scientific consensus and provide more thorough guidance to researchers and governments worldwide. The remembrances from the 1975 Asilomar


Conference on Recombinant DNA that was convened to discuss the potential biological hazards and regulation of biotechnology demonstrate what is possible. At that time, a group of about 140 scientists, attorneys, and physicians participated in the Conference to draw up voluntary guidelines to ensure recombinant DNA research could be conducted in a safe and transparent manner. Scientists voluntarily halted recombinant DNA research until comprehensive guidelines were established by the Conference attendees. It will be up to today’s leading biomedical researchers and public health scientists to decide if the existing review Boards’ guidance for influenza and other ‘dual-use’ pathogen research is sufficient, or a more inclusive international approach for conducting and reviewing such work is now called for.


COL (retd) Dr Z F Dembek is a biochemist and infectious disease epidemiologist with a PhD and Master of Public Health degree from the University of Connecticut, and a Master of Science (Biomedical Science) from Hood College.


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