OLYMPICS RESPONSE
Exchange). The attack could follow certain modern
patterns such as: a single terrorist with an IED/suicide attack; lone wolf (following the example of the Toulouse gunman Mohamed Merah); a group of al Qaeda-inspired terrorists; a multiple conventional terrorist attacks in a single city similar to Mumbai 2008; a multiple conventional terrorist attack in more than one city; a CBRE attack in an urban/ megapolis environment; a cyber-attack against financial/transportation/state infrastructure; a combination of CBRE and cyber-attack; or a combination of conventional and cyber-attack.
CBRNE response planning After a conventional or CBRE attack in a populated area of the city, it is generally estimated that approximately 20% of those involved will stay in place because they will be either dead, or severely wounded or contaminated or both. The remaining 80% will flee in all possible directions. If they are
not wounded or contaminated they will rush to their houses by all means of transportation or on foot. If they are slightly contaminated or wounded they will seek medical attention and will overwhelm ALL hospitals and clinics in the city. In the same period large numbers of the ‘worried well’ will overwhelm medical frontline services. This human behaviour should be the core
in the anthropocentric - Greek: anthropos (man) + kentro (centre) planning of a CBRN state response. All proposals should answer a simple question: “What would be MY reaction in case I am involved in a CBRN terrorist incident?” A second prerequisite should be that CBRN planners should have personal hands-on experience before they attempt to guide others on how to respond in similar events. A third one should be that all drills conducted in the preparation phase should be as realistic as possible because “if you cannot do it properly during an exercise you will not be able to do it right when the real event will happen!”
AT THE HOSPITAL Each and every NHS hospital in London should have the following in order to be able to manage mass CBRNE casualties in the most effective and successful way:
>> Hard fence around the hospital in order to control incoming frustrated/contaminated crowds
>> Secure entrances and windows on ground level; the fence is just a barrier not the ultimate solution
>> Co-operation plan with police authorities in PPE for deployment around the perimeter of the hospital >> CBRNE emergency response plan including a
restoration/aftermath chapter
>> EMS CBRNE Responding Unit in 24-hr shifts – at least during the Olympiad
>> Fixed or deployed decontamination areas ready – at least during the Olympiad
>> Pharmaceutical and antidote stockpile ready >> Morgue facilities ready or according to national response plan directives
>> Exercise/drills within the hospital, with other hospitals or with other response agencies during day and night conditions.
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL & NUCLEAR WARFARE | 2012/02 | 19
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