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Health & Safety


Reducing the risk of human error through automation


Start-up, shutdown and transition actions are often the most dangerous periods of operation in the process industries. Ian Curtis argues that companies could consider reducing the potential for human error by employing automated control through safety permissive sequencing at such times of high risk.


Las actividades de inicio, cierre y transición suelen ser los periodos de más riesgo de explotación en los sectores de procesamiento. Ian Curtis argumenta que las empresas pueden pensar en reducir las posibilidades de errores humanos empleando sistemas de control automatizados a través de la secuenciación permisiva de seguridad en estos periodos de alto riesgo.


Anlauf-, Abschalt- und Umschaltvorgänge sind häufig die gefährlichsten Zeiträume in der Prozessindustrie. Ian Curtis führt an, dass Firmen das Potenzial für menschliches Fehlverhalten reduzieren könnten, indem sie eine automatische Kontrolle zur Sicherheit gewährenden Abfolge in Zeiträumen mit hohem Risiko einführen.


gas, petrochemical, chemical and power industries. Here, compliance with the functional safety standards IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 is the accepted and preferred method of demonstrating that overall risk has been managed in accordance with the legal requirements facing all companies. For continuous processes the


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probability of a hazardous condition occurring is often proportionately greater when the process is in a state of flux such as during start-ups, shutdowns and process transitions.


Safety instrumented systems Te safety instrumented systems associated with these processes are often designed around steady state conditions, but in order to accommodate the non steady state transitions, certain safety instrumented functions need to be bypassed or over-ridden. Tis is where the potential for risk starts to appear. It seems incongruous that, just when it is needed most, the SIS in place is temporarily sidelined and we step away from the intent of the functional safety standards to leave operators to not only deal with the complexities inherent within any process transition, but also perform the SIS function as well. For a continuous process plant such


transitory states are often infrequent and can be of relatively short duration. In such cases it may be that making the safety instrumented system dynamic enough to provide protection at such higher risk occurrences is deemed to be simply not worth the time and expense involved. Te lack of similarity between processes or between the transition state and the steady state may make it too difficult, time-


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he use of Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) is common throughout high hazard process industry sectors, particularly in the oil and


consuming and troublesome to consider and implement an automated SIS solution. In addition, it could be that the operator’s experienced judgment and ability to subjectively assess a complicated situation is seen as essential at such a stage.


“While plant operators commonly perform their role to the highest standards, nonetheless, human error has, after investigation, often been seen to contribute significantly to process safety incidents.”


Ian Curtis, Siemens Industry Automation & Drive Technologies


However, the argument for an alternative view that sees automation technology support the operator during such phases can be seen. It is clear that the operator in question is likely to experience increased stress levels during a plant transition compared to when the


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